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ABSTRACT
Financial incentive is one of the common strategies used to attract healthcare
workers in rural and remote areas. Both high-income and low-income countries
extensively use financial strategy to tackle the disparity distribution of healthcare
workers. However, most studies were conducted in developed countries and assessed
positive incentives programs. Previous studies showed the effectiveness of financial
incentives on recruitment and retention of healthcare workers. Current studies show that
most of the financial incentives supported for education such as scholarships and loan
repayment programs are effective. A few studies assessed the effectiveness of direct
payment incentive programs, especially in low-middle income countries. The evaluated
studies of the effect of financial incentive reduction on the health workers’ decision to
stay or leave their practice location and the relationship between the health providers’ age
and their location choice after the reduction of financial incentive are required also.
This study have three specific aims. First aim is to examine the effectiveness of
direct payment (Hardship Allowance) on retaining dentists in rural and remote areas.
Second aim is to examine the impact of financial incentive reduction, due to the changed
HA areas categorization, on rural and remote healthcare workers. The last one is to
examine the relationship between dentists’ age and dentists’ location choice on financial
incentive reduction, due to the recategorization of Hardship Allowance (HA) areas in
Thailand.
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A retrospective observational study was conducted for answering all three specific
aims. Data used for aim#1 is the resignation data of dentists from 2003 to 2016 and an
annual report on dentist’s location. This data set were obtained from the Human Resource
Management and the Policy and Strategy Bureau, Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) in
Thailand. The fixed effect panel analysis and difference in difference regression was used
to analyze the effectiveness of Hardship Allowance implemented in 2008.
Data used for aim#2 and #3 is the rural and remote dentist's location annual
report, including the relocation and resignation from 2013 to 2018. This data set were
obtained from the Human Resource Management Department and the Policy and Strategy
Bureau at the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) in Thailand. The difference in difference
regression with fixed effect panel analysis was used to analyze the effect of Hardship
Allowance reduction on dentists’ decision to stay or leave their location. The triple
differences regression with random effect estimation was used to analyze the panel data
of dentists’ resignation and relocation by age groups, in changed areas after the policy
implementation.
Data from 2003 to 2016 showed that 2,351 dentists who resigned from the
hospital under the MoPH. Over than 60% of resigned dentists were between 22-28 years
old. The resignation rate from 2003 to 2016 showed that dentists who were located in
rural areas had the highest rate compared with dentists in urban and remote areas. The
highest resignation rate in rural areas in 2004 was at 29.4%. When the Hardship
Allowance policy was implemented in 2008, the resignation rate started decreasing
dramatically in all areas, but especially in rural areas. Additionally, the regression
analysis showed that the resignation rate of dentists in rural areas significantly decreased
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after 2008 at 10.09% (p-value <0.001), while in urban areas after 2008 the resignation
rate decreased at 2.23% (p-value <0.001). Data of 2,384 rural and remote dentists is used
to determine the location choice between the changed and unchanged areas categorization
after the policy implementation in December 2016 which answer the specific aim#2 of
the study. The outcome shows that the resignation of dentists in unchanged and changed
areas is not significantly different. However, the relocation of dentists from rural to urban
in changed areas after the policy implementation is more likely to increase significantly.
Data of 2,384 rural and remote dentists from 2013 to 2018 were used for specific
aim#3 of the study. The percentage of dentists by age groups 22-28, 29-35, 36-45, and
46-60-year-old is 28%, 42%, 23%, and 5.4%, respectively. About 70% of 22-28-yearolds, and 29-35-year-olds are in rural areas, while approximately 60% of the other two
groups are in urban areas. The regression analysis of dentists’ resignation and relocation
on dentists’ age in changed areas after the policy implementation shows that the oldest
group in changed areas is the less likely to resign significantly from their location after
the policy implementation compared with the youngest group.
In conclusion, the study showed that after the policy implementation the
resignation rate of dentists decreased in all areas. When comparing the resignation rate in
rural and urban areas, the resignation rate in rural areas decreased higher than in urban
areas after 2008. Therefore, the Hardship Allowance programs could retain dentists in
rural and remote areas in Thailand. Furthermore, our findings show that the direct
payment reduction does not affect the number of resignations, but the relocation of
dentists. The dentists decide to leave their location after the direct payment HA reduction
policy was implemented. Therefore, the reduction of financial incentives could
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deteriorate the retention of health workers in rural and remote areas. We also found that
dentists’ age is related with the dentists’ decision to leave or stay in rural and remote
areas when the HA was reduced. Although, the policy implementation caused the
reduction of financial incentives, most of the oldest group decided to stay in their practice
location. Besides financial incentive, age is another factor that influences that the
dentists’ decision to leave or stay in rural and remote areas.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Human Resources for Health
The healthcare workforce is one of the most important inputs of a health
system. According to the World Health Organization (WHO) Health System Framework,
the health workforce is one of the six building boxes. These six building boxes are the
basic functions of healthcare system and include service delivery, health workforce,
information, medical product /vaccine /technology, financing, and governance (WHO
report, 2000). Health system goals are improving health and health equity, by ways that
are responsive, financially fair, and efficient (WHO report, 2000). To achieve these goals,
all basic functions in the six building boxes must be implemented effectively.
To achieve the goal of improving population health, the government has to
allocate qualified healthcare workers sufficiently and equally. For healthcare workforce,
governments require qualified people with knowledge, skills, motivation and
responsibility to organize and deliver quality health services. In addition, government is
required to supply and distribute these qualified workers sufficiently and fairly in
response to population health need and equity (WHO, 2007). Evidence showed the
association between health worker density and health outcomes (Chen, 2004). For
example, several studies found that areas with shortages in healthcare workers had high
incidences of mortality, especially in children under five years of age (Chen, 2004;
Hongoro, 2004; Lehmann, 2008; Grobler, 2015).
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Several strategies have been implemented to supply qualified healthcare
workers adequately, especially in rural areas. Many studies showed the effectiveness of
educational strategies, for example the special admission program showed that choosing
rural background students to health professional schools have potential to increase health
workers in rural areas (Wibulpolprasert, 2003; Daniels, 2005; Halass, 2008). In addition,
evidence showed that dentists, who attended in school containing a rural rotation
curriculum, were more likely to practice in rural communities (Woloschuck,
2002; Capstick, 2002; Wilkinson, 2004; Halass, 2008). The Cadetship program in
Australia which has the mandatory service contract for postgraduate training showed that
43% of program participants were practicing in rural areas compared with 20% of nonprogram participants (Dunbabin, 2006).
Evidence of the effectiveness of financial incentive programs for the healthcare
workers is needed. In 2010, WHO suggested four major interventions to address health
worker density issues including: education, regulatory, financial incentives, and
professional and personal support strategies. Among recommended strategies, financial
incentives are commonly used both in developed and developing countries. However,
current evidence is insufficient to clarify the actual effectiveness of the programs
especially in developing countries (Dolea, 2010; Barnighausen and Bloom, 2009;
Grobler, 2015). This study proposed to examine the effectiveness of direct payment
financial incentive to reduce pattern of the dentist resignation from rural and remote areas
in Thailand. We expect to gain valid and reliable evidence to support policy makers
comprehending and developing efficient strategy.
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Disparities in Health Workforce Distribution
Geographic disparities in the distribution of health workforce affects the access
for healthcare service for rural communities. The shortage and inequitable distribution of
healthcare human resources is a global issue (Chen, 2004; WHO, 2010). Many countries
have shortages in healthcare human resources for several reasons, including limited
production capacity, deficient skills healthcare workers and migration of the health
workforce within and across countries (Dolea, 2010). Providing people living in rural
areas with access to a qualified healthcare workforce is a critical public health issue.
Governments of both developed and developing countries have set goals to achieve
health equity and to meet their populations’ health needs particularly for vulnerable and
disadvantaged groups (Dolea, 2010).
The uneven proportion of healthcare workers between urban and rural areas is
apparent worldwide. Rural and remote areas remain some of the most affected by
healthcare workforce shortages and disparities in access to care, both developed and
developing countries (WHO, 2010). Statistics show that 50% of world populations are
rural, while 24% of physicians worldwide are in rural areas (WHO, 2010). In the United
States, data shows that 20% of the US population lives in rural areas, but only 9% of
physicians are located there (Hancock et al., 2009). In urban areas of Canada and
Australia, there are approximately 2.6 and 4.0 physicians per 1000 people, respectively,
while in rural areas of both countries there are 0.9 physicians per 1000 people (Viscomi,
2013).
The disproportion is worse in many developing countries. In Pacific and Asian
countries, the shortage of healthcare workers especially in rural and remoted areas is a
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critical issue hindering efforts to improve population health outcomes. Many strategies
have been implemented to diminish the shortage and maldistribution of qualified health
workers problems, but the insufficient and inequitable distribution of healthcare workers
is still a critical issue in these regions (Leymann, 2008; Henderson,2008). For example,
in Vietnam at least 53% of physicians are located in urban areas while 72% of
Vietnamese live in rural areas. Only 67% of rural health centers in Vietnam have a
physician (Vujicic, 2011). In Cambodia, approximately 54% of physicians served in
capital city, despite the fact that only 9.6% of Cambodians reside in Phnom Penh. In
2005, physician density in the urban areas was about 0.41 per 1000 Cambodian
population while in the most remote areas the density of physician was only 0.06 per
1000 population (Chhea, 2010). Many countries in Africa also showed the
unequal geographic distribution. For example, only 12% of physicians and 19% of nurses
serve in rural areas of South Africa, despite the fact that 46% of citizens live in rural
communities (Hamilton and Yau, 2004). The density of health workers in urban
Tanzania is three times higher than in rural areas (Munga, 2014).
Strategies Used to Address the Healthcare Workforce Distribution Disparity
Several strategies have been used to attempt to attract health workers to rural and
remote areas worldwide (Barnighausen and Bloom, 2009; Grobler, 2009; WHO,
2010; Dolea, 2010). These strategies were suggested by WHO in 2010 to attract, recruit
and retain health workforce in rural and remote areas. Traditionally, governments have
pursued four main categories for recruitment: education, regulatory, financial incentive,
and professional and personal support.
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1) Education, such as students from rural backgrounds, health professional school
outside of major cities, clinical rotations in rural areas, and curricula that reflect rural
health issues.
2) Regulatory, such as enhanced scope of practice, different types of health
workers, compulsory service, and subsidized education for return of service.
3) Financial incentives, such as scholarship, loan repayment, or direct payment
programs.
4) Professional and personal support, such as better living conditions, safe and
supportive working environments, and career development programs.
For this study, we will focus on financial incentives. The strategy of providing
financial incentives to rural physicians is used in many countries ranging from the US,
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Africa (Barnighausen and
Bloom, 2009; Dolea, 2010). Besides examining the effectiveness of financial incentives,
we will analyze how age and opportunity for continuing education influence the decision
to leave the practice area. Both age and the opportunity for continuing education have
been identified as important factors related to physicians’ decision to leave or stay in
rural and remote areas (WHO, 2010; Henderson, 2008). In 2012, Adzei examined the
impact of financial and non-financial incentives for retaining health workers in Ghana.
The study showed that both financial and non-financial incentives influence the retention
of health workers significantly, and opportunity for continuing education was one of the
significant non-financial factors.
Many governments have implemented financial incentive interventions to address
the critical shortages of health workers despite insufficient evidence about the
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effectiveness of the program and their long-term impact on retaining health workers in
rural and remote areas. Other financial incentive interventions, such as scholarship and
loan forgiveness programs for medical students working in rural and remote areas, were
implemented and evaluated. The results from some studies found that participants in the
programs were more likely to work in rural areas (see, e.g., Jackson, 2003; Holmes,
2005; Dunbabin, 2006; Matsumoto, 2008). In 2003, Jackson evaluated four financial
incentive programs in West Virginia. The results showed that when comparing the
obligated physicians who committed to serve in underserved areas and non-obligated
physicians, the obligated physicians tended to be influenced by monetary factors in their
practice decision of whether to deliver health services to uninsured patients. In 2005,
Holmes examined the effectiveness of the National Health Service Corps (NHSC). The
program was implemented by providing scholarship or loan repayment to medical
students in exchange for agreement to practice in underserved areas. Holmes concluded
that the program increased physicians in underserved areas, but he still had questions
with the efficiency of the program which required more investigation. In
2006, Dunbabin evaluated the Cadetship program which offered bonded scholarship for
medical students in Australia in exchange for service in rural areas for two years. The
study showed that 43% of enrolled physicians remain in rural areas after completing
service. In 2008, Matsumoto studied graduated physicians from Jichi University, which a
university provides free tuition for medical students in exchange for agreement to serve
in rural areas. The study showed that obligated physicians were three times more likely to
practice in rural areas compared with non-obligated physicians.
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Overall, the findings showed the effectiveness of attracting health workers to
practice in rural and underserved areas. However, most evidence studied was from
developed countries and focused on medical students or physicians (Sempowski,
2004; Barnighausen and Bloom, 2009; Dolea, 2010). In addition, most financial incentive
programs analyzed in prior studies were scholarship or loan repayment programs
providing educational support which had less flexibility for using money compared with
direct payment program. Barnighausen and Bloom reviewed 43 financial incentives
studies: 34(USA), 5(Japan), 2(Canada), 1(New Zealand), and 1(South Africa). Only five
out of these 43 studies examined direct payment programs. More evidence from
developing countries is required as well as evidence of financial incentives programs
from other health professionals and evidence of direct payment programs evaluation.
Such evidence can clarify the actual effectiveness of financial incentives programs. To
create effective policies based on financial incentives, policymakers should have a deep
understanding of the role of financial incentives in health workers location
decision (Grobler, 2009; Dolea, 2010). This is the first study to analyze the effects of
financial incentives for dentists in Thailand.
Financial incentives have been used to address geographic disparities in
the distribution of health workers in Thailand. The government has implemented the
financial policy to encourage healthcare workers to locate in rural and remote areas for
more than two decades. However, there is little evidence of the effectiveness of the
financial incentive program in Thailand especially in the dentist group. The Hardship
Allowance (HA) has been implemented since 1998. The HA is the direct payment
program that Thai government provides to health professional including: physicians,
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dentists, pharmacists, and nurses who work in community hospitals under Ministry of
Public Health (MoPH). The criteria and rate of payment is different among the health
professionals. In this study we show the criteria and rate of HA payment for dentists only.
The criteria and rate of HA payment have shown in Table 1 for HA rate before 2008,
Table 2 for HA rate in 2008, and Table 3 for HA rate in 2013 and 2016. The
program results have been described and analyzed the efficiency every 5 years since 2005
but there is no the effectiveness evaluated study. However, the disparity distribution
could not be solved, and the data showed the increasing number of resignation dentists
from 71 in 1999 to 103 in 2003 (Dental Department, MoPH, 2007).
The Thai government has implemented financial incentive strategies to retain
qualified health professionals in rural public facilities. Hardship Allowance program is
one of them that government implemented to reduce the income gap between private and
public sectors. In 2008, the government started a huge revision of Hardship
Allowance. The Hardship Allowance payment in Thailand in 2008 provided extra
compensation to new physicians and dentists working in rural and remote
areas representing about 100%-300% of their salary. This intervention made the income
of new graduated dentists in rural and remote areas higher than new graduated dentists in
urban areas (Pagaiya, 2015). The evaluated study of the effectiveness of Hardship
Allowance program is required to provide the evidence to Thai government and other
countries where have similar context.
Thailand context
Thailand is a lower-middle income country with 65.98 million people in 2010,
(NSO, 2010). Most of the population (55.8%) resides in rural areas. Thailand geography
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is categorized into four regions: Northern, Northeastern, Central and South. According to
local administrative functions, the country is composed of 76 provinces, 877 districts and
7,255 sub-districts. Naturally, Thailand has three topographic regions: plain, highland,
and mountainous areas. Most of the plain areas are in the Central regions, the highlands
areas are in the Northeastern regions where the mountainous areas are in the Northern
and the Southern regions.
Thailand Healthcare System
There are public and private health sectors providing healthcare service in
Thailand. The government body responsible for the oversight of public health in Thailand
is the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH). The health system in Thailand is dominated by
the public sector. The main providers in rural and remote areas are authorized by
the MoPH. The rural health system consists of district hospitals and sub-district health
centers. In 2010, there were 734 community hospitals serving 83.6% of all districts.
Besides the public sector, the private sector providers are scattered across the country but
are congregated in urban areas (Pagaiya and Noree, 2009).
Dentists in Thailand
Distribution of Dentists
The Thai Dental Council showed that nearly half of dentists in the country are
practicing in Bangkok while the rest of them distributed into four regions. From 2009 to
2010, statistics showed an increase in the number of dentists, but there is are disparities
between Bangkok and other regions. This is a consequence of the government policy to
increase the supply of health professionals especially in rural and remote areas in 2005.
For example, in 2009 and 2010 the density of dentists was 0.16 and 0.19 per 1000
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population, respectively. An unequal distribution of dentists has been shown. In Bangkok
the density of dentists it was 0.86 per 1000 population. The density of dentists in Central,
North, South and Northeastern regions excluding Bangkok was 0.11, 0.10, 0.09, and 0.06
per 1000 population, respectively (Thailand HRH, Sirilak, 2010).
Statistics showed the inequity distribution of dentists in Thailand. In 2013, the
Dental Council of Thailand reported that there were 11,607 dentists for 64 million Thai
citizens, creating a dentist to population ratio of 1:5,553 (Thai Dental Council,
2013). Data showed that over half of all dentists were in Bangkok and other big cities
(50.9%). The dentist-to-population ratio in Bangkok, Central, North, South, and
Northeastern regions was 1:1,039, 1:8,499, 1:9,147, 1:9,300, and 1:13,783,
respectively. These ratios demonstrate that disparities in the geographic allocation of
dentists occurred in some rural and remote area in Northern, Northeastern and Southern
regions of Thailand, whereas urban areas benefit from a greater supply of dentists relative
to rural areas.
To address the inequity in the geographic allocation of dentists, Thailand
implemented three major strategies: educational, compulsory, and intensives
strategies (Busarakamuha, 2016).
1.

Educational strategies

The educational strategies include increasing dentists, special recruitment student from
rural background origin, and curriculum reform. The first educational strategy was to
admit more students into dental school to increase the number of trained dentists across
the country. The shortage of dentists was reduced in the 1970s when the Ministry of
University Affairs (MoUA) and the Office of the National Education Council (ONEC)
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implemented plans to increase the number of dentists (Lexomboon, 2000). The second
educational strategy was to recruit more rural background student through the special
admission. The third educational strategy was developing clinical program to contain
rural rotation curriculum. The dentist who attended clinical rotation curriculum were
expected to have positive attitude for practicing in rural communities.
2.

Compulsory strategies
The compulsory strategy was a policy required a compulsory service contract to

assign newly graduated dentists to community hospitals, especially in rural and remote
areas. 1989 was the first year that newly dentists had to serve in the community hospitals
under MoPH for at least three years. Any newly graduated dentist who chose to opt out of
the program had to pay a fine of $12,120.
3.

Motivation/Incentive strategies
3.1 Financial Incentives
The policy was to provide financial incentives to retain dentists practicing in

community hospitals, especially in rural and remote areas (Busarakamuha, 2016). The
government implemented a direct payment program called the Hardship Allowance (HA)
for dentists working in rural and remote areas. The HA payment has been implemented
since 2001, but in 2008 the government increased the rate of payment. The rate and
criteria of the HA payment were adjusted to be consistent with the economic growth of
the country in both 2013 and 2016.
3.2 Non-financial Incentives
The non-financial incentives were composed of career development, specialist
training/ continuing education and social strategies. The career development was a policy
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to increase attractiveness for health workers to decide practicing in rural areas. For
example, district dentists start career at level 4 and they are promoted to level 7 after
approximately 8 years of service. The specialist training and continuing
education provide opportunity for education for rural dentist as well as dentists in
regional or central hospitals. A minimum for one year of service in rural area is required
for most training. Rural and remote dentists have a special place for special training on
the condition that they commit to continue serve in rural hospital graduated. The social
strategy was the policy to create network for rural dentists so they can provide moral and
technical support and to motivate recognition within the field. These three strategies are
still in effect today.
Thailand Hardship Allowance Policy
Before 2008, the HA policy to attract healthcare professionals to work in
community hospitals in rural and remote areas across Thailand had a tiered allowance
system as shown in Table 1.1.
Hardship Allowance Policy change in 2008
The number of dentists increased between 2001 and 2008; however, the unequal
distribution of dentists persisted. The resignation rate of dentists was also increasing
(Dental department, MoPH, 2008). Financial incentive is the strategy chosen to decrease
the resignation rate of dentists. Therefore, in 2008 the government increased the HA
significantly, giving the highest direct payment incentive to dentists working in rural and
remote areas as show in Table 1.2.
In 2008, the HA rate for dentists depended on years of service and practice area;
for example, dentists who serve in urban and rural areas for 1-3 years would receive
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Table 1.1 Hardship Allowance annually payment before 2008 by $US
Year of Service

Urban

Rural

Remote1

Remote2

First year

0

720

3750

7500

2 years up

0

938

3750

7500

$3,750 per year, while their cohorts who serve in remote areas would receive $7,500$11,250 per year. The HA rate also increased for those who served longer in any
community hospitals under MoPH; for example, dentists who served 4-10 years in urban
and rural would receive $7500 and $11,250 per year, respectively. Compared with the
HA rate before 2008, the HA rate for dentists located in rural areas after 2008 increased
five times from the previous one.
The definition of rural and remote areas
At the present, there is no rural and remote definition which every country can
apply (Matsumoto, 2008). There is no official definition of rural and remote areas in
Thailand as well. The rural and remote areas, which are identified in this study, are
applied from the MoPH identification (Appendix A). The classification of the MoPH for
urban, suburban, rural and remote areas are used to determine the areas for the HA
payment. The objective of the HA payment policy is to attract, and influence dentists to
stay longer in the unattractive areas such as rural and remote areas. Therefore, the rural
and remote areas which are identified by the MoPH, are the unpleasant areas compared
with the urban and suburban areas. For example, the rural areas are further from the
urban city and have less amenities such as commercial banks, convenience stores, private
clinics, and so on, compared with the urban and suburban areas. In addition, many remote
areas are the furthest from the urban areas and many of them are close to the border of the
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countries, which have the least amenities and have difficult and inconvenient
transportation.
Most of the rural and remote populations are lesser than the urban population. The
distance between the remote areas and the city, in many provinces, are further than the
distance between rural areas and the city as well. However, the classification of rural and
remotes areas in this study do not comply with this common measure across Thailand.
For example, the population in 2005, in some rural areas such as Chiangdao district,
Chiangmai province is about 87,922 while in urban areas in Chiangrai or Loppburi
provinces have lesser population at 68,198 (Wiangpapao district), and 77,005 (Banmi
district), respectively. There is different distance among the urban, rural, and remote
areas in each province as well. For example, the distance between Chiangdao district
(rural areas) and Chiangmai city is about 86.5 km, while the distance between Pathumrat
district (rural areas) and Amnartchareon province’s city is about 31 km. Furthermore, the
distance between Maeai district (remote areas) and Chiangmai city is 189.4, while the
distance between Chanuman district (remote areas) and Amnartchareon province’s city is
about 65 km.
In 2013, the government adjusted the criteria for paying the hardship allowance
(annually, US$) as shown in Table 1.3.
The hardship allowance payment structure has remained constant since 2013;
however, in 2016, the government reclassified the rural/remote status of certain areas.
Some rural hospitals became “suburban 1” or “suburban 2” and some hospitals in
suburban 1 or 2 became urban in 2016. However, the criteria for hardship allowance
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Table 1.2 Hardship Allowance annual payment in 2008 by $US
Year of

Urban

Suburban

Rural

Remote1

Remote2

services
1-3 years

3750

3750

3750

7500

11250

4-10 years

7500

9375

11250

15000

18750

11-20 years

9375

11250

15000

18750

22500

11250

15000

18750

22500

26250

21 up

Table 1.3 Hardship Allowance annually payment in 2013 by $US
Urban

Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural

Remote1

Remote2

1-3 years

3750

3750

3750

3750

7500

11250

4-10 years

4500

5625

7500

11250

15000

18750

11 up

5625

7500

9375

15000

18750

22500

Year of
services

payment remained the same as in Table 3. In other words, healthcare professionals
working in some rural hospitals and suburban hospitals experienced a sudden drop in HA
rates due to the reclassification of the rurality/urbanity of their hospital. Social and
economic development caused the extension of urbanization in Thailand, so
the MoPH must adjust the area to be consistent with the current economic situation. For
example, in Chiangmai province 2016, 9 out of 13 rural hospitals became urban hospitals.
According the rate on Table 3 if young dentists who serve in rural areas less than
3 years when their practice place became suburban or urban areas their HA do not
change. Then they may decide to stay. If the middle age dentists who serve in rural areas
for 4-10 years when their practice place became suburban or urban areas, then they lost
$3,750-6,750 per year. If the senior dentists who serve in rural areas for over 11 years
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when their practice location became suburban or urban areas, then they lost $5,265-9,735
per year. If the middle age or senior dentist preferred high income when they lost, they
might decide to leave the areas.
The adjusting HA areas categorization criteria followed the Notification
of MoPH in December 2012. The Notification of MoPH identify that each provincial
public health office has to reclassify the rural and remote areas in their province
following the MoPH’s criteria and submit the new list of rural and remote areas to
the Strategic and Policy Bureau, MoPH. The MoPH’s criteria for reclassification urban,
rural, and remote areas in each province include transportation, urbanization,
and health provider’s shortage. The transportation criteria include both the difficulty to
travel and the long distance from the district of the hospital to the urban city within the
province or to the nearest urban city in another urbanized province. The urbanized
provinces are the top 25 high income provinces in 2013 (Appendix C). The urbanization
in each district can be measured by the number of amenities and the revenue of the
district’s government. The amenities in the district areas include commercial banks,
private clinics, and convenient stores. The health providers’ shortage criteria are the
areas where are in the dangerous zone such as the areas in the three Southernmost
provinces and the high turn overate of health workers’ areas.
After the new criteria for reclassification the HA areas were announced, each
provincial office collected and analyzed data. Consequently, the lists of the new area
categorizations were sent to the Strategy and Policy Bureau, MoPH. Then the new
lists were reported officially through the Notification of MoPH Issue #11 in December
2016 which is shown in Appendix B.
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The Thai population growth rate and the MoPH dentist's growth rate from 2003 to 2016
According to the number of recruitments, resignations and overall dentists from
2003 to 2016, the average growth rates of recruitment, resignation and overall dentists
are 4.06, 11.93, and 6.06 respectively. The average of resignation rate shows that dentists
are more likely to resign. To address this issue, the government implemented the HA
policy to increase retention of dentists in rural and remote areas. The HA policy was
implemented in 2001 and had a big change in 2008 by providing a huge amount of
payment rate. The HA policy was adjusted some payment rate and criteria in 2013 and
reclassified some rural areas to urban areas in December 2016.
During the implementation of HA policy from 2003 to 2016, the educational and
the compulsory service strategy are also implementing persistently. The educational
strategy produces more graduated dentists and the compulsory
service strategy recruits more graduated dentists to work in primary hospitals especially
in rural and remote areas. As a result, the overall dentist's growth rate increase. The
average growth rate from 2003 to 2016 is equal 6.06. At the same time the average Thai
population growth rate is equal 0.24 (Official Statistics Registration System 2003 to
2016). The statistic shows that the dentists' growth rate outweigh the population growth
rate. Therefore, in general Thailand have no shortage of dentist. The government have
to persistently evaluate and monitor all strategies used to address the disparity
distribution of dentists to prevent the oversupply of dentists in Thailand.
The Hardship Allowance Expenditure
Table 1.4 shows the estimated annual HA expenditure in 2009 and in 2013,
respectively. The annual HA expenditure in 2009 and 2013 was about $18.7 and
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$24 million, respectively. Although, the annual HA rate was reduced in 2013, the
increasing of dentists caused the total annual HA payment increased. In 2019, the
highest percentage group is the dentist who were in very remote areas and served for 1-3
years or were in rural areas and served for 4-10 years or who were in suburban areas and
served for 11-20 years or who were in urban areas and served for over 21 years. In 2013,
the high percentage group is the dentist who were in the rural, suburban, or urban areas
who served 1-3 years.
Aim of the Study
Rigorous evidence is required to help policymakers understand the effectiveness
of financial incentives on dentists’ decision to remain in rural areas (Barnighausen and
Bloom,2009; Dolea, 2010). Barnighausen and Bloom suggested that most of the financial
incentive evaluated studies were from developed countries, so evaluated studies from
more developing countries are required. Dolea commented on the disparity between
physicians/medical student and other health professional’s programs
and how there should be a more diverse array of health professional studies.
At present the information about the effectiveness of financial incentives to
retain dentists in rural areas is limited, especially the effectiveness of financial incentives
through direct payment method, when compared with the evaluation for the intervention
involving educational programs (Dolea, 2010). More evidence of professional and
personal support is also required (Dolea, 2010; Henderson, 2008). In this manuscript, I
propose a study to examine the effectiveness of the financial incentives program for
retaining dentists in rural and remote areas in Thailand. Besides, I propose to analyze the
impact HA
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Table 1.4 The estimated annual HA expenditure in 2009 and 2013
Year

Annual HA rate Number of dentists

2009

2013

Percent Total annual HA payment

$

3,750

496

26.7

$ 1,860,000

$

7,500

84

4.5

$

9,375

243

13.1

$ 2,278,125

$

11,250

570

30.6

$ 6,412,500

$

13,125

10

0.5

$

15,000

307

16.5

$

16,875

14

0.8

$

$

18,750

119

6.4

$ 2,231,250

$

22,500

16

0.9

$

Total

1859

100

$ 18,744,375

$

3,750

783

29.7

$

2,936,250

$

4,500

102

3.9

$

459,000

$

5,625

104

3.9

$

585,000

$

7,500

255

9.7

$

1,912,500

$

9,375

159

6

$

1,490,625

$

11,250

655

24.8

$

7,368,750

$

15,000

465

17.6

$

6,975,000

$

18,750

81

3.1

$

1,518,750

$

22,500

34

1.3

$

765,000

Total

2638

100

$

$

630,000

131,250

$ 4,605,000

$

236,250

360,000

24,010,875

Note: the money exchange rate using the rate in August 2018: $US 1 = 32 THB

reduction on dentists’ decisions to resign from rural and remote areas based on their age as
well as the opportunity for continuing education.
Evidence showed that age and opportunity for continuing education should impact
the decision of dentist to resign from rural and remote areas when the HA decreased. Due
to years of service which directly associated with age is one of two criteria of HA
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payment rate in 2008, 2013 and 2016. As well as, the opportunity for continuing
education has shown as the most common reason for dentists’ resignation when excluded
the reason for getting a new job (resignation data, 2003-2017). In addition, the
opportunity for continuing education is one of the strategies the MoPH implemented to
retain dentists in the rural communities (Lexomboon, 2003). There has been no formal
evaluation of this program in Thailand.
The central hypothesis of this study is that direct payment financial
incentives decrease the resignation rates of dentists in rural and remote areas, as indicated
in Aims 1 and 2. A secondary hypothesis in Aim 3 is that Thailand’s HA affected
dentists working in rural and remote areas, based on their age, as well as the opportunity
to continue their education.
To attain the overall objectives, the following specific aims will be pursued:
Aim1: To examine whether the HA payment in 2008 reduced resignation rates of dentists
in rural and remote provinces relative to urban provinces.
Hypothesis1: After the HA policy in 2008, dentists in rural and remote provinces are less
likely to resign. The resignation rates in rural and remote provinces after 2008 are
decreasing compared with the resignation rates in urban provinces.
Aim2: To estimate the effect of the HA reduction, due to recategorization in HA areas
from rural to urban in December 2016, on rural and remote dentists' resignation and
relocation.
Hypothesis2: Rural and remote dentists who located in the changed areas which HA was
reduced in December 2016 are more likely to leave (resign and relocate) from their areas.
Therefore, after 2016, the resignation and relocation of dentists in changed areas increase.
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Aim3: To examine the relationship between dentists’ age and dentists’ resignation and
relocation in changed areas after the 2016 policy implementation.
Hypothesis3: Based on the policy change in 2016, the HA area was recategorized.
Consequently, the HA payment rate was decreased. Rural dentists who are older affected
the HA reduction more than the younger dentists. Therefore, the older dentists are more
likely to resign or relocate from their areas due to the HA reduction compared with the
younger dentists.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature is composed of four major parts as follows: first is the description
of the theories and model of health care workers geographic location. This part
contains the theory of decision-making, and how it applies to the factors
associated with the dentists’ decision to leave or stay in rural and remote areas. The
utility function of dentists’ location choice has been shown in this section based on
financial factors and non-financial factors. The second section is other theory
related to the behavior and motivation of healthcare workers. The third section is the
strategies used for addressing the disparities distribution of healthcare workers and the
evidence of the effectiveness of these strategies. This section discusses the previous and
current evaluated studies. The last section is the gap in the literature. Based on literature
reviews from the previous three sections, this information and discussion can contribute
to the knowledge gap of the study.
How Do Healthcare Providers Decide Where to Work: Theories and models of
healthcare workers’ geographic location decisions.
The Utility Theory: Theory of Decision Making
In 2005, Dussault suggested approaches to understanding the geographic imbalance
of health workers which included economic and normative views. For the economics
views, the distribution of health providers is a function of the health workers market
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When there is an unequal supply and demand for workers in a given geographic area then
the imbalance happens. Regarding the economic perspective, if wages increase, more
health workers want to be employed and more people will go to the health
providers, ultimately to a new equilibrium and a more balanced distribution of health
professionals. The normative view explains the disparities as the health worker
distribution compared with a standard or social norm. This norm can be considered by
professional institutions, by policy makers, or by comparing with a certain region.
Normative approaches normally apply full-time equivalent (FTE) ratios of physicians,
nurses, etc., to population.
The normative and the economic perspectives complement one another. The
description normative view focuses on the need and supply side, while the economic
view approaches the demand and financial incentives. The study suggested approaching
health worker geographic imbalance by combining these two perspectives,
which is consistent with the utility concept. A previous study used utility theory to
explain practice location preferences of health workers (Bolduc, 1996). The utility
function assumes that a number of factors influence the providers’ decision to locate in
attractive areas and play a part in health providers’ decision to locate their practice. The
monetary factors are not only an essential part for health workers to choose practice
location but other elements such as leisure time, proximity to family, and so on also relate
to the preferences to choose the location of health workers.
In 1954, Edwards described the reasons individuals make choices among
advantageous options. These theories focus on the concept of the subjective value, or
utility, of all options, which the decider must select. The economists assume that people
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have rational behavior. Then they have transitive preference and that they select in such a
way as to maximize utility or expected utility. Early utility maximization the
economists held that the goal of human action is to seek pleasure and avoid pain. Every
object or action may be considered from the point of view of pleasure- or pain-giving
properties. These properties are called the utility of the object, and pleasure is given by
positive utility and pain by negative utility. The goal of action, then, is to seek the
maximum utility. This straightforward self-indulgence of the future is simply
converted into a theory of choice.
Economists measure a person’s preference in term of utility. In
2009, Varians explained the utility model which economists can use for measuring the
preference of an individual. Although utility mostly measures the consumer preference,
healthcare worker preference can be measured by utility. The variation of geographic
distribution of dentists in Thailand showed that dentists have different
preferences in choosing their practice location. In this study, we apply utility theory
to predict the effectiveness of the financial and non-financial preference of dentists on
practice location choice.
Several studies showed the evidence of financial and non-financial
factors that influence the practice location choice of healthcare workers. The extent of
financial incentive is more definite compared with non-financial incentives. Financial
incentives are all things related to money and income such as salary, salary supplement,
benefits, allowance, etc., while non-financial incentives can be improved working and
living condition, continuing education, training and professional development,
management and supervision, opportunity for promotion, and so on (Henderson,
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2008; Buykx, 2010). Several evidences showed the effectiveness of financial incentive
program in attract health workers in underserved areas (Sempowski,2004;
Barnighausen and Bloom, 2009; Dolea, 2010). While Henderson referred to salary,
benefit, and allowance for financial incentives in Pacific and Asian countries, the
financial incentives in Sempowski and Barnighausen and Bloom studied mostly were
scholarship and loan repayment programs. Many evidences from developing countries
showed the important of financial and non-financial factors integration
to influencing health worker ’s decision to practice in rural and remote areas (WHO,
2010; Humphrey, 2009; Grobler, 2015). For example, Evidences from Ghana and
Tanzania showed the results from the survey of the healthcare workers in remote
areas and found that financial and non-financial factors influence the motivation and
retention of health workers (Adzei, 2012; Mungo, 2013). These evidences support
the utility concept of health worker’s preference for practice location choice especially in
developing countries.
In this study, we apply utility theory in explaining the location choice of dentists
in Thailand. We can consider a dentist as an individual. When they make a choice as to
maximize their utility that means they gain the optimal satisfaction. The variation of the
geographic allocation of dentists across Thailand showed that individual dentists prefer
choosing practice location. Some dentists chose to locate in rural areas when
the Hardship Allowance (HA) ,the direct payment financial incentive from Thai
government, increased while others chose to practice in urban areas with low HA but
close to many amenities and have more opportunities for continuing education. These
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incidences can be explained by the utility maximization theory that the individual dentist
chose the practice location to gain optimal satisfaction.
According to the utility theory, we simply theorize that a dentist chooses to leave
or stay in rural and remote areas to optimize their preferences based on financial and nonfinancial factors. The simple utility function of dentists’ location choice can be denoted
as function (1).
U (π, x; β)
U = f (π, x; β) (1)
Where
U is the utility function of dentist choice
π is the financial factors which in this study we estimate the effectiveness of the HA
x is non-financial factors
β is the vector of parameters
We adopted the WHO framework of factors related to decision to leave or stay in
rural areas to account for the non-financial factors. From the WHO 2010 framework all
factors included financial aspect, mandatory service, personal origin and values, family
and communities’ aspects, working and living conditions, and career related aspect.
The 2010 WHO framework is shown in Figure 2.1.
Based on the 2010 WHO framework, other factors besides the financial
aspects are considered the non-financial factors: personal origin and values, family and
community aspects, working and living condition, career related aspect, and mandatory
service. The framework of Thai dentist’s location choice is established to comply
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with the 2010 WHO framework. The framework of Thai dentist’s location choice is
shown in Figure 2.2

Figure 2.1 Factors related to the decision to leave or stay in rural and remoted areas

Financial incentives
-Salary
-Hardship Allowance
-other benefit and
supplements

Dentists’ decision to
leave or stay in rural
and remote areas

Non-financial incentives
-Personal origin and
value
-Family and community
aspect
-Working and living
condition
-Career aspect

Figure 2.2 The model of Thai dentist’s location choice
In this study, we aim to measure the choice of dentists to leave or stay in rural
areas. We assumed that dentists’ preferences, which affect the decision to leave or
stay, included the financial and non-financial factors.
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2.1 Financial factors
Financial incentive is a common factor among many factors listed in both
developed and developing countries (Kruger, 2005; Danial, 2005; Henderson&Tulloch,
2008; Humphrey, 2009; WHO, 2010). The financial aspect of the WHO perspective
includes benefits, allowances, salaries, and payment system. In 2009, Henderson showed
that financial incentives for health workers in Pacific and Asian countries can be high
salaries, salary supplements, benefits and allowances. Humphrey listed remuneration
and salary packaging and benefits as financial incentives
(2009). However, Barnighausen and Bloom categorized financial incentives in five
groups based on programs’ implementation to attract and retain physicians and other
health workers in rural and underserved areas. Five categories of financial incentive
programs included service-requiring scholarship, education loans with service
requirement, service-option educational loans, loan repayment programs, and direct
payment. While, most of evaluated study for financial incentive programs from
developed countries reported the effect of scholarship and loan repayment program, many
survey studies from developing countries reported the significance of wages, benefit and
other compensation as an important factor for recruiting and retaining health workers in
rural and remote communities. (Barnighausen and Bloom, 2009; Henderson,
2008; Dolea, 2010; Grobler, 2015).
Financial factor in term of salary, benefit, allowance, and other compensation is
very important in many developing countries. Finance and benefit are considered the
most important factors affecting the location decision of health professional especially in
countries where the salary from the government is not enough for basic living
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expenses (Henderson, 2008; Lehmann, 2008). The financial incentives are very
important motivating factor for health workers in the countries where low salaries and
benefits. For example, the survey of geographic location of physicians in Vietnam
showed that most Vietnam physicians (53%) practiced in urban areas. The study showed
that most physicians in Vietnam have second jobs for gaining satisfied income. It was
suggested that to remain Vietnam physicians in rural areas, the government must recruit
them to rural communities by providing high salaries and benefits in the first place
(Vujicic, 2011). In addition, the questionnaire surveys of medical students from Congo,
Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda showed that 96% of participants answer the most
important reason to leave Africa is the low salary (Burch, 2011).
In this study, we model utility function to predict the dentists’ decision to leave or
stay in rural and remote areas which influencing by direct payment method ‘Hardship
Allowance’. A model of financial factors based on dentist’s location choice utility
function can be denoted as function (2)
U(π) is the utility function of financial factors
U(π) = f(HA, S, O;α)(2)
o

HA=hardship allowance

o

S = salary

o

O=other compensation, benefits

o

α is the vector of parameters

2.2 Non-financial factors
Based on the 2010 WHO framework, the non-financial factors include personal
origin and values, family and community aspects, working and living condition, career
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related, and mandatory service. A model of non-financial factors based on dentist’s
location choice utility function can be denoted as function (3)
U(x) is the utility function of non-financial factors
U(x) = f(P,F,W,C,M; ϒ) (3)
o

P = personal origin and values

o

F=Family and community

o

W=working condition

o

C=career related

o

ϒ is the vector of parameters

In term of non-financial factors in this study, we propose to measure how can age and
opportunities to continuing education associated with the direct payment financial
incentive ‘Hardship Allowance’ predict the location choice of the dentists in
Thailand. So the utility function of our proposal model can be denoted as function (4).
U(D) = f (HA, A, O; ƍ)(4)
o

D= Dentists decision to leave or stay in rural and remote areas

o

HA=Hardship Allowance

o

A=Age of dentists

o

O=Opportunities to continuing education

2.2.1

Personal origin and values

2.2.1.1 Rural background
As shown in Figure1, personal factors include rural background (origin), values,
and altruism. Many studies showed the effectiveness of selection rural background
students to study in medical or other healthcare professional schools (Daniels,
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2005; Halass, 2008; Suphanchaimat, 2016). In 2009, Wilson showed the strong impact of
geographic origin on retention of healthcare workers in rural and remote areas. The
studies of rural clinical rotations programs for medical students at the University of
Calgary and pharmacy students in New Zealand showed that rural origin students were
more likely to choose rural practice than urban origin students (Wolschuk, 2002;
Capstick 2008).
2.2.1.2 Rural upbringing
Evidence showed that physicians who graduated from schools that contained
a clinical rotation curriculum were more likely to practice in rural and remote areas
(Woloschuck, 2002; Capstick, 2002; Halass, 2008). In addition, graduated students from
schools located in rural areas showed the same results (Mathew, 2008). Graduated
students gained values and altruism to work in rural and remote areas from clinical
rotation curriculum schools and school located in rural areas.
Although the WHO framework did not clarify what is personal origin and value,
based on Lexomboon in 2003, personal factors included age, year of service, educational
level, gender, marital status and children, and other personal factors. In 2008, Lehmann
explored the relationship between attraction and retention factors on healthcare worker
decisions for practice areas. He presented that individual factors such as origin, age,
gender and marital status may have an impact on health professional decisions.
2.2.1.3 Age
A differing connection between age and practicing location decisions was
found (Lexomboon, 2003). Generally, relationships between the decision for
leaving a practice location and demographic characteristics such as age, gender, education
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level are indecisive (Lehman, 2008). In 1990, Easterbrook explored how factors
influenced family medicine location decisions and found that age was no significant
factor on physician decisions. However, the study of the impact of job satisfaction on
worker turnover found that the higher the age of the workers the more likely they are
to leave their present work (Lamber, 2001). In 2005, Richards showed there was a high
percentage of older health workers (>50 years) practicing in rural areas, while another
one reported the average ages of health workers in urban and rural areas were 36.1 and
36.8, respectively (Richards, 2005; Ebuehi, 2011). In 2013, Antwi identified the impact of
wages on the retention of health workers. The author stated that age was important and
focused on young adults aged 20-35-years old (Antwi, 2013). These studies showed the
various results regarding the relationship between age and health worker’s decision.
Evidence is still required to show the actual association of age on practice location
decisions of the healthcare workforce.
2.2.1.4 Year of service
A study examined the relationship between job satisfaction and intention to leave
the practice areas and showed that the tenure had negative association with job
satisfaction. When the tenure increased, the job satisfaction decreased (Lamber, 2001).
However, the study evaluated a skills training program for rural retaining physicians in
Alberta, and data showed that the more years of practice, the less likely the physicians are
to leave rural locations (Gorsche, 2012). As same as the age factor, to clarify
the relationship between years of service and the health worker’s decision to leave rural
and remote areas, more evidence is required (Lexomboon, 2003).
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2.2.1.5 gender
The association between gender and retention of health workers in rural and
remote areas is also inclusive (Lehman, 2008). In 2001, Lamber showed
males had lower job satisfaction than females; however, there was no significant
difference in decision to retain in rural areas between males and females. There was also
no significant difference between male and female physicians working in rural areas from
the national survey of retention of primary care physicians in rural health professional
shortage areas, as well as male and female residents at a rural setting who were more
likely to practice general surgery than specialists (Pathman, 2011; Deveney 2013).
However, in 2005, the survey of primary healthcare workers in rural areas in Scotland
reported that 81% of respondents were women (93% of nurses, 52% of doctors, 33% of
dentists and dental nurses, and 91% of other health professionals) (Richards, 2005). In
addition, the medical students participating in the Cadetship program which
offers scholarships in exchange for serving at least 2 years in rural areas were mostly
female (60%) (Dunbabin, 2006). Different results in the study examined the impact of
wages on retention of health workers showed that more men, responded to the increasing
wages than women (Antwi, 2013). Wilson reviewed the interventions to address the
disparity distribution of healthcare workers, and also concluded that men are more likely
to practice in rural and remote areas than women (Wilson, 2009).
2.2.2

Family and community
According to the WHO framework, provision of schooling for children, sense of

community spirit, and community facilities available are included in this group.
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Some articles included the family factor such as marital status to be classified in personal
characteristics (Lexomboon, 2003).
2.2.2.1 Marital status
Many evidences showed the association of marital status and the decision to leave
rural remote areas. For example, in 2003, Viscomi’s study in Australia showed that
physicians were likely to practice in a rural area if they had a partner with a rural
background. In 2009, Stagg identified influential factors for career choices of the South
Australian Flinders University Parallel Rural Community Curriculum graduated students.
The study found that graduated students who had a rural background spouse/partner
were more likely to choose practicing in rural locations. In 2012, Royston surveyed new
osteopathic medical students to examine the factors related to decision to practice rural
areas. He found that besides rural upbringing factors, students who have a spouse or
significant other who had lived in rural areas were more likely to intend to practice in
rural areas.
2.2.2.3 Provision of school for children
In 2007, Serneel showed that access to education for children was the most
significant factor that affected the location decision in rural areas of nursing and medical
students in Ethiopia. In 2003, Viscomi summarized many reasons influencing family
physicians to remain in rural areas, including childcare and provision of school for their
children.
2.2.2.4 Sense of community spirit
In 2009, Christine reported that ‘rural upbringing’ was related to the tendency of
health workers to choose to practice in rural areas. The study explained that rural
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childhood experience made the health workers familiar and resilient to integrate the
community which drives them to their interest in rural community. Hancock tested
whether the rural upbringing could be a predictive factor for recruiting and
retaining physician practice in rural areas by using a qualitative method study. The results
showed that rural exposure through recreation, education, long-term residence, or a
mixture of these, contributes an early creation or familiarity, resilience, and
community/place integration that bring attentiveness for graduated physicians practicing
in rural areas (2009).
2.2.3

Working and living condition

2.2.3.1 Working environment: relationship in working place, work load,
Work environment is one of the major non-financial factors influencing the
decision to leave or stay in rural of health providers (WHO, 2010; Lexomboon, 2003).
Many studies group this factor to non-financial incentive which related the retention of
health worker practicing in rural communities (Henderson, 2008; Adzei,
2012; Awofeso 2010). Working and living conditions are very important in many
developing countries. Due to the budget constraint, the government in many developing
countries strengthen their incentive policy by combining financial incentives with
improving working and living conditions in rural and remote areas (Henderson,
2008). For example, the financial and non-financial incentives have been used and
evaluated in Ghana. The study showed that both incentives significantly influenced the
location choice of healthcare workers (Adzei, 2012). The significant non-financial
incentives in Ghana included leadership skills, opportunity for continuing education, and
availability of infrastructure and resources. The difficulty in rural and remote areas, such
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as limited access to electricity, primitive social amenities, poor quality educational or
communication facilities and inadequacy of portable water are all barriers to deciding
to practice in rural and remote areas of health workforces. Improving these difficulties
can reduce the decision to leave rural areas of healthcare workers in Nigeria (Awofeso,
2010).
2.2.3.2 Job satisfaction
In 2010, Delobelle explored the Southern African nurses whether job satisfaction
related to their decision to leave or stay in rural areas. The survey study showed that job
satisfaction significantly associated with retention in rural area. The survey of health
worker in Ghana showed the same result as the study in Southern African nurses. The
survey showed that job satisfaction significantly reduced the intention of health workers
to leave the rural areas (Boneburger, 2014). The same scenario with the study in
Thailand, in 2003, Lexomboon explored the factors causing Thai dentist leaving their
practice location. The study showed that job satisfaction was one significant factors
influence dentists decide to leave their location.
2.2.4

Career related aspect
The opportunity for continuing education or training was most common important

motivated factor reported from health workers questionnaire survey (Grobler, 2015).
The WHO framework showed some examples of career related factors including access to
continuing education opportunities, supervision, professional development courses and
workshops, and so on. In 2007, Serneels explored the factors affecting location decision
of nurses and medical students in rural areas in Ethiopia. The results showed that the
opportunity for promotion was a highly significant factor for nursing students’ location
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choice, while having access to training was more significant to medical students’ location
choice. The survey of medical students from six countries in Africa showed the reasons
to stay in Africa most involved with career related aspect. Medical students from Congo,
Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda were choosing to stay in Africa because of good
career options 92% and opportunity for further education 88% (Burch, 2011). In
2012, Adzei identified the opportunity for development as one significant influential
factor for the health workforce in Ghana. The study showed that the opportunity
for development could be a predictor for motivation and retention of health workers in
rural areas.
2.2.5

Bounding or mandatory service
The bounding or mandatory service factor can be called several names for

example, compulsory service, obligatory, mandatory, requisite and coercive programs.
This program has occurred since the early 1900s (Frehywot). The mandatory
service program has been implemented in many countries around the world for
recruitment and retaining health workers in rural areas in their
country. Frehywot represented that there are three different types of mandatory service
programs in 70 countries. They are the condition of service program, the mandatory
service with incentives program, and the mandatory service without incentives program.
The mandatory service with incentives program is the program generally used in many
countries. We can notice that the mandatory service program is associated with financial
incentives used in many developed countries (Pathman, 2004; Jackson, 2003; Dunbabin,
2006; Matsumoto, 2008). The evidences showed that obligated participants who
committed to serve in rural areas in exchange for scholarship or loan repayment, were
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more likely to practice in a committed location. The studies showed that some obligated
health workers chose to stay in the original location after completing their commitment
(Cullen, 1997; Jackson, 2003; Matsumoto, 2008).
Other Theories Associate the Movement Behavior of Health Workers
1. Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation
According to Judson’s study, the topic is “Harnessing the Right Combination of
Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation to Change Physician Behavior.” The study showed
the effort of the policy makers to change physicians’ behavior. The policy makers
implemented strategies to improve efficiency in the production of health with extrinsic
and intrinsic motivations. Both extrinsic and intrinsic incentives were provided to
improve provider behaviors. The problems were the difficulty to assess the achievement
of these incentives in behavior change. Many arguments occurred among the policy
makers about how and when extrinsic and intrinsic incentive should be implemented to
optimize provider behavior (Judson, 2015).
Judson suggested four types of extrinsic and intrinsic motivators. They are
including successful extrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation “overpowered” by
intrinsic motivation, successful intrinsic motivation, and intrinsic motivation “crowded
out” by extrinsic motivation.
1.

Successful extrinsic motivation: the evidence showed that the behavior of

physicians improved after changing the payment method. The salaried physicians who
used to ignore clinical assignment and sometimes avoid taking care of patients
began improving their practice and responsibility when implementing fee-for-
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service (FFS) payment system. This shows that the financial incentives affected the
behavioral change of physicians.
2.

Extrinsic motivation “overpowered” by intrinsic motivation: the article

showed one example: the chief of one medicine institute offered financial reward for
faculty member who attend the medical grand round at least 50%. He expected to
increase the round attendee. However, some mid-career physicians felt insulted and
denied attending the medical grand rounds. This example showed that financial reward
cannot overcome by intrinsic motivation. This situation can be used to explain how to
attract healthcare workers practicing in rural and remote areas by using financial
incentives and non-financial incentives.
•

Successful intrinsic motivation: the evidence showed many physicians

volunteered to work in West Africa in 2014 to provide healthcare service for
patients infected with Ebola. These volunteer physicians risked themselves working in
the dangerous areas to help other people because they believed the worthy and
significance to saving people’s lives. They said they receive huge happiness for helping
people’s lives with no compensation.
•

Intrinsic motivation “crowded out” by extrinsic motivation: the evidence

showed the physician who used to sacrifice his time and effort for helping HIV/AIDs
patients to have a better quality of life. However, after many years of his dedication, he
learned that he received lower income compared with many new physicians. Ultimately,
he stopped serving HIV/AIDs patients then worked in hospital medicine, which provided
him with higher income.
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These models explained how both extrinsic and intrinsic motivators can be
effective or ineffective, based on the context and expectations. For example, FFS
physicians are more likely to increase the volume of care, while salary physicians feel
adequately compensated, so financial incentive may insult their professionalism. Intrinsic
motivation may be a proper way for changing behavior. This model provides a
wide perspective in considering the behavioral changes of providers from the extrinsic
and intrinsic incentives.
2. Motivation and Behavior Psychology Theories
The behavior psychology approach is commonly used in the article of healthcare
workforce geographic location from the management discipline. Basically, motivation
theories are applied by management to change worker behavior. According to the
conceptual model of this study besides the financial incentives such as Hardship
Allowance, the non-financial incentives such as personal origin and value, family aspect,
working and living condition, and career related are associated with the decision to leave
or stay in rural areas of dentists. The non-financial incentives we focused in this study are
personal age, and opportunity for continuing education whether they affect the decision
of dentists to leave the practice communities.
The Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs
This is a classic theory which explained the needs of human being are categorized
into five levels from lower to higher hierarchy (Dempsey, 1999).
Level 1: Physical needs, such as the material need for food, drink and shelter
Level 2: Safety needs, such as protection from danger
Level 3: Belonging needs, such as friendship and social compatibility
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Level 4: Esteem needs, for respect, reputation and autonomy
Level 5: Self-actualization needs, expressed as the realization of one’s potential
The theory shows that individuals have a hierarchy of psychological needs. The
higher-level needs will not be important unless the lower-level needs are filled. Health
provider is a human being which have need as same as other people. To cover the basic
need in level 1, the health provider have to sufficient income and have financial security.
After they are fulfilled the level 1 need then they increase their need in the next level.
The Herzberg’s Motivation Theory
According the theory, motivators and work environmental factors are related to
job satisfaction (Robbin, 2001). Job satisfaction is related to decision to leave the practice
location (Lexomboon, 2003). Motivating factors can be achievement, recognition, type of
work, responsibility, advancement, and opportunity for continuing education. Work
environment factors can be primary hospitals policy and administration, supervision,
relationship with supervisors, work condition, salary, relationship with co-worker,
personal life, status, and security. The health worker will be dissatisfied with work if their
hygiene factors do not meet their expectation.
Human behavior theory
Several theories such as intuitive theories, reinforcement theories, motivation
theories, and theories of learning can be used to describe human behavior (Fincham and
Rhodes, 1992). All these theories show that behavior is affected by stimulus. For
example, family factors such as spouse’s job, children’s schooling, higher household
income can influence the decision of healthcare worker leave or stay in rural and remote
areas. The opportunity for continuing education is one of the motivating factors; and our
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study is interested in how it relates to financial incentive for dentist working in rural and
remote areas in Thailand.
Addressing the Healthcare Worker Disparities Distribution: Strategies used and the
effectiveness
In 2010, WHO suggested intervention to improve attraction, recruitment, and
retention of health workers in rural and remote areas. There are four major categories of
interventions: education, regulatory, professional and personal support, and financial
incentives.
Educational strategies
In 2010, Dolea reviewed the evaluated strategies to increase attraction and
retention of health workers in remote and rural areas. She suggested that
education strategies had influenced mainly on the attractiveness of rural and remote
areas. Therefore, it is necessary to choose desirable students, those who are probable to
work in rural and remote areas. Those who will be trained in these locations with applied
methods and programs that tend to convince them decide to work in rural areas. The
example of intervention in the education category can be: students from rural
backgrounds, health professional schools outside metropolitan areas, clinical rotations in
rural areas during studies, curricula that reflect rural healthcare problems, and continuing
professional development for rural health workers.
a. Recruiting student from rural origin, underserved population
Students with a rural origin are more likely to practice in a rural setting.
Evidences show that students with a rural origin are more likely to practice in a rural
setting, which is a consistent finding in many studies. It appears to be the single factor
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most strongly associated with rural practice (Wilson, 2009; Dolea, 2010). The
survey of medical students who participate in Australian Rural Clinical Schools Program
showed that rural background medical students were 10 times more likely to prefer
working in rural areas compared with non-participants (Walker, 2012). Thai government
also applied the educational studies for addressing the inequitable distribution of
physicians. The medical schools recruited rural background students by special admission
(Wibulpolprasert, 2003). The geographic origin selection intervention is the most
strongly related with rural location (Wilson, 2009).
b. Clinical rural rotation curriculum
In 1999, Rabinowitz investigated physicians who graduated from Jefferson
Medical college which contained the Physician Shortage Area Program (PSAP). His
longitudinal cohort study showed that PSAP graduates were four times more likely than
non-PSAP graduates to locate in rural and underserved areas. The study which examined
the Rural Medical Education Program (RMED) which started in 1989 by placing students
in a rural community of New York, showed that about 25% of physicians from RMED
working in underserved communities (Sumchy, 2005). In 2004, Tani evaluated the
community-based medical education in medical students in Tokushima Prefecture Japan,
the study clarified that the intensity of students’ attitudes about interest and a sense of
fulfillment in community medicine and medicine in remote area was significantly
increased after the community-based practice. The study of the impact of rural clinical
division of the school of Medicine at the University of Queensland (UQ) found that UQ’s
rural clinical division is having a positive impact on the intern workforce in the regional
hospitals most closely allied with it (Wilkinson,2004).
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The Medical Education (RMED) Program from University of Illinois, which
provides the long ambulatory training for medical students, showed the program
achievement by 68% of program participants practicing in rural Illinois
(Salafsky 2005). In 2007, White evaluated how access to continuing medical education
(CME) in Australia is important and impacts the retainment of physicians in rural
communities. He found that the access to CME increased the confidence of physicians'
remaining in rural areas. In 2008, Halaas examined the Rural Physician Associate
Program in Minnesota. The nine months longitudinal experiences in
rural communities induced more medical students to choose to practice in rural areas. The
rural rotation experiences influenced health professional students to be more likely to
choose locating in rural communities, especially rural background students (Wolschuk,
2002; Capstick 2008). In 2014, Playford determined Rural Clinical School of Western
Australia Program (RCSWA) which contain rural clinical program. The study showed
that participant in RCSWA program strongly associated with greatly likelihood for
working rural areas.
c. School location in rural area
The study showed that the new physicians who graduated from Memorial University
Medical School, which is located in a rural area in Canada, were more likely to practice in
rural communities, especially those who have a rural background (Mathew, 2008). In
2011, Rabitnowitz evaluated the Physician Shortage Area Program (PSAP) of Jefferson
Medical College (JMC) to show the effective of program impact on female physicians.
The study showed that female physicians who participated in PSAP were more likely to
practice in rural areas compared with non-PSAP female. The result support the
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effectiveness of the medical school rural programs that have the potential to recruit more
female physician practicing in rural areas.
Regulatory strategies
These strategies can be called several names including “compulsory service,”
“obligatory,” “requisite,” and coercive” programs. These programs have been used
worldwide since the early 20th century to recruit and retain health professional in rural
areas in their countries (Frehywot, 2010). The regulatory strategy has been implemented
in many countries worldwide for recruitment and retaining health workers in rural areas
in their country including Thailand. According to Frehywot article, the regulatory
programs were classified three types using differently in 70 counties: 1) condition of
service, 2) compulsory service with incentives, and 3) compulsory service without
incentives. The common one is the mandatory service with incentives program, due to
this program being associated with financial incentives used in many developed countries
(Pathman, 2004; Jackson, 2003; Dunbabin, 2006; Matsumoto, 2008). These evidences
showed that participants who received financial support in exchange for committed to
serve in rural areas were more likely to retain in rural areas than the non-participants
were.
Dolea summarized that some evidences showed that mandatory strategies could
recruit and retain health workers in rural and remote areas. In 2003, Jackson
examined a West Virginia scholarship and loan repayment program, which required
medical students to commit to serve in underserved areas after graduating. The study
showed that committed physicians were more likely to stay in their started practice place
than were non-committed physicians. In 2006, Dunbabin showed the investigation
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of the Cadetship program in Australia, which has a bonding scheme for postgraduate
training where 43% of participated physicians were locating in rural areas, compared to
20% of all national physicians. The bonding scheme from the National Health Service
Corps and Oklahoma’s physician loan repayment/incentive program in USA as well as
the Jichi Medical University home prefecture compulsory scheme in Japan showed the
influential retention (Cullen, 1997; Matsumoto, 2008). However, many bonding
schemes or compulsory services as in the West Virginia program, Cadetship program,
NHSC and Jichi Medcial University programs involved with scholarship and loan
repayment required services which are considered financial incentives intervention also
(Jackson, 2008; Dunbabin, 2006; Cullen, 1997; Matsumoto, 2008).
Professional and personal strategies
In 2010, Dolea suggested that professional and personal factors were the top
choice and preference for work in rural areas. Questionaire-based surveys show that
professional and personal support may affect health workers’ decision to practice in
underserved areas (Grobler, 2015). In 2008, Lehmann showed that poor living condition
and insufficient health care and education facilities were associated with the reluctant to
practice in rural and remote areas.
In 2006, Gardiner evaluated the impact of a rural doctor workforce program. The
program involves social and psychological support and practical interventions, on the
well-being and retention of general practice physicians in rural areas. The study showed
that the enrolled physicians were less likely to leave rural communities in the short to
medium term (from 30% to 25%) (Gardiner, 2006). In 2012, Adzei examined the
motivation and retention of healthcare workers in Ghana. He reported that besides
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financial incentive, non-financial incentives also significance influence motivation and
retention to locate in rural. These non-financial incentives were leadership and
supervision skill, continuing professional development, and infrastructure and resource.
Financial strategies
Evidences showed that financial incentives have influential attractiveness,
recruitment and retention for health workers in rural and remote areas (Gibbon, 2006;
Niger Ministry of Health, 2008; Dolea, 2008). Evidence of financial incentives programs
were from developed and developing countries. Based on the literature review in part one
about factor attracting and retaining health workers in rural areas, many articles were
from developing countries report the important of financial factors. However, when
review the literature about the effectiveness of financial incentive program to recruit and
retain health workers in rural areas, many articles were from developed countries.
Financial incentives programs from developing countries mostly were direct
payment program. The evidences showed that the financial programs and evaluation from
developing countries was very rare compared with the evaluated program from developed
countries (Dolea, 2010; Grobler, 2015). In 2007, Ross examined the Friends
of Mosvold Scholarship Scheme from South Africa. The results found that 100% of
participants completed their committed service in underserved areas. In
2011, Ditlopo evaluated the rural allowance policy in North West Province, South Africa
by interviewing 40 health workers from five rural hospitals. The results showed the rural
allowance affected to the increasing of health workers in rural areas, but most staff
showed program dissatisfaction. In 2013, Antwi investigated the effective of raising
public sector wages program in Ghana. The study found that increasing wages 10% could
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decrease 1.03% health worker rural leaving rate. Not only the number of studies
from developing countries is lesser than studies from developed countries, but also the
quality of the study that required more rigorous study from developing countries (Dolea,
2010; Grobler, 2015).
Financial incentives program from developed countries mostly were scholarship
and loan repayment program. Most of previous and current financial incentive evaluated
studies were from developed countries (WHO, 2010; Dolea, 2010; Humphrey, 2009;
Grobler, 2015). For example, the review article of Barnighausen and Bloom showed that
among 43 studies, most of them were from the US, five of them from Japan, two from
Canada, one from New Zealand and another one from South Africa. Among 34 articles
from the US, 24 articles examined the effectiveness of National Health Service Corps
programs which provide scholarship for health professional students and loan repayment
for young health professionals. The Jichi Medical University program from Japan was
also the scholarship for medical student program. The Ontario Underserviced Area
Program from Canada contained both scholarship for medical students and direct
payment for physician. However, most of the financial incentives program from
developed countries were scholarships and loan payment programs while program from
developing countries were direct payment program.
The evaluated program used utility theory explain the location choice of health
workers. In 1996, Bolduc estimated the model of choice of location by general physicians
for establishing their initial practice. The model used to assess the effect of various
incentive measures introduced in Quebec to influence the geographical distribution of
physicians across 18 regions. Bolduc measured choices of location of the physicians in
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Quebec before and after the intervention and used autoregressive multinomial
probit model analyses data. Bolduc used utility theory explained the incentives policies
to maximize utilization of physicians to practice in the areas. The results provided
evidence that these policies had a significant effect on location choices.
The effectiveness of the financial incentive program was explained by program
outcome. In 2004, Sempowski reviewed the effectiveness of financial incentives in
exchange for rural and underserved areas. He summarized the effectiveness of financial
programs from 10 articles. The results showed that the return-of-service programs to rural
and underserviced areas have achieved their short-term recruitment goal while the longterm retention has less achievement. Barnighausen and Bloom reviewed the evaluated
financial incentives studies conducted from earliest recorded date until January
2009. They identified five different types of financial incentive programs as servicerequiring scholarship (41 studies), education loans with service requirements (2 studies),
service-option educational loans (1 study), loan repayment programs (3 studies), and
direct payment programs (5 studies). The study outcome was categorized in three groups:
program results, program effects, and program impact.
Most studies showed program results outcomes of recruitment, retention, and
satisfaction of participants or families. For example, in 1975, Bass
and Copeman measured the outcome of Ontario Underserved program and found that
about 53% completed committed services and 74% remained in the original location. In
1997 and 2007, Inoue evaluated the Jichi Medical University program, which provided
medical students scholarships for exchange with serving at least nine years in rural
communities. The findings showed that 96% of participants completed the contract and
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67% remained in the original location. In 1994, Pathman et al. studied the outcome of
National Health Service Corps (NHSC) programs. The finding showed that participants
complete committed services less than non-participants do. The means satisfaction of
participants (NHSC physicians) also were lower than the satisfaction of non-participants.
The financial incentives programs effect outcome composed of provision of care,
retention, and participant satisfaction. Evidences showed program effect outcomes, for
instance, Rabinowitz evaluated the Physician Shortage Area Program from Jefferson
Medical College in Philadelphia. In 2000, Rabinowitz found that participants’ physicians
were two time more likely to provide care to the underserved people compared with nonparticipants physicians. In 2001, Rabinowitz showed that 24% of NHSC physicians
provided primary care in rural areas compared with 5% of non-NHSC physicians. In
2003, Probst et al. evaluated the NHSC programs in South Carolina. The finding showed
that 28% of NHSC alumni physicians served Medicaid patients more than 19% of nonNHSC alumni.
The financial incentives programs impact outcome composed of health system
and health outcome. There were a few studies reported these outcomes. In 1990,
Anderson and Rosenberg examined the impact of the Ontario Underservice Area
Program. The study showed that physician density in the rural and remote areas in
Ontario was increasing over the 30 years of the program. In 2005, Holmes evaluated the
impact of NHSC physicians who graduated from 1976-1988. The study showed that the
elimination of the program would affect 10% physicians decreasing in underserved
locations. In 2006, Pathman et al. studied the impact of NHSC programs from physicians,
nurses and physician’s assistant working in all rural Health Professional Shortage Area
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(HPSA) in the US in 1984. The finding showed that having the NHSC program
participants increased the non-participants in underserved communities by six percent.
In 2004, Pathman et al. measured the outcome of financial incentives programs in
40 US states. The programs consisted of state service requiring scholarship, state loan
service-option, state loan repayment, direct financial incentive for residents, and
direct financial incentive for health professionals. As a whole, the study showed that
states support-for-service programs increased physicians in underserved small and rural
communities. The study found that loan payment and direct financial incentives
committed physicians after graduated and had minimal penalties. On the other hand, the
scholarship program committed physician early in their training and had high penalties.
The study showed the best response for completing service and longer retention among
participants from loan payment and direct financial incentive programs.
According to five financial incentives type described in Barnighausen and Bloom
study in 2009. They can be categorized into two main groups: educational financial
incentive support and multipurpose financial support. The educational financial support
group included service-requiring scholarship, education loans with service requirements,
service-option educational loans, and loan repayment programs. There is only direct
payment program is the multipurpose financial support which provided flexibility
compared with the educational financial support (Humphrey, 2009). There is rarely study
of the effectiveness of direct payment programs. Although, the study of Pathman et al. in
2004 showed the study outcome of direct payment program outweighed the scholarship
programs in recruitment and retention of physicians in underserved areas, current
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evidence is not enough to conclude the effectiveness between the direct payment
financial incentive and other incentive programs.
Gap in the Literature
The literature review shows that there is inadequate evidence regarding (i) what
is the effectiveness of direct payment financial incentives in middle-income countries,
and (ii) how the dentist response to the direct payment financial incentives for retaining
them practice in rural and remote areas.
The research gap which have been found from the review literature and will be
fulfilled from this study are including:
1. Most current studies were from developed countries, there was a few
studies from developing countries. Most evidences from developed countries evaluated
the outcome of the financial incentives program such as NHSC programs from USA,
Ontario Underserviced Area Program from Canada, Jichi Medical University program
from Japan. Many evidences from developing countries explored and identified the
important of financial factors without estimating the program outcome (Adzei,
2012; Agey-Baffour, 2013; Awofeso, 2010)
2. Most current studies target population were medical students and
physicians, there was a few studies target population on other health professionals
including dentists. For example, among 24 NHSC evaluated programs, there is only
study from Mofidi et al. in 2002 reported the retention rate of dentists who participated in
NHSC programs.
3. Currently financial incentives evaluation programs mostly examined
programs supported education such as scholarships and loan forgiveness programs. There
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were a few studies assess direct payment programs. This is consistent with the majority
of financial evaluated studies mostly conducted in developed countries. Most Developed
countries implemented educational support programs such as scholarships and loan
forgiveness program. For example, NHSC programs in US provide service-requiring
scholarships for students and loan repayment program for physicians. Ontario
Underservices Area Program in Canada provide Service-requiring scholarships for
medical students and direct financial incentives for physicians. Jichi Medical University
in Japan provide service-requiring scholarships for medical students.
There is no evidence of study on a high direct payment incentive (provide 1-3
times of salary) programs.
The first gap is the current published evaluated strategies for recruiting and
retaining healthcare workers in rural and remote areas mostly done in developed countries
(Humphrey, 2008; Wilson, 2009; Dolea, 2010; Grobler, 2015; Verma, 2016). The
financial incentives programs were also mainly conducted in developed countries. Several
reviewed articles showed that most of the effectiveness financial incentive programs for
attracting and retaining health professional in rural and remote areas were evaluated and
published by many developed countries. For example, in 2004, Sempowski reviewed 10
articles: 6 articles from US, 3 articles from Canada, 1 article from New Zealand and 1
article from South Africa. In 2009, Barnighausen and Bloom reviewed 43 articles: 34
articles from US, 5 articles from Japan, 2 articles from Canada, 1 article from Australia,
and 1 article from South Africa.
Most studies of human resources for health in low-and-middle income countries explored
the problems and identified the factors related with the problem (Adzei,2012;
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Awofeso,2010). Although, many countries have adopted the strategies recommended by
WHO, there is less studies evaluating the effectiveness of the programs (Lehmann, 2008;
Henderson, 2008; Buchan, 2013; Dolea, 2010). Evidence for the effectiveness of
addressing strategies is highly required especially the effectiveness of financial incentives
which commonly used in low-and middle-income countries (Dolea, 2010; Grobler,
2015). The reviewed articles showed that the programs affected decision to leave or stay
in rural and remote areas diversely due to the program implementation in different
environments and contexts such as different occupations, different countries. These
finding suggest that there is required for a study of the effectiveness of financial
incentives for retaining healthcare workers in rural and remote areas in more developing
countries.
The second gap is many published articles of the effectiveness of financial
programs focusing on the behavior of medical students and physicians. For example,
among 43 articles which were reviewed by Barnighausen and Bloom, there were 3
articles: Bradbury in 1963; Mofidi et al. in 2002; and Porterfield in 2003 that showed
study outcome of dentists. In addition, among the studies examined the effectiveness of
the National Health Service Corps (NHSC) programs mostly showed the results of
medical students or physicians, despite students who enrolled in the NHSC programs
involved family nurses, midwives, physician assistants, and dentist (Barnighhausen and
Bloom, 2009). In 2003, Porterfield reported that alumni NHSC dentists were less likely
to work in underserved areas compared with alumni NHSC physicians. However,
this evidence is insufficient to explain the different or similar location choice behavior
of physicians and dentists.
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In Thailand, public/private organization distribution of dentists different from
physicians, pharmacists, and nurses as shown in Table 3.8. Data showed that dentists
mostly practice in private sectors compared with others health professional which
dominated in public sectors. Therefore, the study of the effectiveness of financial
incentives on dentists is required to test whether the dentist’s location choice behavior is
different from other health professionals.
Table 2.1 Public/Private organization distribution of health workers
Healthcare professionals

Doctors
Dentists*
Dental nurses*
Pharmacists
Nurses

Public sector

Private sector

Total

Number (%)

Number (%)

Number

21,550 (82.1)

4,694 (17.9)

26,244

4,725 (47.4)

5,221 (52.6)

9,926

4,313(100)

-

4,313

7,173 (82.4)

1,527 (17.6)

8,700

122,460 (89.7)

13,987 (10.3)

136,447

Public sector: Includes all government owned/funded health facilities under health
ministry and other related ministries.
Sources: MoPH, 2010
* Dental council, 2009
The third gap is most of studies evaluated financial incentives which supported
education such as service-requirement scholarship or loan repayment programs.
For example, among 43 articles Barnighausen and Bloom found 5 direct payment
financial incentives programs from 4 articles: Bass and Copeman in 1975; Anderson and
Rosenberg in 1990; Jackson in 2003; and Pathman in 2000 and 2004. The scholarship and
loan repayment programs are benefit for healthcare students and professionals in some
countries such as the United Stated where the educational cost is very high. However, in
some countries where have low educational cost, the scholarship and loan repayment may
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be less attractive than direct payment incentives. Therefore, there should be more
studies evaluated the effectiveness the direct payment incentives program.
The fourth gap is no published evidence on the high direct payment incentive
program. The study of Voluntary Bonding Scheme New Zealand Ministry of Health in
2012 showed the proportion of direct payment incentives to the physicians was about 10
percent of physician’s salary. The direct payment program in West Virginia showed
maximum incentive was US$ 20,000 to 40,000 per year for physicians working in
underserved areas in 2001 (Jackson, 2003). In Thailand, the Hardship Allowance for
dentists working in rural and remote areas in 2008 were US$ 3,750 – 11,250 per year.
Although the payment was lower compared with incentive payment in New Zealand and
US, the Hardship Allowance in 2008 was 100-200% of new dentist’s salary in Thailand.
This study will show the effectiveness of the high direct payment incentive for retaining
dentists in rural and remote areas.
Conceptual Framework
Based on the utility theory, this study apply to create the model of Thai dentist’s
location choice which shown in Figure 2.2. We assumed that the Thai dentists’ decision
to leave or stay in rural and remote areas depend on two major factors including financial
and non-financial factors.
The conceptual framework of the study is showed in Figure 2.3. This framework
shows all factors related to the dentists’s decision to leave or stay in rural and remote
areas following the model of dentist’s location choice. The framework shows two major
factors including financial and non-financial factors. In this study, we aim to examine
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Figure 2.3 Conceptual Framework
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the effectiveness of the Hardship Allowance, which is the direct payment financial
incentives for dentists working in primary hospitals under the MoPH. Another box of
financial incentives, which might show in the econometric model for data analysis.
However, other financial incentive such as the pay for overtime which is various in each
hospital may be confounding factor that related to the location choice of dentists. For
non-financial incentives in this study, we examine the relationship between age (personal
factor) and the location choice. Although, we assumed other factors have relationship
with the dentists’ location choice such as the opportunity to continuing education, the
limitation of data set causes the missing of this variable in the econometric model. In
addition, other non-financial incentives such as the Hospitals’ administration and
relationship in workplace, which vary in any office, is another unobserved factor may
influence the dentists’ location choice (Lexomboon, 2003). The community or the district
and province environment may be another confounding factor associated with the
decision of dentists’ to leave or stay in rural or remote areas. For instance, the remote
areas in the attractive provinces (such as Chiang Mai in the North region) may be
favorable place for dentists compared with rural areas in unattractive provinces (such as
Burirum in the Northeast region).
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
This chapter describes the purposes and the methodology for the study. Section
3.1 outlines the Aims and the hypotheses of the study. The theoretical models which
consist of the utility model of Thai dentists’ location choice are shown in Section 3.2.
Section 3.3 describes the methodology of the study which consists of specific aims,
hypotheses, study designs, sources of data, study population, unit of analyses, dependent
variables, independent variables, explanatory variables, econometric models, and data
analyses.
The objectives of the study
There are three objectives to this study. The first objective of the study is
to investigate the effectiveness of direct payment financial incentives, the ‘Hardship
Allowance’ (HA), in 2008 for reducing the resignation rates of dentists in rural and
remote areas relative to urban areas. The second objectives is to investigate the effect of
decreasing HA , due to the 2016 policy changing of practice location status from rural to
urban area and remote to rural area, on rural and remote dentist’s resignation. The last
objective is to determine the relationship between dentist’s resignation and dentist’s age
after the decreasing HA, due to the 2016 policy changing of practice location status from
rural to urban area and remote to rural area.
The Specific Aims of the study are:
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Aim1: To examine whether the HA payment in 2008 reduced resignation rates of dentists
in rural and remote provinces relative to urban provinces.
Hypothesis1: Dentists who received higher HA after 2008 are less likely to resign
in rural areas. The resignation rates of dentists in rural and remote provinces after 2008
are decreasing compared with the resignation rates of dentists in urban provinces.
Aim2: To estimate the effect of the HA reduction, due to recategorization in HA areas
from rural to urban in December 2016, on rural and remote dentists' resignation and
relocation.
Hypothesis2: Rural and remote dentists who located in the changed areas which HA was
reduced in December 2016 are more likely to leave (resign and relocate) from their areas.
Therefore, after 2016, the resignation and relocation of dentists in changed areas increase.
Aim3: To examine the relationship between dentists’ age and dentists’ resignation and
relocation in changed areas after the 2016 policy implementation.
Hypothesis3: Based on the policy change in 2016, the HA area was recategorized.
Consequently, the HA payment rate was decreased. Rural dentists who are older affected
the HA reduction more than the younger dentists. Therefore, the older dentists are more
likely to resign or relocate from their areas due to the HA reduction compared with the
younger dentists.
Methodology for Specific Aim 1
Aim1: To examine whether the HA payment in 2008 reduced resignation rates of dentists
in rural and remote provinces relative to urban provinces.
Hypothesis1: After the HA policy in 2008, dentists in rural and remote provinces are less
likely to resign. The resignation rates in rural and remote provinces after 2008 are
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decreasing compared with the resignation rates in urban provinces.
Research Design
The study design for Aim1 is a longitudinal retrospective cohort study using an
observational database. This study is based on the natural intervention. The intervention
is the implementation of financial incentive direct payment called “Hardship Allowance”
(HA) in Thailand in 2008. The Hardship Allowance is the direct payment financial
incentive for physicians, dentists, pharmacists and other health providers working in
primary hospitals under the Ministry of Public Health especially in rural and remote
areas. However, in this study we examine the effectiveness of the financial incentive HA
on retaining dentists in rural and remote areas. The treatment group in this study is only
the dentist group so there is no control group. To minimize the possibilities of selection
bias, we used the retrospective observational data of dentists’ location from 2003 to 2016
to examine the change of location choice before and after policy implementation. The
observational data of dentists’ location before and after policy implementation in 2008
contains variation in Hardship Allowance program. This variation which occurred from
the independent or exogenous changes in event across time can identify the effects of
Hardship Allowance on the dentists’ decision to stay or leave rural and remote areas.
In this study we measure the retention rate of dentists in urban, rural and remote
areas by using the resignation rate of dentists by areas and by province. The resignation
rates by areas are estimated by the number of dentists who resigned divided by all exist
dentists in each area: urban, rural and remote areas. In this study, the area is identified by
urban, rural and remote areas. There is no official definition of rural and remote areas in
Thailand. The rural and remote areas, which are identified in this study, are applied from
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the MoPH identification (Appendix A). The classification of the MoPH for urban,
suburban, rural and remote areas are used to determine the areas for the HA payment.
The classification of rural and remotes areas in this study do not comply with this
common measure which based on population or distance between working place to the
city. The characteristics of hospitals in urban, rural and remote areas under the Ministry
of Public Health Notification Issue 4, shows that urban areas are the capital city in each
province. The urban areas in some big provinces include the capital city and other big
cities which have highly density population. The rural areas are most other districts
beside the capital city, in many provinces most districts are considered the rural areas
which have lower density population compared with the urban city. The remote areas are
found in some provinces mostly near the border provinces. The remote areas are located
the furthest from the urban city compared with rural city and have the lowest density of
population. However, the density population and the distance between hospitals and
urban city in rural and remote areas are various in each province.
The number of urban, rural and remote areas in each province is different
depending on the size and the urbanization. In this study, the rural and urban provinces
are classified by using the percentage of urban hospitals in each province. The urban
hospitals are calculated by the number of hospitals in urban areas divided by all hospitals
in all areas in the provinces. The percentage of urban hospitals are categorized in 4
quartiles (Q1-4). The province in quartile 1 (Q1) have 7.7-16.7% urban hospitals, in
quartile 2 (Q2) have 17.6-25% urban hospitals, in quartile 3 (Q3) have 26.7-33.3% urban
hospitals, in quartile 4 (Q4) have 35.3-100% urban hospitals. The provinces in Q1
indicated the most rural areas. The provinces in Q2 and Q3 are more urbanization
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compared with the province in Q1. The provinces in Q4 are considered the most
urbanized areas.
The overall resignation rate of dentists is calculated by the number of resignation
dentists divided by the number of all public dentists under the MoPH in each province.
The number of resignation dentists from 2003 to 2016 are obtained from the Human
Resource Management Department, MoPH. However, there is no data of individual
dentists from 2003 to 2012. The updated data of individual dentists which obtained from
the annual report of Policy and Strategy Bureau MoPH, are available from 2013.
Therefore, the number of all dentists in each province each year since 2003 to 2012 must
be retrieved from the individual dentist's data in 2013. The number of all dentists in each
province from 2003 to 2012 are estimated by using the recruiting year and resigning year
from individual dentist's data in 2013. The condition used to estimate active dentists is
that “if dentists were active in a given year the recruiting date was before, and resignation
rate was after the given year. For example, the number of active dentists in 2003 are
calculated by counting all dentists who recruited before 2003 and resigned after 2003
Source of data
Our data sources for addressing the specific Aim 1 include the resignation data of
public dentists under MoPH from 2003 to 2016, individual dentists’ data
under MoPH from 2013 to 2016, and the urban, rural and remote areas data in 2008. The
resignation data are obtained from the Human Resource Management Division,
Permanent Secretary Bureau, MoPH. Individual dentists’ data are obtained from the
Policy and Strategy Bureau, which adjusted from annual reported data of Human
Resource Management Division, Permanent Secretary Bureau, MoPH. The urban, rural
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and remote areas data in each province are obtained from the notification of
the MoPH issue # 4 of Policy and Strategy Bureau, MoPH (Appendix A). Due to the
resignation data contained only the individual dentist who resigned from primary
hospitals under MoPH from 2003 to 2016. The updated individual dentists’ data which
obtain from the Policy and Strategy Bureau, MoPH contained exist individual dentists’
data since 2013. Therefore, the existed individual dentists’ data from 2003 to 2012 could
be extracted from the individual dentists’ data in 2013 by using recruiting year and
resigning year of individual dentists as describing above.
Study population
The study population in this Aim 1 is all dentists who are the government
employee working in health facilities under the MoPH. The total 3,132 resignation
dentists in this study are the dentists who worked in health facilities under the MoPH and
resigned from the health facilities under the MoPH from 2003 to 2016. In 2016, the total
dentists who work in health facilities under the MoPH were 5,247. The study population
in this aim is measured by province. The dentists’ data from 75 provinces except
Bangkok are used. We excluded Bangkok due to Bangkok has the special administrative
jurisdiction which differently from other 75 provinces. The most important reason is no
community hospitals in Bangkok which means no HA payment. Based on the reason of
resignation, the dentists who retired, died or fired from any reason are excluded from the
study. The dentist who work in administrative facilities such as provincial public health
office and dentists who work in dental college (dental hygiene's school) are also excluded
from the study.
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Unit of analysis
The unit of analysis in this Aim is the province-year in Thailand. Seventy-five
provinces are reported in the study excluding Bangkok.
Dependent variable
The dependent variable for Aim 1 is the resignation rate of dentists who worked
in the health facilities under the Ministry of Public Health during 2003 to 2016. The
dentists’ resignation rate is calculated from the number of resigned dentists divided by
the number of active dentists in each province in each year from 2003 to 2016. In the
econometric model 1.1, the outcome variables are the resignation rate in urban, the
resignation rate in rural and the resignation rate in remote areas. The rural resignation rate
is calculated from the number of rural dentists who resigned from MoPH divided by the
rural active dentists by province by year from 2003 to 2016. The remote resignation rate
is calculated from the number of remote dentists who resigned from MoPH divided by
the remote active dentists by province by year from 2003 to 2016. The urban resignation
rate is calculated from the number of urban dentists who resigned from MoPH divided by
the urban active dentists by province by year from 2003 to 2016.
In the econometric model 1.2, the outcome variable is the overall resignation rate
in each province each year. The overall resignation rate in this model measure the effect
of policy implementation of dentists' resignation in rural and remote areas compared with
in urban areas.
Key explanatory variable
The key explanatory variable for Aim 1 is the HA payment policy implementation
in 2008. The HA payment policy implementation in 2008 is the direct payment financial
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incentives which the government provide to the healthcare provider including dentists
working in community hospitals under the MoPH. The objective of the HA payment in
2008 is to attract dentists practicing in community hospitals especially in rural and
remote areas by providing about 5 times of previous rate. The HA payment criteria is
based on areas and year of service as shown in Table 1.1 and 1.2 for HA payment before
and after 2008, respectively. The major variables in the Econometric model for Aim 1 are
composed of:
Rural1 is the province in Q1 which has the urban hospital 7.7-16.7% which mean about
92.3-83.8% of the areas in the province are rural and remote hospitals.
Rural2 is the province in Q2 which has the urban hospital 17.6-25% which mean about
82.4-75% of the area in this province are rural and remote hospitals.
Urban1 is the province in Q3 which has the urban hospital 26.3-33.3% which mean
about 73.7-66.7% of the area in this province are rural and remote hospitals.
Urban2 is the province in Q4 which has the urban hospital 35.3-100% which did not
show in the model because being used as a reference.
Post is the HA policy implementation, post is equal 1 if in a year after 2008, otherwise
post is equal zero
Post * Rural1 is the interaction of HA policy and the province in Q1, before 2008
post*rural1 is equal zero
Post * Rural2 is the interaction of HA policy and the province in Q2, before 2008
post*rural2 is equal zero
Post * Urban1 is the interaction of HA policy and the province in Q3, before 2008
post*urban1 is equal zero
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Analysis Method
To achieve the first Aim, a univariate analysis provides estimates of the
demographic characteristics of the study population. A bivariate analysis is conducted to
determine if there is any difference in these characteristics between the rural and remote,
and urban population. As well as the difference in these characteristics between before
and after 2008. Mantel-Haenszel chi square test is used to determine if there are any
differences between two population of rural and remote, and urban areas, and between
populations before and after 2008. The analysis is conducted at a 95% confidence interval
(alpha = .05) A difference in difference regression analysis is then used to estimate the
differences in resignation rate in rural and remote areas relative to urban areas before and
after the 2008 implemented policy. Due to data set in this study is a longitudinal data
(cross-sectional time-series data) so the fixed effect for panel data analysis is used to
examine the model. The model in this analysis is:
Econometric Model: Regression model using fixed effect estimation
Rita = α0 + α1postit +µi+ɤit

(1)

where
Rita is the resignation rate of dentists locate in province ‘i’ in year ‘t’ in areas ‘a’ (urban,
rural, remote areas)
post is the HA implemented policy, post = 1 if year >= 2008, otherwise post = 0
µi is the province i to n.
ɤit is the random error term
The percentage of urban hospitals is classified into 4. The 2nd model can provide
the outcome of overall resignation rate in rural-urban provinces after the policy in 2008.
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The first econometric model measured the difference of the resignation rate of
dentists in each area: urban, rural, and remote areas. Based on the data set using in this
model is the panel data set, therefore the regression for panel data analysis is used. The
outcomes of the model regression in each area will be compared and discussed. Besides
the first model, we measured the outcome of the overall resignation rate of dentists in
different areas before and after the policy implementation by using the econometric
model equation #2. In this model the major predictors are the post (HA implementation
policy) and the percentage of urban hospitals in each province. The urban hospitals are
calculated and divided with all hospitals under the MoPH in each province. The
percentage of urban hospitals is classified into 4 quartiles (Q1-4). The provinces in Q1
which have 7.7-16.7% urban hospitals are indicated the most rural province while the
provinces in Q4 which have 35.3-100% urban hospitals are indicated the most urbanized
province. The 2nd model can provide the outcome of overall resignation rate in both rural
and urban provinces after the policy in 2008.
Yit = β0 + β1Rural1it + β2Rural2it + β3Urban1it + β4postit + β5post. Rural1it + β6post.
Rural2it + β7post.Urban1it + Ɛit

(2)

where
Yit is the overall resignation rate of dentists in province‘i’ in year ‘t’
Rural1 is the province in Q1 with the lowest percentage of urban hospitals, Rural1= 1 if
urban hospital = 7.7-16.7%, otherwise Rural1=0
Rural2 is the province in Q2 with the lower percentage urban hospitals, Rural2= 1 if
urban hospital = 17.6-25%, otherwiseRural2=0
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Urban1 is the province Q3 with the moderate percentage of urban hospitals, Urban1= 1
if urban hospital = 73.7-66.7%, otherwise Urban1=0
Urban2 is the province in Q4 with the highest urban hospital which did not show in the
model because being used as a reference.
post is the HA implemented policy, post = 1 if year >= 2008, otherwise post = 0
Ɛit is random error
Methodology for Specific Aim 2
Aim2: To estimate the effect of the HA reduction, due to recategorization in HA areas
from rural to urban in December 2016, on rural and remote dentists' resignation and
relocation.
Hypothesis2: Rural and remote dentists who located in the changed areas which HA was
reduced in December 2016 are more likely to leave (resign and relocate) from their areas.
Therefore, after 2016, the resignation and relocation of dentists in changed areas increase.
Research design
The study design for Aim 2 is a longitudinal retrospective cohort study using an
observational data. The study is based on the natural intervention. The intervention is the
implementation of reducing the Hardship Allowance rate by changing the dentist’s
working location categorization for allocating HA in Thailand in December 2016. The
Hardship Allowance is the direct payment financial incentive for physicians, dentists,
pharmacists and other health providers working in primary hospitals under the Ministry
of Public Health especially in rural and remote areas. In 2008, Thai government have
launched a policy for attracting healthcare providers stay longer in rural and remote areas
by providing direct payment financial incentive called “Hardship Allowance”.
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In 2008, the HA in rural areas was about 100% of new graduated dentists’ salary and in
remote areas at 200-300%. After the economic growth and urbanized expansion, in
December 2016 the government adjusted the HA area categorization. Some rural areas
became urban areas causing the reduction of the HA rate on the changed areas. The
adjusted HA areas categorization criteria are followed the Notification of MoPH on
December 2012. It was identified that all area in each province were reclassified the
urban, rural or remote areas based on these criteria. First criteria is the difficulty of
transportation from the working location to the urban city within province and to another
big provinces nearby. Second one is the urbanization within the working area’s district
such as number of commercial banks, number of medical and dental private clinics,
number of convenient stores, annual revenue of local government in district level, etc.
Third one is the dentist shortage situation in that area. And the last one is the areas are in
the risk zone which are the three provinces in southern border of Thailand.
The adjusted working areas are collected and distributed by the Ministry of Public
Health Notification Issue #11 and the list of new areas after changing in December 2016
are shown in Appendix B. In this study we examine the effect of the financial incentive
HA reduction due to the adjusting HA area categorization in some rural areas on dentists’
retention in rural and remote areas. The policy affects all dentist population in the study.
The treatment group in this study is only the dentist group so there is no control group.
To minimize the possibilities of selection bias, we used the retrospective observational
data of dentists’ location from 2013 to 2018 to examine the change of location choice
before and after policy implementation in December 2016. The observational data of
dentists’ location before and after policy implementation in December 2016 contains
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variation in Hardship Allowance reduction program. This variation which occurred from
the independent or exogenous changes in event across time can identify the effects of
Hardship Allowance reduction on the dentists’ decision to leave or stay in rural and
remote areas.
In this study we measure the retention rate of rural and remote dentists who stay
or leave from their practice location after the recategorized HA areas from rural areas to
urban areas by using the resignation and relocation of rural and remote dentists. We
compared the resignation and relocation of dentists between the changed areas and
unchanged areas to show the characteristics of dentists in these two areas. Due to the data
set we obtained is the longitudinal data of individual dentists from 2013 to 2018 so we
can do the panel data analysis. We estimate the resignation and relocation of rural and
remote dentists in the changed areas and unchanged areas after the policy implementation
in December 2016 by using difference in difference regression with fixed effect
estimation for panel data analysis.
Sources of data
Data sources used for addressing this specific Aim 2 included the dentists’ data
from 2013 to 2018, and the rural and remote areas data adjusted in December 2016. The
dentist data obtained from the Policy and Strategy Bureau, which is revised from annual
reported data of Human Resource Management Division, Permanent Secretary
Bureau, MoPH from 2013 to 2018. The data contained of individual dentist's data in each
year from 2013 to 2018. Initially, data of dentists in 2013 was selected only dentists
located in rural and remote areas. The new recruited dentists in 2014, 2015, and 2016
were also located in rural and remote areas. The individual dentist data include dentists'
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characteristics for example gender, age, year of service, current salary, and specialty and
geographic location of each dentists by year. The changed status of rural to urban areas
data is obtained from the notification of the MoPH issue # 11,12 by the Policy and
Strategy Bureau, MoPH in December 2016 (Appendix B).
Study population
The study population in this Aim 2 is all dentists who work as a government
employee in rural and remote primary hospitals under MoPH across the country during
2013 to 2018. In this study we excluded data of rural and remote dentist who is
identified that died or retired or was fired from any reason.
Unit of analysis
The unit of analysis in this study is the individual dentist-year working in rural and
remote primary hospitals under MoPH from 2013 to 2018.
Dependent variable
To achieve Aim 2, the dependent variable is whether an individual dentist who working
in rural and remote primary hospitals under the Ministry of Public Health resign or
relocate (to urban areas) from their location during 2013 to 2018.
Key explanatory variable
The key explanatory variable for Aim 2 are the time that changed HA areas
implementation in December 2016 and the changed areas. The changed HA
areas policy in December 2016 is implemented in some rural areas. These rural areas
became urban areas in December 2016, as a result the HA payment rate reduced. The
objective of the HA areas recategorization in December 2016 is to adjust the areas to
comply with the economics and urban expansion. The HA payment rate and criteria in
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December 2016 is as same as in 2013 as shown in Table 3. The major variables in the
Econometric model for Aim 2 are composed of:
RuraltoUrban is the changed areas, ruraltourban =1 if the rural areas became in urban
areas in December 2016, otherwise ruraltourban=0
Post in the econometric model identified when the time of policy implementation
in December 2016, after December 2016 post = 1, otherwise = 0.
Post * RuraltoUrban is the interaction of the policy implementation in December 2016
and the changed area, if after December 2016 and in the changed
area, post*ruraltourban is = 1, otherwise = 0
Covariate variables
The covariate variables use to accomplish Aim 2 are following these variables:
Age is recorded in number in data set. Age of dentists’ data set is the current age at the
time data was record. Age will be categorized in 4 groups: 1 = age 23-28 years, 2 = age
29-35 years, 3 = age 36-45 years, 4 = 46-60 years
Gender of rural and remote dentists is recorded in text in data set. Two value of dentists’
gender is recorded for male and female.
Year of service is recorded in number in data set. Year of services is the duration that
dentists working in any rural and remote primary hospitals under the MoPH. It is
calculated from the different of recruitment date which is a date when dentist start
working in MoPH and resignation date which is a date when dentist quit working
in MoPH.
Region is the geographic area. In Thailand is divided into 4 regions: 1=Northern region,
2=Central region, 3=Northeastern region, and 4=Southern region.
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Distance is the distance from the dentist’s practice location (primary hospital) to the
urban city in each province. The distance in this study is measured in kilometer (1
kilometer = 0.62 mile). In the econometric model for Aim 2 the distance is categorized in
4 groups: 1=0-20km., 2=21-40km.,3=41-60km., and 4=61km.ups
Analysis method
To describe and understand the overview of data in Aim 2, a univariate analysis is
computed to summarize the characteristics of the study population. A bivariate analysis is
used to demonstrate whether there is any difference between before and after December
2016. Mantel-Haenszel chi square test is conducted to measure if there are any
differences in these characteristics between before and after December 2016. The
analysis is conducted at a 95% confidence interval (alpha =.05). The objective of a
bivariate analysis is to control for the unbiased selection. This can show the variation
among the population in these two group to identify the effects of the recategorizing HA
areas policy on the rural and remote dentist’s decision to resign or relocate to urban.
A difference in difference regression analysis with fixed effect estimation for
panel data is then used to estimate the differences in rural and remote dentist’s
resignation and relocation in changed areas after December 2016 implemented policy.
Econometric Model: Difference in difference regression model using fixed effect
estimation
Yit = β0 + β1ruraltourbanit + β2postit + β3postit.ruraltourbanit + βm Xit + Ɛit
Where
Yit is the outcome variables including:
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1) Yit is whether dentist ‘i’ resigned in year ‘t’ , Yit = 1 if dentist ‘i’ resigned in ‘t’,
otherwise Yit = 0 ;
2) Yit is whether dentist ‘i’ relocate to urban in year ‘t’ , Yit = 1 if dentist ‘i’ relocate
to urban in ‘t’, otherwise Yit = 0 ;
3) Yit is whether dentist ‘i’ resigned &relocate in year ‘t’ , Yit = 1 if dentist ‘i’
resigned and relocate in ‘t’, otherwise Yit = 0 t
Ruraltourbanit is the changed areas, ruraltourban =1 if the rural areas became in urban
areas in December 2016, otherwise ruraltourban=0
Postt is the policy implementation, post = 1 if year >= 2017, otherwise post = 0
Post.ruraltourbanit is the time after policy implementation interaction with the
changing area status areas in year ‘t’
Xit is covariate variables
β0 is the intercept
β1 is the slope coefficient for ruraltourban, if β1 is positive, means where the area is
changed, the dentist is more likely to resign from the area. If β1 is negative, means
that where the area is changed, the dentist is less likely to resign from the area, holding
other variable constant.
β2 is the slope coefficient for policy implementation in 2017, if β2 is positive, means that
when the policy implemented in 2017, the dentist is more likely to resign from the area. If
β2 is negative means that when the policy implemented in 2017, the dentist is less likely
to resign from the area, holding other variable constant.
β3 is the slope coefficient for interaction of policy implementation and the changed area,
β3 is the probability of dentist’s resignation after the policy change and the changed area.
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If β3 is positive, it means that after December 2016 at the changed area the dentist is more
likely to resign. If β3 is negative, it means that after December 2016 at the changed area
the dentist is less likely to resign, holding other variables constant.
βm is the slope coefficient for covariate variables and the probability of dentist’s
resignation by covariate variables, holding other variables constant.
Methodology for Specific Aim 3
Aim3: To examine the relationship between dentists’ age and dentists’ resignation and
relocation in changed areas after the 2016 policy implementation.
Hypothesis3: Based on the policy change in 2016, the HA area was recategorized.
Consequently, the HA payment rate was decreased. Rural dentists who are older affected
the HA reduction more than the younger dentists. Therefore, the older dentists are more
likely to resign or relocate from their areas due to the HA reduction compared with the
younger dentists.
Research design
The study design for Aim 3 is also a longitudinal retrospective cohort study using
an observational data. The study is based on the natural intervention. The intervention is
the implementation of reducing the Hardship Allowance rate by changing the dentist’s
working location categorization for allocating HA in Thailand in December 2016. The
Hardship Allowance is the direct payment financial incentive for physicians, dentists,
pharmacists and other health providers working in primary hospitals under the Ministry
of Public Health especially in rural and remote areas. In 2008, Thai government have
launched a policy for attracting healthcare providers stay longer in rural and remote areas
by providing direct payment financial incentive called “Hardship Allowance”.
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In 2008, the HA in rural areas was about 100% of new graduated dentists’ salary and
200-300% in remote areas. After the economic growth and urbanized expansion, in
December 2016 the government adjusting the HA area categorization. Some rural areas
became urban areas causing the reduction of the HA rate on that area. The adjusting HA
area categorization criteria are followed the Notification of MoPH on December 2012. It
was identified that all area in each province were reclassification for the urban, rural or
remote areas based on several criteria following these. First is the difficulty of
transportation from the working location to the urban city within province and to another
big province nearby. Second is the urbanization within the working area’s district such as
number of commercial banks, number of medical and dental private clinic, number of
convenient stores, annual revenue of local government in district level, etc. Third is the
dentist shortage situation in that area. The last one is the areas are in the risk zone which
are the three provinces in southern border of Thailand.
The adjusting working areas are collected and distributed by the Ministry of
Public Health Notification Issue 11 and the list of new areas after changing in December
2016 is shown in Appendix B. In this study, we investigate the relationship between
dentists’ retention and dentists’ age after influencing by the financial incentive HA
reduction due to the adjusting HA area categorization in some rural areas. The policy
affects all dentist population in the study. The treatment group in this study is only the
dentist group so there is no control group. To minimize the possibilities of selection bias,
we used the retrospective observational data of dentists’ location from 2013 to 2018 to
examine the change of location choice before and after policy implementation in 2017.
The observational data of dentists’ location before and after policy implementation in
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2017 contains variation in Hardship Allowance reduction program. This variation, which
occurred from the independent or exogenous changes in event across time, can identify
the effects of Hardship Allowance reduction on the dentists’ resignation in relation to the
dentists’ age.
In this study, we measure the relationship of the age and the resignation rate of
rural and remote dentists after the adjusting areas policy from rural areas to urban areas in
December 2016. We compared the resignation dentists in each age group (22-28, 29-35,
36-45, 46-60) between the changing areas and unchanging areas to show the
characteristics of dentists in these two areas. Due to the data set we obtained is the
longitudinal data of individual dentists from 2013 to 2018 so we can do the panel data
analysis. We estimate the resignation rural and remote dentists in each age group in the
changing areas and unchanging areas after the policy implementation in December 2016
by using segmented regression for panel data analyzation.
Sources of data
Data sources used for addressing this specific Aim 3 is as same as data used in
Aim2, which included the data of dentists from 2013 to 2018, and the rural and remote
areas data adjusted in December 2016. The data of dentist obtained from the Policy and
Strategy Bureau, which is revised from annual reported data of Human Resource
Management Division, Permanent Secretary Bureau, MoPH from 2013 to 2018. The data
contained of data of individual dentists in each year from 2013 to 2018. The individual
dentist data include dentists' characteristics for example gender, age, year of service,
current salary, and specialty and geographic location of each dentists by year. The
changing status of rural areas to urban areas data is obtained from the notification of
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the MoPH issue # 11,12 by the Policy and Strategy
Bureau, MoPH in December 2016 (Appendix B).
Study population
The study population in this Aim 3 is all dentists who work as a government
employee in rural and remote healthcare facilities under MoPH across the country during
2013 to 2018. In this study we exclude data of rural and remote dentist who is identified
in the resignation reason that died or retired or was fired from any reason.
Unit of analysis
The unit of analysis in this study is the individual dentist-year working in
healthcare facilities under MoPH from 2013 to 2018.
Dependent variable
To achieve Aim 3, the dependent variable is whether an individual dentist who
working in rural and remote primary hospitals under the Ministry of Public Health
resign from their location from 2013 to 2018.
Key explanatory variable
The key explanatory variable for Aim 3 are the implementation of the changing
practice location categorization in December 2016, the changing areas and dentists
age. In this study, we aim to measure the relationship of dentists’ resignation and age in
changing areas after the policy implementation. The HA areas changing policy in
December 2016 is implemented in some rural areas which become urbanized. Some rural
areas became urban areas in December 2016 as a result the HA payment rate reduced.
The objective of the HA areas change implementation in December 2016 is to adjust the
areas to comply with the economics and urban expansion. The HA payment criteria in
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December 2016 is as same as the payment criteria in 2013 as shown in Table 3. The
major variables in the Econometric model for Aim 2 are composed of:
The major variables in the Econometric model for Aim 2 are composed of:
RuraltoUrban is the changed areas, ruraltourban =1 if the rural areas became in urban
areas in December 2016, otherwise ruraltourban=0
Post in the econometric model identified when the implementation of the changing
practice location status in December 2016, after December 2016 post = 1, otherwise = 0
Age is recorded in number in data set. Age of dentists data is the current age at the time
data recorded the MoPH. Age will be categorized in 4 groups: 1 = age 23-28 years, 2 =
age 29-35 years, 3 = age 36-45 years, 4 = 46-60 years.
Post * RuraltoUrban is the interaction of the policy implementation in December 2016
and the changed area, if after December 2016 and in the changed area,
post*ruraltourban is = 1, otherwise = 0
RuraltoUrban*Age is the interaction of the changing area status from rural to urban
areas and dentists’ age
Post *RuraltoUrban*Age is the interaction term of the time implementation of the
changing practice location status in 2016, the changed area and age, we can see how age
affect the dentist’s resignation and relocation in changed areas after the time of the HA
areas recategorization implementation in December 2016 .
Covariate variables
The covariate variables use to accomplish Aim 2 are following these variables:
Gender of rural and remote dentists is record in text in data set. Two value of dentists’
gender is recorded for male and female.

80

Year of service is recorded in number in data set. Year of services is the duration that
dentists working in any rural and remote primary hospitals under the MoPH. It is
calculated from the different of recruitment date which is a date when dentist start
working in MoPH and resignation date which is a date when dentist quit working
in MoPH.
Region is the geographic area. In Thailand is divided into 4 regions: 1=Northern region,
2=Central region, 3=Northeastern region, and 4=Southern region.
Distance is the distance from the dentist’s practice location (primary hospital) to the
urban city in each province. The distance in this study is measured in kilometer (1
kilometer = 0.62 mile). In the econometric model for Aim 2 the distance is categorized in
4 groups: 1=0-20km., 2=21-40km.,3=41-60km., and 4=61km.ups
Analysis method
To describe and understand the overview of data in Aim 3, a univariate analysis is
computed to summarize the characteristics of the study population. A bivariate analysis is
used to demonstrate whether there is any difference between the rural and remote
population by age. In addition, the difference in these characteristics between before and
after 2016 by age. Mantel-Haenszel chi square test is conducted to measure if there are
any differences between the rural population and remote population as well as the
differences in these characteristics between before and after 2016 by age. The analysis is
conducted at a 95% confidence interval (alpha =.05). The objective of a bivariate analysis
is to control for the unbiased selection. This can show the variation among the population
in these two group to identify the effects of the changing policy and age on the dentist’s
decision to resign.
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A triple differences regression analysis with random effect estimation for panel
data is then used to estimate the differences in rural and remote dentist’s resignation and
relocation in relation to dentists’ age where the area is changed after the December 2016
policy implementation.
Econometric Model: triple differences regression model using random effect estimation
Yit = β0+β1ruraltourbanit + β2ageit+ β3postit+ β4post.ruraltourbanit + β5 post.ageit+
β6ruraltourbanit.ageit + β7 post.ruraltourbanit.ageit +βmXit + Ɛit
Where Yit is the outcome variables including:
1) Yit is whether dentist ‘i’ resigned in year ‘t’ , Yit = 1 if dentist ‘i’ resigned in ‘t’,
otherwise Yit = 0 ;
2) Yit is whether dentist ‘i’ relocate to urban in year ‘t’ , Yit = 1 if dentist ‘i’ relocate
to urban in ‘t’, otherwise Yit = 0 ;
3) Yit is whether dentist ‘i’ resigned &relocate in year ‘t’ , Yit = 1 if dentist ‘i’
resigned and relocate in ‘t’, otherwise Yit = 0 t
Ruraltourbanit is the changed areas, ruraltourban =1 if the rural areas became in urban
areas in December 2016, otherwise ruraltourban=0
Ageit is the dentist ‘i’ age in year‘t’, age is categorized in 4 groups: 1 = age 23-28 years, 2
= age 29-35

years, 3 = age 36-45 years, 4 = 46-60 years

Postit is the areas changing implemented policy, post = 1 if year >= 2017, otherwise post
=0
Post.ruraltourbanit is the time after policy implementation interaction with the changing
status areas in year ‘t’
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Post.ageit is the time after policy implementation interaction with the age of dentist ‘i’ in
year ‘t’
ruraltourbanit.age is the changed areas in year ‘t’interaction with the age of dentist ‘i’ in
year ‘t’
Post.ruraltourbanit.ageit is the time after policy implementation interaction with the
changing status areas in year ‘t’ interact with the age of dentis ‘i’ in year ‘t’
Xit is covariate variables
β0 is the intercept
β1 is the slope coefficient for ruraltourban, if β1 is positive, means that where the area is
changed, the dentist is more likely to resign from the area. If β1 is negative, means
that where area is changed, the dentist is less likely to resign from the area, holding other
variable constant.
β2 is the slope coefficient for age group. It is the percent of change in dentist’s ‘i’
resignation among age group.
β3 is the slope coefficient for the time implementation in December 2016, if β3 is positive,
means that when the policy implemented in December 2016, the dentist is more likely to
resign from the area. If β3 is negative, means the dentist is less likely to resign from the
area, holding other variable constant.
β4 is the slope coefficient for interaction of the time policy implementation in December
2016 and the changed area, β4 is the probability of dentist’s resignation and relocation
after the policy implementation and the changed area, holding other variables constant.
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β5 is the slope coefficient for interaction of the time policy implementation and age, β5 is
the probability of dentist’s resignation and relocation after the time policy
implementation in December 2016 among age groups, holding other variables constant.
β6 is the slope coefficient for interaction of changed area status and age group, β6 is the
probability of dentist’s resignation and relocation where the area is changed among age
groups, holding other variables constant.
Β7 is the slope coefficient for interaction of the time policy implementation in December
2016, the changed area, and age group, β7 is the probability of dentist’s resignation and
relocation after the time policy implementation in December 2016 where the area is
changed among age groups, holding other variables constant.
βm is the slope coefficient for covariate variables. βm is the probability of dentist’s
resignation and relocation by covariate variables, holding other variables constant.
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CHAPTER 4
MANUSCRIPT 1
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DIRECT PAYMENT FINANCIAL INCENTIVE ON
REDUCING RESIGNATION RATE OF DENTISTS IN RURAL AND REMOTE
AREAS: EVIDENCE FROM THAILAND1

1

Noochpoung R., Hair N., Hung P., Puttrasri W., Chen B., to be submitted to BMD Health
Service Research

85

Abstract
Financial incentive is one of the common strategies used to attract healthcare
workers to and retain them in rural and remote areas by many policy makers in developed
and developing countries. Current studies show that most of the financial incentives
supported education such as scholarships and loan repayment programs are effective.
Few studies assessed the effectiveness of direct payment incentive programs, especially
in low-middle income countries. This study aims to examine the effectiveness of direct
payment (Hardship Allowance) on retaining dentists in rural and remote areas using data
from Thailand. A retrospective observational study was conducted. Data on the
resignation of dentists from 2003 to 2016 and an annual report on dentist’s location were
obtained from the Human Resource Management and the Policy and Strategy Bureau,
Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) in Thailand. The difference in difference regression
and the fixed effect estimation were used to analyze the effectiveness of Hardship
Allowance implemented in 2008. Data from 2003 to 2016 showed that 2,351 dentists
who resigned from the hospital under the MoPH. Over 60% of resigned dentists were
between 22-28 years old. The resignation rate from 2003 to 2016 showed that dentists
who were located in rural areas had the highest rate compared with dentists in urban and
remote areas. The highest resignation rate in rural areas in 2004 was at 29.4%. When the
Hardship Allowance policy was implemented in 2008, the resignation rate started
decreasing dramatically in all areas, but especially in rural areas. Additionally, the
regression analysis showed that the resignation rate of dentists in rural areas significantly
decreased after 2008 by 9.94% (p-value <0.001), while in urban areas after 2008 the
resignation rate decreased by only 2.12% (p-value <0.001).
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In conclusion, the study showed that after the policy implementation the
resignation rate of dentists decreased in all areas. When comparing the resignation rate in
rural and urban areas, the resignation rate in rural areas decreased higher than in urban
areas after 2008. Therefore, the Hardship Allowance programs could retain dentists in
rural and remote areas in Thailand.
Introduction
The uneven distribution of the healthcare workforce between urban and rural
areas is a global issue (WHO, 2010). The statistics showed that 24% of health providers
are in rural areas, while 50% of the world population live in rural areas (WHO, 2010).
This maldistribution of healthcare workers happens both in developed and developing
countries. For example, in the United States, 20% of the population lives in rural areas,
but only 9% of physicians are located there (Hancock et al., 2009). In the urban areas of
Canada and Australia, there are approximately 2.6 and 4.0 physicians per 1000 people,
respectively, while in rural areas of both countries, there are 0.9 physicians per 1000
people (Viscomi, 2013). Evidence showed the maldistribution of health workers in
developing countries is much more severe. For example, in Vietnam at least 53% of
physicians are located in urban areas while 72% of Vietnamese people live in rural areas.
Moreover, data showed that only 67% of rural health centers in Vietnam have a physician
(Vujicic, 2011). Similarly, in Cambodia, approximately 54% of physicians served in the
capital city, even though only 9.6% of Cambodians reside in Phnom Penh. In 2005, the
physician density in the urban areas was about 0.41 per 1000 Cambodian population,
while in the most remote areas the density of physicians was only 0.06 per 1000
population (Chhea, 2010). Thailand is also one of the countries in Southeast Asia, which
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confronts the maldistribution of healthcare workers in urban and rural areas
(Wibunpolprasert, 2003).
Dental care is a part of healthcare that experiences short supply in rural and
remote areas as well as the issues described above. The maldistribution between urban
and rural dentists also exists, and there are a few studies that report the unequal dental
supply. Research showed that about 20% of California communities have a shortage of
dentists. Approximately 70% of communities with dental supply shortages are rural.
Areas with a lower supply of dentists have higher percentages of minorities, children, and
low-income populations (Mertz, 2001). In Australia, a study showed that dentists in a
major city were 59.1 per 100,000 population, while in rural and remote areas dentists
were 28.3 and 16.0 per 100000 population (Teusner, 2005). In Thailand, dentists are also
inequitably distributed, with shortages in some rural and remote areas. Data from the
Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) reported in 2013 shows 50.9% of dentists are in
Bangkok and other big cities, while 49.1% of dentists served population in all countries
in four regions: in North, Central, Northeast, and South region (Dental department
MoPH, 2005).
Oral healthcare is an important aspect of overall healthcare. Evidence showed the
uneven distribution of dental supply related with the disparity in dentalcare access among
people in Bangkok and other regions (Lapying & Puttasri, 2013; 2014). The statistics
showed the dentist per population ratio in Bangkok in 2005 and 2013 was 1:1,305 and
1:1,039, respectively. In 2013, it was 1:9,147, 1:8,499, 1:9,300, and 1:13,783,
respectively in the North, Central, South, and Northeast regions. Data showed that
Bangkok, which has higher supply of dentists, also presented higher dental care access.
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For example, in 2003, 2007, and 2011 the dental service utilization rate was at 0.28, 0.21,
and 0.27 visit/person/year, respectively. In contrast, in the Northeastern region, which has
the lowest supply of dental care, the dental care utilization rate was at 0.12 in 2003, 2007,
and 2011.
Nevertheless, this type of disparity distribution is problematic, attempts have been
made to address it. Several interventions were recommended by World Health
Organization (WHO) in 2010 to lessen the inequitable distribution of healthcare workers.
WHO (2010) established the framework of factors related to healthcare workers’ decision
to leaving or staying in rural and remote areas. The factors include financial aspect,
personal and family factors, working and living conditions, career aspects and mandatory
service factors. To simplify all related factors in our study, we consider other factors
besides financial factors as non-financial factors.
The non-financial incentives can include educational support or general support,
and they are generally used to solve the shortage of healthcare workers in rural and
remote areas in developed and developing countries (Barnighausen and Bloom, 2009;
Dolea, 2010). Non-financial incentives include educational strategies, mandatory service
strategies, and professional and personal support strategies (WHO, 2010). Several studies
support using both financial and non-financial incentives to recruit and retain healthcare
workers in rural and remote areas (Wibulpolprasert, 2003; Henderson, 2008; Dolea,2010;
Grobler, 2015). Nevertheless, financial incentives intervention is more likely to be used
by many policy makers when facing a shortage of healthcare workers despite having
insufficient evidence of the effectiveness of financial incentives (Dolea, 2010). In fact,
evidence showed the financial incentive affected recruitment more than retention
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(Barnighausen and Bloom, 2009; Hamphrey, 2009). The financial incentive strategies are
still used by many countries, and the evaluation of the effectiveness of the programs is
still needed (Dolea, 2010; Globler,2015).
Financial incentives strategy is the common approach that many countries used to
reduce the healthcare providers maldistribution (WHO,2010; Dolea, 2010).
Barnighausen and Bloom (2009) reviewed articles which reported the effectiveness of the
financial incentives’ programs. Most studies have been done in developed countries.
Among the 43 reviewed articles in Barnighausen and Bloom (2009), 34 studies were
from the US, 5 were from Japan, 2 were from Canada, 1 was from Australia, and 1 was
from South Africa. Financial incentives can be categorized into 5 programs: servicerequiring scholar, education loans with service requirements, service option educational
loans, loan repayment, and direct-payment program (Barnighausen and Bloom, 2009).
Moreover, the financial incentives could be classified into 2 groups: educational-support
and the general-support based on the purpose of payment. All 43 articles reported the
effectiveness of health workers’ recruitment, while only 18 articles reported the
effectiveness of the health workers retention in rural and remote areas. Most studies
evaluated the educational support programs. For example, among the 34 articles from the
US, 24 studies reported the effectiveness of National Health Service Corps (NHSC)
program, which provides scholarships and loan repayment for healthcare students and
young healthcare professionals in exchange for working in underserved areas.
Although, the NHSC participants included physicians, nurses, dentists,
pharmacists, and other health providers, most studies measured the recruitment and
retention of medical students and physicians. Among the NHSC evaluated studies, only
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Mofidi (2002) measured the effectiveness of financial incentives for NHSC dentists. In
addition, all study’s participants from Canada, Australia, Japan, and South Africa were
also only medical students and physicians. Furthermore, these articles examined the
outcome of the educational support programs. A few articles measured the outcomes of
the direct-payment programs, for examples, the Ontario Under Serviced Area Program
from Canada, the US programs studied by Jackson (2003), other US focused-studies in
Pathman (2000 and 2004), and the Friend of Mosvold Scholarship Scheme in South
Africa. Pathman et al.(2004) compared the effectiveness and outcomes of financial
incentive programs from 40 states in the US. They found that loan repayment and direct
payment programs have something in common. For instance, these two programs
intensely committed medical students after their graduation and the penalties for
incomplete obligatory service was lower than the scholarship program where committed
students earlier. The results also showed that the retention rate of participants in loan
repayment and direct payment programs were longer compared with the scholarship
programs. To conclude, all evaluated articles showed the effectiveness of recruitment at
about 33-100% while less than half of evaluated articles showed the effectiveness of
retention with a range between 18-90%.
Based on the literature review, there are a few research gaps in the study of the
effectiveness of the financial incentive programs:
1. Most studies were from developed countries, and only a few studies were from
low-middle income countries (B&B, 2009; Dolea, 2010; Henderson, 2008).
2. Most studies’ populations were medical students and physicians (Dolea, 2010).
Other healthcare professionals, such as dentists, were rarely examined.
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3. The financial incentive programs that were evaluated in the studies mostly were
educational support programs, e.g. scholarships, loan forgiveness. A few studies
assessed direct payment programs (B&B,2009).
4. There is no study of a high direct payment incentive program (1-3 times of
salary).
Thailand as a place of study provides an opportunity to address all these gaps.
There is no evidence to show the effectiveness of financial incentive programs for
dentists retaining in rural and remote areas in Thailand.
Therefore, in this study, we aim to examine the effectiveness of direct payment
financial incentives on decreasing the resignation rate of dentists in rural and remote
areas relative to urban areas. We hypothesized that dentists who received higher Hardship
Allowance (HA) after 2008 are less likely to resign from rural areas. The resignation
rates of dentists in rural areas after 2008 decreased compared with those dentists in urban
areas.
Background
The Thai Government has implemented financial policies for retaining healthcare
providers in rural and remote areas for over two decades. The Hardship Allowance
program is a financial incentive that government implemented to reduce the income gap
between the private and public sectors. In 2008, the government started a huge revision of
Hardship Allowance program. The Hardship Allowance payment in Thailand in 2008
provided extra compensation to new physicians and dentists working in rural and remote
areas representing about 100%-300% of their salary. This intervention made the income
of new graduated dentists in rural and remote areas higher than new graduated dentists in
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urban areas (Pagaiya, 2015). The evaluated study of the Hardship Allowance program is
required to provide evidence about the effectiveness of this financial incentive program to
the Thai Government and other countries with similar contexts.
Thailand Hardship Allowance Policy Before 2008
Before 2008, the HA policy to attract healthcare professionals to work in
community hospitals in rural and remote areas across Thailand had a tiered allowance
system as shown in Table 1.1. Since 1989, every new graduated dentist from public
school have mandatory service in any community hospitals (urban, rural, remote areas)
for three years. After completing three years they can choose to leave or stay in public
hospitals. The hardship allowance policy provided direct payment for every public dentist
working in hospitals under the MoPH. There is no condition beyond serving in the public
hospitals for at least 15 days a month. There is no penalty for leaving the public hospitals
in any areas.
At the present, there is no rural and remote definition which every country can
applied (Matsumoto, 2008). There is no official definition of rural and remote areas in
Thailand as well. The classification of the MoPH for urban, suburban, rural and remote
areas are used to determine the areas for the HA payment. The objective of the HA
payment policy is to attract, and influence dentists stay longer in the unattractive areas
such as rural and remote areas. Before 2008, most areas outside urban city in downtown
have been considered rural areas. The remote areas are in some provinces, especially the
border provinces. In Thailand has an urban district where city hall and provincial public
health office are located. The population density in urban district is approximately more
than 500 per square mile. Most district beside urban district are determined rural district
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according to MoPH in 2001. The population density in rural district is approximately less
than 500 per square mile. The remote districts were mostly the furthest from the urban
district, which have difficulty transportation. The population density in remote district is
approximately less than 100 per square mile. However, the classification of rural and
remotes areas in this study do not comply with this common measure across Thailand. In
this study, the rural and remote areas are defined following the MoPH identification
(http://bps.moph.go.th/new_bps/node/52).
Table 1.1 shows the Hardship Allowance rate for dentists working in rural and
remote areas for 1 year to over than 3 years before 2008. However, the number of dentists
who resigned from the hospitals under the MoPH, especially in rural areas, still increased.
Therefore, the government decided to increase the Hardship Allowance payment to
remain dentists in public hospitals under the MoPH.
Hardship Allowance Policy change in 2008
The number of dentists increased between 2001 and 2008; however, the unequal
distribution of dentists persisted. The resignation rate of dentists was also increasing
(Dental Department, MoPH, 2008). Financial incentive was the strategy chosen to decrease
the resignation rate of dentists. Therefore, in 2008, the government increased the HA
significantly, giving the highest direct-payment incentive to dentists working in rural and
remote areas as show in Table 1.2. In 2008, the HA rate for dentists depended on years of
service and the practice area; for example, dentists who serve in urban and rural areas for
1-3 years would receive $3,750 per year, while their cohorts who serve in remote areas
would receive $7,500-$11,250 per year. The HA rate also increased for those who served
longer in any community hospitals under MoPH; for example, dentists who served 4-10
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years in urban and rural areas would receive $7500 and $11,250 per year, respectively.
Compared with the HA rate before 2008, the HA rate for dentists located in rural areas
after 2008 increased five times from the previous one.
Table 4.1 The comparison of Thailand’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per Capita with
new graduated dentist’s annual salary and annual Hardship Allowance
Year

GDP per

Salary of new

Hardship Allowance

Capita

graduated dentists

Rural

Remote

2007

US$ 3,978

US$ 3,671

US$ 720-938

US$ 3750-7500

2008

US$ 4,380

US$ 3,821

US$ 3,750

US$ 7500-11250

2009

US$ 4,208

US$ 3,821

US$ 3,750

US$ 7500-11250

Before 2008, the hardship allowance in rural areas was about 20-25% of new
graduated dentists’ salary and 100-200% in remote areas. In 2008, the hardship allowance
in rural areas was about 100% of new graduated dentists’ salary and 200-300% in remote
areas. This table demonstrates the high-powered incentives of the HA policy. New
graduated salary was a little bit lower than GDP per capita. But when added with
Hardship allowance, dentist work in rural and remote areas would earn higher than GDP.
Theoretical model
In this study we used the utility theory to explain the decision to stay or leave
rural and remote areas of dentists. We assumed that dentists have different preference to
stay or leave rural and remote areas. They have chosen to locate in the areas that provide
them the maximum utilization based on financial and non-financial factors. The simple
utility function of dentists’ location choice can be denoted as function (1).
U (π, x; β)
U = f (π, x; β)

(1)

95

Where U is the utility function of dentist choice
π is the financial factors which in this study we estimate the effectiveness of the HA
x is non-financial factors
β is the vector of parameters
We adopted the WHO framework of factors related to the decision to leave or stay
in rural areas to account for the non-financial factors. From the WHO 2010 framework,
all factors included financial aspect, mandatory service, personal origin and values,
family and communities’ aspects, working and living conditions, and career related
aspect. The 2010 WHO framework is shown in Figure 1.1.
Based on the 2010 WHO framework, besides the financial aspects are nonfinancial factors. They include personal origin and values, family and community aspects,
working and living condition, career related aspect, and mandatory service. The
framework of Thai dentist’s location choice is established to comply with the 2010 WHO
framework, and it is shown in Figure 1.2.
In this study, we aim to measure the choice of dentists to resign from the MoPH
in rural areas. We assumed that dentists’ preferences, which affect the decision to resign
or stay, included both financial and non-financial factors.
Method
Research design and data sources
The study design for Aim1 is a longitudinal retrospective cohort study using an
observational database. This study is based on the natural intervention. The Thai
government implemented the financial incentive direct payment called “Hardship
Allowance” (HA) in Thailand in 2008. The Hardship Allowance is the direct payment
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financial incentive for physicians, dentists, pharmacists and other health providers
working in primary hospitals under the Ministry of Public Health especially in rural and
remote areas. However, in this study we examine the effectiveness of the financial
incentive HA on retaining dentists in rural and remote areas. The intervention group in
this study is only the dentist group so there is no control group. We used the retrospective
observational data of dentists’ location from 2003 to 2016 to examine the resignation rate
before and after policy implementation. The variation which occurred from the
independent or exogenous changes in event across time can identify the effects of
Hardship Allowance on the dentists’ decision to resign from the MoPH in rural and
remote areas.
In this study we measure the resignation rate of dentists by areas and by province.
The resignation rates by areas are calculated by the number of dentists who resigned
divided by all exist dentists in each area: urban, rural and remote areas. In this study, the
area is identified by urban, rural and remote areas as categorized by the Ministry of
Public Health Notification Issue 4 (appendix A). The resignation rate of dentists in urban,
rural and remote areas before and after the policy implementation are analyzed following
the econometric model 1.1.
The number of urban, rural and remote areas in each province is various
depending on the size and the urbanization. In this study, the rural and urban provinces
are classified by using the percentage of urban hospitals in each province. The urban
hospitals are calculated by the number of hospitals in urban areas divided by all hospitals
in all areas in the provinces. The percentage of urban hospitals are categorized into 4
quartiles (Q1-4). groups: 1) 7.7-16.7% urban hospitals, 2) 17.6-25% urban hospitals, 3)
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26.7-33.3% urban hospitals, and 4) 35.3-100% urban hospitals. The provinces have 7.716.7% urban hospitals are indicated the most rural areas and the provinces have 35.3100% urban hospitals are indicated the most urbanized areas.
The overall resignation rate of dentists is calculated by the number of resignation
dentists divided by the number of all public dentists under the MoPH in each province.
The number of resignation dentists from 2003 to 2016 are obtained from the Human
Resource Management Department, MoPH. However, there is no data of individual
dentists from 2003 to 2012. The updated data of individual dentists which obtained from
the annual report of Policy and Strategy Bureau MoPH, are available from 2013.
Therefore, the number of all dentists in each province each year since 2003 to 2012 must
be retrieved from the individual dentist's data in 2013. The number of all dentists in each
province from 2003 to 2012 are calculated by using the recruiting year and resigning year
from individual dentist's data in 2013. For example, the number of active dentists in 2003
are calculated by counting all dentists who recruited before 2003 and resigned after 2003
Study population
The dentist’s population in this study were all the government employees under
the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH). Our data contained all public dentist population
under the MoPH in Thailand. The resigned dentists’ data and the annual report with
dentist location data contained information on public dentists who work in community,
provincial, and regional hospitals in 76 provinces in Thailand. There was no resigned
dentists’ data and annual report with dentist location data for public dentists in Bangkok.
Dentists who worked in dental colleges (which produce dental nurses), the dental
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department in provincial public health office, and the dental department in MoPH were
excluded from the study.
The location areas which provided the hardship allowance in 2008 were classified
into 5 areas for government documents: urban, suburban, rural, remote1, and remote2
(see Table 1.2). To simplify our model and analyses, we reclassified the areas into 3
areas, including urban, rural and remote. We grouped urban and suburban into urban
areas and remote1 and remote2 into remote areas.
The resignation data we obtained, lack of information of active dentists from 2003
to 2012. Therefore, we estimated active dentists during 2003 to 2012 from the annual
report dentist location data in 2013. The active dentist is determined to have existed in a
given year (2003 to 2012) when their recruitment year is before the given year and their
resignation year is after the given year.
Variable used
The dependent variable used in this study is the resignation rate of dentists. We
measured the resignation rate of dentists before the policy implementation in 2008
compared with the resignation rate after the policy.
The independent variable is the HA payment policy implementation in 2008 as
well as the percent of urban hospitals in each province, each year. The HA payment
policy implementation in 2008 is the direct payment financial incentive, which the
government provided to the dentists working in hospitals under the MoPH. The urban
hospitals were the hospitals under the MoPH which located in urban and suburban areas
corresponded with the HA areas in Table 1.2. The urban hospitals were categorized in 4
quartiles (Q1-4). The provinces in Q1, which contained 7.7-16.7% urban hospitals, are
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considered the most rural province while the provinces in Q4, which contained 35.3100% urban hospitals, are considered the most urbanized province. The province in Q2
and Q3 contained urban hospitals between 17.6-25% and 26.7-33.3%, respectively.
Data Analysis
Descriptive statistics were calculated to describe the characteristics of the study
population. A bivariate analysis was used to show whether there is any difference
between populations, before and after the implementation of financial incentive program.
The analysis was conducted at a 95% confidence interval (alpha= .05). A difference in
difference regression with fixed effect analysis was then used to estimate the differences
in resignation rate in rural areas relative to urban areas before and after the 2008
Hardship Allowance policy implementation.
Econometric Model: Regression model using fixed effect estimation
Rita = α0 + α1postit +µi+ɤit

(1)

where
Rita is the resignation rate of dentists locate in province ‘i’ in year ‘t’ in areas ‘a’ (urban,
rural, remote areas)
post is the HA implemented policy, post = 1 if year >= 2008, otherwise post = 0
µi is the province i to n.
ɤit is the random error term

The first econometric model measured the difference of the resignation rate of
dentists in each area: urban, rural, and remote areas. Based on the data set using in this
model is the panel data set, therefore xtreg is used to regress this model. The outcomes
of the model regression in each area will be compared and discussed. Besides the first
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model, we measured the outcome of the overall resignation rate of dentists in different
areas before and after the policy implementation by using the econometric model
equation #2. In this model the major predictors are the post (HA implementation policy)
and the percentage of urban hospitals in each province. The urban hospitals are counted
and divided with all hospitals under the MoPH in each province. The percentage of urban
hospitals is classified into 4 groups: 0-25%, 26-50%, 51-75%, 76-100%. The provinces
which contained 0-25% urban hospitals are considered the most rural province while the
provinces which contained 75-100% urban hospitals are considered the urbanized
province. The 2nd model can provide the outcome of overall resignation rate in both rural
and urban areas after the policy in 2008.
Yit = β0 + β1Rural1it + β2Rural2it + β3Urban1it + β4postit + β5post.Rural1it +
β6post.Rural2it + β7post.Urban1it + βmXit + Ɛ it

(2)

where
•

Yit is the overall resignation rate of dentists in province‘i’ in year ‘t’

•

Rural1 is the province in Q1, Rural1= 1 if urban hospital = 7.7-16.7%, otherwise
Rural1=0

•

Rural2 is the province in Q2, Rural2= 1 if urban hospital = 17.6-25%,
otherwiseRural2=0

•

Urban1 is the province in Q3, Urban1= 1 if urban hospital = 26.7-33.3%, otherwise
Urban1=0

•

Urban2 is the province in Q4, Urban2 is a reference among all areas.

•

post is the HA implemented policy, post = 1 if year >= 2008, otherwise post = 0

•

Xit is covariate variables
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Results
Dentist Characteristics
Data from Table 4.2 showed that 2,351 dentists resigned from the public health
sectors under the MoPH from 2003 to 2016. The resignation dentist is approximately
43.04% of all existed dentists in MoPH. The age groups of dentists in this study were
classified into 4 groups: 22-28, 29-35, 36-45, and 46-60 years old. The results in Table 4
clearly show that the 44-60 group has the lower proportion of number of dentists as well
as the lower resignation percentage. The 22-28 group has the highest resignation
percentage compared with the other age groups. Gender characteristic of Thai dentists
showed that most of public Thai dentist are women. The resignation number of female
dentists was higher because the overall number was higher, but the percentage of male
dentists’ resignation was higher than those of female resignation. However, there is no
significant different of dentists’ resignation rate among gender. Considering resignation
by area, it was found that urban and rural dentists resignation percentage was nearly
equal at 49.6% and 43.9% respectively, while resignation percentage of remote dentists
was the lowest at 6.4%. The resignation percentage by the year of service was consistent
with the age. Data showed that dentists who served for 1-3 years was the highest group at
54.7 and the dentists who served more than 21 years was the lowest group at 5.1%. The
resignation dentists were much more obvious in the early year of service group. The
dentists who served for 1-3 years showed the highest resignation percentage which was at
60.22% followed by the dentists who served for 4-10 years group was at 30.06%, the
dentists who served for 11-20 years was at 7.82%, and the dentists who served over than
21 years was at 1.9%.
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Table 4.2 Dentist characteristics by resignation status during 2003-2016, n (column%)
characteristics

Resignation 2003-2016
Yes (2351)

No (5462)

22-28

1,531(66.13)

2,794(51.15)

29-35

603(26.05)

1,412(25.85)

36-45

138(5.96)

927(16.97)

46-60

43(1.86)

329(6.02)

Male

722(31.19)

1,632(29.88)

Female

1,593(68.81)

3,830(70.12)

Urban

6,418(49.59)

1,205(52.79)

Rural

4,666(43.99)

1,029 (38.38)

Remote

1,029 (6.42)

156(8.46)

1-3

1,394(60.22)

2,862(52.39)

4-10

696(30.06)

1,409(25.79)

11-20

181(7.82)

840(15.38)

21 up

44(1.90)

352(6.44)

North

542(23.41)

1,172(21.45)

Central

699(30.19)

1,399(25.61)

Northeast

722(31.19)

1,909(34.94)

South

352(15.21)

983(17.99)

P-value

Age
P < 0.001

Gender
P=0.251

Area
P < 0.001

Year of service
P < 0.001

Region

Distance
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P < 0.001

0-20km

418(18.06)

1,135(20.83)

21-40km

278(12.01)

278(14.77)

41-60km

266(11.49)

773(14.15)

61km ups

1,353(58.44)

2,745(50.25)

P < 0.001

Thailand geography is categorized by 4 regions including North, Central,
Northeast, and South regions. The dentists’ resignation rate by regions showed that
dentists located in the Northeast region had the highest resignation the rate of 31.19%,
which is close to the resignation rate 30.19% in central region. Dentists working in the
Southern region had the less resignation rate of 15.21%. The distance of hospitals from
the urban city or Mueang district, where the downtown of each province is located, is
measured. Generally, Provincial Public Health Offices and all government offices are in
Mueang(urban) district. The distance between the hospital to Mueang district is classified
into 4 groups including 0-20km, 21-40km, 41-60km, and 61km up. It was found that
dentist, who located in the hospitals more than 61km away from urban district have the
highest resignation rate at 58.44%.
The resignation trend from 2003 to 2016
The line graph in figure 4.3 shows the trend of resignation rate of dentists by areas
by years. It is found that the highest resignation rate is in rural areas. The highest rate is
29.6% in 2004. The lowest resignation rate is in remote areas. The resignation trend
among urban, rural and remote areas shows that the resignation rate before and after 2008
in urban and remote areas quite not differ. The line graph of resignation rate in urban and
remote areas seem straight compared with the line of resignation rate in rural areas. In
rural areas the resignation trend is obviously different before and after 2008. The graph
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shows that the resignation trend in all areas is decreasing after 2008 especially in rural
areas.
The average of dentist resignation rates by urban hospitals within each province
Table 4.3 compared the average of overall resignation by urban hospitals in each
province compared before and after the policy implementation in 2008. Data show that

Resignation rate

the average dentist resignation rate before 2008 higher than the average after 2008. In this
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Figure 4.1 Unadjusted trends in resignation rates from 2003 to 2017 by service location
(urban, rural, remote)
result table, the urban hospitals are used to represent the rural or urban areas in provincial
level. For example, the provinces in Q1 which have the urban hospital 7.7-16.7%
represents the rural provinces. The provinces in Q4 which have the urban hospital 33.3100% represents the urbanized provinces. These rural and urbanized provinces were
consistent with the regions shown in Table 4.6. This table showed that most urbanized
areas are in province in Central region which is close to Bangkok the capital city. The
rural and remote areas are the provinces in Northern, Northeastern and Southern regions

105

which close to the border of the country. The comparison of the average resignation rate
between before and after 2008 showed that in the rural provinces (which urban hospital
7.7-16.7%) has the most difference compared with the average in the urban provinces.
The estimated percentage point changes from fixed effect estimation in resignation
rates among rural and remote areas.
Table 4.3 The average of dentist resignation rates by urban hospitals within each province
Areas (%of urban
hospitals) (N=1063)

Dentist Resignation rate
Means Before 2008

Means After 2008

Difference before
and after 2008

0-25%

12.98

6.20

-6.78

9.28

5.46

-3.82

51-75%

12.31

6.98

-5.33

76-100%

7.95

4.93

-3.02

26%-50%

Table 4.4 showed the results from the econometric model (1.1) fixed effect
estimation analysis by areas. It was found that before 2008, dentists were more likely to
resign from the hospital under the MoPH in all areas. The highest resignation rate was
shown in rural areas. It was found that the estimate predicted resignation rate of dentist in
rural areas before 2008 was at 17.45%. The resignation rate in remote areas is the lowest
rate among three areas. After 2008, data showed that the resignation rate in all areas
decreased. The highest reduction rate is in rural areas. It was shown that after 2008 the
dentist resignation rate reduced by 10.08% per year. The comparison of the resignation
rate of dentists in rural and remote areas with urban areas, has shown that the resignation
rate in rural areas declined higher rate compared with the resignation rate in urban areas.
The reduction of resignation rate in urban and rural areas significantly decreased while in
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remote areas the reduction rate insignificantly decreased. Table 4.5 showed the results
from the regression analysis from the econometric model (1.2). In this model we also
used the percentage of urban hospitals to represent the rural or urban provinces as same
as the results shown in Table 4.3. It was found that the overall resignation rate before
Table 4.4 Estimated percentage point by fixed effect estimation in resignation rates
among urban rural and remote dentists by province after the 2008 HA policy.
Urban

Rural

Remote

-2.122**

-9.941**

-0.071

(0.673)

(1.421)

(1.014)

7.510**

17.315**

3.505**

(0.542)

(1.130)

(0.809)

R2

.009

.047

.000

No of Observation

1,064

1,064

1,064

76

76

76

Sigma_u

5.42

10.32

5.66

Sigma_e

10.59

22.25

15.87

rho

.207

.117

.113

After 2008

Intercept

No of groups

Note: standard errors are reported in parenthesis
** indicates significance at 95% level
2008 in all areas increased each year. In this model we used urbanized province as a
reference. Before 2008, overall resignation rate was increasing every year in all areas. It
was found that after 2008, the overall resignation rate decreased at 3.01%. Our finding
shows that the overall resignation rate after 2008, declined in all areas. The resignation
rate in rural provinces (7.7-16.7 %urban hospitals) after 2008, significantly decreased at
3.79% compared with the urban provinces.
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Table 4.5 Estimated percentage point by difference in difference regression on overall
resignation rates among province contained urban hospitals7.7-16.7%,17.6-25%, 26.733.3%, and35.3-100%, respectively.
Overall resignation rate
Intercept

7.95**(1.31)

Post(after2008)

-3.01**(1.09)

Rural1(7.7-16.7%urban hospitals province)

5.09**(1.83)

Rural2(17.6-25%urban hospitals province)

1.27(1.81)

Urban1(26.7-33.3%urban hospitals province)

4.42**(1.91)

Rural1.post

-3.79**(1.52)

Rural2.post

-.76(1.51)

Urban1.post

-2.27(1.58)

R-sq within/R-sq between

.0779/.0005

No. of observation/No. of groups

1,064/76

Sigma_u

5.338

Sigma_e

8.526

rho

.281

Note: standard errors are reported in parenthesis
** indicates significance at 95% level
Discussion
The aim of the study is to examine the effectiveness of the financial incentive
program Hardship Allowance program. We used the resignation rate before and after the
policy implementation to examine whether the resignation rate has changed. The results
in the difference in difference regression analysis, showed that the resignation rate
decreased in all areas-urban, rural, and remote-, after the policy implementation. The
overall outcomes show that the resignation rate in all three areas decreased
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Table 4.6 the group of provinces by region and the percentage of urban hospitals
Region
North

Provinces in Q1
chainat

Provinces in Q2
chiangmai

Provinces in Q3
chiangrai

Provinces in Q4
nakhonsawan

lampun

kamphaengphet

phichit

phetchabun

maehongson

lampang

nan

payao

phitsanulok

prae

uthaithani

sukhothai

uttaradit

tak
uttaradit

ayutthaya

nakhonnayok

angthong

chacheangsao

chantaburi

pathumtani

kanchanaburi

chonburi

trad

phetburi

prachinburi

lopburi

ranong

singburi

nakhonpathom

Central

nonthaburi
prachuapkirikhan
rayong
ratchaburi
samutprakan
samutsakhon
samutsongkhram
suphanburi
Northeast

amnatcharoen

nakhonpanom

burirum

nakonratchasima

buengkan

roiet

chaiyaphum

sakonnakhon

loei

ubonratchatani

kalasin

surin

mukdahan

yasothon

khonkan

nongbualamphu

mahasarakam

saraburi

nongkhai

109

sakao
sisaket
udonthani
South

Nakhonsirtham
krabi

chumphon

satun

marat

narathiwat

pattalung

surattani

phuket

pattani

songkla

phangnga

trang
yala

significantly after the policy implementation although only the resignation rate in remote
areas insignificantly decreased. These results clearly show that the direct payment
financial incentives have affected the dentists’ decision to resign from the rural and
remote areas. This outcome is consistent with several studies, which examined the
financial incentives strategies (Sempowski, 2004; Barnighausen and Bloom, 2009; Dolea,
2010; Grobler, 2015).
The outcome of the study is consistent with the study’s hypothesis. We assumed
that the HA direct payment is influential factor for dentist remain in rural and remote
areas. The finding shows that after 2008, dentists in rural, urban and remote areas are less
likely to resign from their practice location. The study did not have control groups (nonprogram participants) to compare with the treatment groups (program participants).
Nevertheless, we used fixed effect estimation for panel data analyzation to show the
causal effect of the policy on the resignation rate of each areas (urban, rural, and remote
areas) before and after 2008. The results evidently show that the resignation rate in rural
areas significantly decreased after the policy increasing HA in 2008. Moreover, the
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resignation rate in urban areas significantly also decreased but the resignation rate
reduction in urban areas is lesser than in rural areas.
In urban areas, data showed that the resignation rate from 2003 to 2016 was lower
than in rural areas. This result is consistent with many studies (Lexomboon, 2003;
Nilnate, 2009). There are several reasons could explain the reason of the results of the
resignation rate between before and after. First, most Thai dentists have original
background in urban areas (Lexomboon, 2003; Nilnate, 2009; Pagaiya, 2015). Based on
the factors related to health workers decision to leave or stay in rural and remote areas,
original background is one of the strong influences of health workers decision (Wilson,
2009; Dolea, 2010; WHO, 2010). Most urban dentists who have original background in
urban areas are more likely to stay in urban areas. Then some rural dentists who have
urban original background are more likely to resign the rural areas and some urban
dentists who have urban original background are more likely to stay in the current
location. Another reason is the HA payments may affect the urban dentists less than rural
dentists because the urban dentists can do dual practice (Wibulpolprasert, 2003;
Henderson, 2008). Dentists in urban have more opportunities to earn extra money for
working in private clinic in the evening or on weekend. The income from private sectors
may be equal or higher than the HA rate. Therefore, in urban areas the HA payments
have the less influences for dentists to decide to resign or stay in the practice location
compared with rural dentists.
The resignation rate of dentists in remote areas decreased with no significant
difference. In the unadjusted trend graph also showed that the resignation rate in remote
areas the lowest rate among three areas (urban, rural, and remote areas). The reason may
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include the probability that the dentists in remote areas choose to relocate instead resign
when they decide to resign their practice location. However, our data is insufficient to
justify this assumption. Data set from 2003 to 2016 shows only the resignation rate of
dentists. Second reason is the dentists in remote areas required higher incentives to
increase the difference between before and after the HA policy implementation. This
current HA rate may not be sufficient to motivate remote dentists to remain in their
workplace. The last one is the possibility that the financial incentive is not the only factor
influence the dentists and other health workers remain in remote areas. Previous studies
reported the effectiveness of the integration of financial and non-financial incentives to
increase the long retention of health workforce in remote areas ( Henderson, 2008;
Lehman,2008)
These showed that the HA payment affected the decision of dentists to resign
from their practice location especially in rural areas. Although, our data could not provide
how long the dentists remain in the rural and remote areas, the data could show that the
dentists are less likely to resign from rural areas after the policy implementation. This
study is different from other current studies in many ways. For example, most previous
studies showed the effectiveness of financial incentive which support education such as
scholarship and loan repayment programs (Sempowski, 2004; Baunighausen and Bloom,
2009; Humphrey, 2008; Grobler, 2015). Some studies show the effectiveness of
recruiting and retaining at maximum to 100% and 90% respectively (Barnighausen and
Bloom, 2009). However, all studies which show high percentage of program’s
accomplishment used descriptive analysis and there is no control group in the study (Bass
& Copeman ,1975) This made several studies were commented the causal effect
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explanation of the program and the retention rate of the participants ( Barnighausen and
Bloom, 2009; Dolea, 2010; Grobler, 2015).
The difference in difference regression with fixed effect estimation is used in this
study to minimize the time-invariant variables which the results could show the causal
effect of the HA program and the reduction of dentists’ resignation rate. The study can
show the effectiveness of the HA on retaining dentists in rural areas. Our finding can
demonstrate the effectiveness of the direct payment program to stay longer in rural areas.
Although, our study has insufficient data to present the period of year that dentists stay
longer in rural areas, the finding could show the causal effect of the direct payment
program using fixed effect estimation to justify. The study employs pre and post
intervention to measure the effectiveness of direct financial payment on resignation of
dentists. The method is rigorous evidence to demonstrate the direct payment financial
incentive which is the requirement from several current review articles (Humphrey, 2009;
Leman, 2007; Barnighausen and Bloom, 2009 ).
The resignation trend of rural dentist after 2008 was decreasing for a couple of
year then it rebound up again. Although the resignation rate did not rise as high as in
2004-2005, the rising of resignation rate after receiving high amount of hardship
allowance showed that financial incentives might not be the only factors influencing the
decision to resign or stay in practice location of dentists. This outcome is consistent with
several studies showed the motivational factors for retaining healthcare provider in rural
and remote areas (Henderson, 2008; Lehman, 2008; Humphrey, 2009; Grobler, 2015).
Many evidences reported that only financial incentives are not enough to retain health
workers in rural and remote areas. The non-financial incentives for example, the good
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working and living environment, the provision to school for health worker’s children, the
opportunity to continuing education all affected the decision of health workers leaving or
staying in practice location. These can explain by the utility maximization theory, which
dentists decide to resign or stay in rural and remote areas to optimize their utility (Bolduc,
1997).
Evidence support using the financial and non-financial incentives to motivate
healthcare workers remain in rural and remote areas (Lexomboon, 2003; Henderson and
Tulloch, 2008; Lehman, 2008). Studies show factor related to healthcare workers
decision to resign or stay in rural and remote areas include financial factors such as salary
supplement, benefit, hardship allowance and non-financial factors such as personal and
family factors, working and living conditions, career aspects (WHO, 2010; Dolea, 2010).
The results from the study show the variation of the public dentists in MoPH. They are all
receive the HA after the policy implementation. Although, most dentists in rural areas
who received higher HA rate were less likely to resign compare with the dentists in urban
areas who received lower HA rate, there were resigned dentists in rural areas. This
various response of dentists demonstrated that higher HA rate is not the only factor for
dentists decide to resign or stay in rural and remote areas.
In addition, the mapping graph showed the low resignation rate in rural areas were
in the most Northern region and the most Southern regions. Before policy
implementation in 2008 the resignation rate of rural dentists was high in Northeastern
region and upper part of Central region which far from Bangkok. The resignation rate of
rural dentists after 2008 was reducing especially in Northern and Southern region, there
were more provinces had resignation rate lower than 5%. However, most provinces in
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Northeastern still had resignation rate between over than 5% to 15%. This could be
supported the important of non-financial incentives for decision to resign or stay of
dentists in Northeastern areas. These variation of the resignation rate among regions
showed that dentists have different preference to decide the practice location. However,
the constraint of the data set causes our study has not enough evidence to support the
influence of non-financial incentives. We expected to have future study contain complete
data and can explain comprehensively the relationship between financial and nonfinancial factors on health providers decision to resign or stay in rural areas.
Conclusion
The study showed that after the policy implementation in 2008 the overall
resignation rate of dentists decreased especially in rural areas. These showed that the
Hardship Allowance payments affected the decision to resign rural areas of dentists.
Although, there is insufficient data to explain how long the direct payment HA could
decrease the resignation rate of the dentists, we can conclude that the Hardship
Allowance programs could retain dentists in rural and remote areas.
Limitation
The resignation data set was incomplete. There is no active dentists contained in
the resignation data set. To show the resignation rate, which we choose to be an outcome
for answer our research questions, we must estimate active dentists from the annual
report data set in 2013-2016. Although this method provides number of active dentists, it
is the underestimated number of dentists, which is lessen the reliability of the study
outcome.
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The most important limitation in this study is lack of the true rural-urban
measurement. The unit of analysis of the study is the province-year. However, we could
not comprehensively define the rural-urban provinces. In the study, we measured the
rural-urban provinces by estimating from the number of the urban hospitals in each
province. Consequently, the results show some rural provinces, which estimated from the
urban hospitals, are the attractive province and have low resignation rate. This indicate
the inconsistent areas using the urban hospitals estimation.
Furthermore, the data source of this study is obtained from the annual report of
Human resource management which contained a few variables. There are some variables
unavailable from the data set. For examples, variables which related with the nonfinancial incentives is not included in the annual report. Based on the conceptual
framework showed the factor related to the decision of dentists to leave or stay in rural
and remote areas involved with financial and non-financial factors. However, the
observational data is contained mostly the financial factor variables and some personal
characteristics of dentists. Therefore, the outcome shows the restricted evidence to
analyses and discuss to complete to theoretical concept.
This study we used the resignation rate to measure the effectiveness of the
hardship allowance. We assumed that the resignation rate decreased mean the dentist
retained in rural areas however in our study did not show whether they are still in the
rural areas. They may be move from rural to urban areas which our data are restricted to
answer whether they move from rural to urban or stay in rural.
Another limitation is this study we used the resignation rate to measure the
effectiveness of the HA programs. Even though the outcome showed that the resignation
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rate reduced after the HA program implementation, we do not know the long-term effect
of the program. Our data we obtained have no retention rate to show the true retention
before and after the program.
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MANUSCRIPT 2
THE EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL INCENTIVE REDUCTION ON LOCATION
CHOICE OF RURAL AND REMOTE DENTISTS: EVIDENCE IN THAILAND2
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Abstract
Both developed and developing countries generally use financial incentives to
tackle the disparity distribution of healthcare workers. Previous studies showed the
effectiveness of financial incentives on recruitment and retention of healthcare workers.
However, most studies were conducted in developed countries and assessed positive
incentives programs. Few studies evaluated the effect of financial incentive reduction on
the health workers’ decision to stay or leave their practice location in low-middle income
countries. This study aims to examine the impact of financial incentive reduction, due to
the changed HA areas categorization, on rural and remote healthcare workers. A
retrospective observational study was conducted. Data on the rural and remote dentist's
location annual report, including the relocation and resignation from 2013 to 2018, were
obtained from the Human Resource Management Department and the Policy and Strategy
Bureau at the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) in Thailand. Segmented regression was
used to analyze the effect of Hardship Allowance reduction on dentists’ decision to stay
or leave their location. Data of 2,384 rural and remote dentists is examined to determine
the location choice between the changed and unchanged areas categorization after the
policy implementation in December 2016. The outcome shows that the resignation of
dentists in unchanged and changed areas is not significantly different. However, the
relocation of dentists from rural to urban in changed areas after the policy
implementation is more likely to increase significantly.
In conclusion, the direct payment reduction does not affect the number of
resignations, but the relocation of dentists. The dentists decide to leave their location after
the direct payment HA reduction policy was implemented. Therefore, the reduction of
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financial incentives could deteriorate the retention of health workers in rural and remote
areas.
Introduction
The disparities distribution of the healthcare workforce between urban and rural
areas is a global issue (WHO, 2010). WHO (2010) showed that the proportion of
healthcare providers per population was higher in urban areas compared to rural areas.
Many studies showed that healthcare workers prefer to work in urban areas (Dussault,
2005; Henderson, 2008;). Statistics showed that about 50% of world population live in
rural areas while approximately 38% of nurse and 25% of physicians provided health
care in rural areas. Both developed and developing countries have experienced this
uneven distribution of healthcare workers (Dolea, 2010; WHO, 2010).
The consequence of this uneven health workers is the restricted access to
healthcare of people in areas that have a low density of health workers. The disparity of
health service in rural and remote areas is related to the lack of healthcare providers in
these areas (Dussault, 2005; Henderson, 2008; WHO, 2010). Evidence shows that the
shortage of a healthcare workforce is associated with the population’s health outcome
(Chen, 2004; Henderson, 2008). For instance, data from WHO reported that the five-year
children mortality rate is high in countries that have a low density of healthcare workers
(Henderson, 2008).
The lack of oral healthcare professionals in rural and remote areas is also part of
the same global health issues (Kruger 2005). For example, Kruger showed that in some
parts of Western Australia the dentists per 100,000-population ratio was 5.9, while it was
43 in the capital cities. This same disparity of dental health providers happened in
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Thailand, too. For example, in 2013, dentist per 100,000-population ratios was 96 in
Bangkok, while it was 7 in the Northeastern region (Lapying & Puttasri, 2013). As a
result, the areas with the higher dental supply showed the higher dental care services. For
example, the dental care utilization of Bangkok citizens in 2011 was 0.27
visit/person/year, but the dental care utilization of Northeastern region people was 0.12
visit/person/year.
To improve health outcomes and increase equitable access to healthcare for the
rural population, WHO recommended strategies to recruit and retain qualified healthcare
providers in rural and remote areas. These strategies include educational, mandatory
services, professional and personal support, and financial incentives interventions (WHO,
2010; Dolea, 2010). Among those recommended strategies, financial incentives are the
strategy which is selected the most to address the healthcare worker issues, both in
developed and developing countries where confront with the shortage of healthcare
workers especially in rural and remote areas (Humphrey, 2009; Dolea, 2009; Grobler,
2015).
Evidences show the effectiveness of financial incentives for recruiting and
retaining healthcare workers in rural and underserved areas (Dolea, 2010;
Sempowski,2004; Barnighausen and Bloom, 2009; Grobler, 2015). Most studies
evaluated and reporting the effectiveness of financial incentives program were from
developed countries, for examples the USA, Japan, Australia, Canada, etc. The financial
incentives program from these countries was mostly the scholarship and loan repayment
programs. Moreover, the study population mostly were medical students and physicians.
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There are few studies that include study population in dentists and other health
professionals (Barnighausen and Bloom, 2009).
Background
Thailand is also one developing country using financial incentives strategies to
address the inequitably distributed healthcare providers in urban and rural areas. The Thai
government implemented direct payment financial incentives called Hardship Allowance
(HA) to motivate health profession stay in primary hospitals under the Ministry of Public
Health (MoPH). Since 2001, the HA are provided to healthcare providers including
physicians, dentists, pharmacists, nurses, etc., to retain them in rural and remote areas.
The highest rate HA policy was launched in 2008. The government implemented
the Hardship Allowance policy, which provides 100% of salary to rural dentists and
200% to 300% of salary to remote dentists. The evaluated study showed that the HA
policy could reduce the resignation rate of dentists in rural areas significantly.
However, in 2013, the government adjusted the rate and criteria of payment which
reduced the HA rate of Dentists who located near the city and Dentists who served over 4
years. This significant change happened again in December 2016 when the government
adjusted the HA areas. Some rural areas became urban areas which reduced the HA rate.
Table 1 shows the criteria and rate of HA payment in 2008 and 2016, and the reduction of
HA payment when rural areas became urban areas.
Many studies examined the effectiveness of the financial incentive on recruitment
and the retention of healthcare workers. However, few studies evaluate the impact of
financial strategy when the government has to change the policy to match the status of
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Table 5.1 Hardship Allowance annual payment in 2008, 2016 and the reduction after the
policy changed the areas categorization

In 2008
Year of
services

Urban

Suburban

Rural

Remote 1

Remote 2

1-3 years

$3,750

$3,750

$3,750

$7,500

$11,250

4-10 years

$7,500

$9,375

$11,250

$15,000

$18,750

11-20 years

$9,375

$11,250

$15,000

$18,750

$22,500

21 years up

$11,250

$15,000

$18,750

$22,500

$26,250

1-3 years

$3750

$3750

$3750

$3750

$7500

4-10 years

$4500

$5625

$7500

$11250

$15000

11 years up

$5625

$7500

$9375

$15000

$18750

In 2016 until the present

The difference if rural areas become urban areas
1-3 years

$3750 -$3750 =$0

4-10 years

$4500 -$7500 =3000(40%)

$5625-$7500 = -875(25%)

11 years up

$5625-$7500 = 3750(50%)

$7500 -$9375 =-1875(20%)

resources and economics in the country. This study aims to examine the effect of
financial incentive reduction on rural and remote healthcare workers. In this study, we
used rural and remote dentist data in Thailand to represent the healthcare workers in rural
and remote areas from low-middle income countries.
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Theoretical model
In this study, we used the utility theory to explain the decision to stay or leave
rural and remote areas of dentists. We assumed that dentists have different preference to
stay or leave rural and remote areas. They have chosen to locate in the areas that provide
them the maximum utilization based on financial and non-financial factors. The simple
utility function of dentists’ location choice can be denoted as function (1).
U (π, x; β)
U = f (π, x; β)

(1)

Where
U is the utility function of dentist choice
π is the financial factors which in this study we estimate the effectiveness of the HA
x is non-financial factors
β is the vector of parameters
We adopted the WHO framework of factors related to the decision to leave or stay
in rural areas to account for the non-financial factors. From the WHO 2010 framework,
all factors included financial aspect, mandatory service, personal origin and values,
family and communities’ aspects, working and living conditions, and career related
aspect.
Based on the 2010 WHO framework, besides the financial aspects are nonfinancial factors. They include personal origin and values, family and community aspects,
working and living condition, career related aspect, and mandatory service. The
framework of Thai dentist’s location choice is established to comply with the 2010 WHO
framework, and it is shown in Figure 1.2.
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In this study, we aim to measure the effect of the HA reduction, due to
recategorization in HA areas from rural to urban in December 2016, on rural and remote
dentists' resignation and relocation. We assumed that Rural and remote dentists who
located in the changed areas which HA was reduced in December 2016 are more likely to
leave (resign and relocate) from their areas. Therefore, after 2016, the resignation and
relocation of dentists in changed areas increase.
Method
This is a longitudinal retrospective cohort study using an observational data. The
study is based on the natural intervention of the policy implementation of reducing the
Hardship Allowance rate by reclassifying the rural and urban areas for allocating HA in
Thailand in December 2016. The Hardship Allowance is the direct payment financial
incentive for physicians, dentists, pharmacists and other health providers working in
primary hospitals under the Ministry of Public Health especially in rural and remote
areas. In 2008, the Thai government launched a policy for attracting healthcare providers
to stay longer in rural and remote areas by providing a direct payment financial incentive
called “Hardship Allowance”.
In 2008, the HA in rural areas was about 100% of new graduated dentists’ salary
and 200-300% in remote areas. After the economic growth and urbanized expansion, in
December 2016 the government adjusted the HA area categorization. Some rural areas
became urban areas causing the reduction of the HA rate in those areas. The adjusting
HA area categorization criteria followed the Notification of MoPH on December 2012. It
was identified that all areas in each province were reclassified to urban, rural or remote
areas based on several criteria. First, it is the difficulty of transportation from the working
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location to the urban city within the province, and to another big province nearby.
Second, it is the urbanization within the working area’s district, such as the number of
commercial banks, the number of medical and dental private clinic, the number of
convenient stores, the annual revenue of local government in district level, etc. Third, it is
the dentist shortage situation in that area. The last criteria, it is whether or not the areas
are in the risk zone, which are the three provinces on the southern border of Thailand.
After the announcement of new criteria for the reclassification of the HA areas,
each provincial public health office has to collect and analyze data and send the list of
new area categorizations to the MoPH. Then the Policy and Strategy Bureau, in the
MoPH collected all the reports from every provincial public health office and distributed
them throughout the MoPH Notification Issue#11. The list of new areas reclassified and
distributed in December 2016 has shown in Appendix B.
In this study, we examine the effect on dentists’ decision to leave or stay in rural
and remote areas, from the financial incentive HA reduction, due to the adjusting HA
area categorization in some rural areas. The policy affects all the dentist populations in
the study. The intervention group in this study is only the dentist group so there is no
control group. Therefore, we used the retrospective observational data of dentists’
location from 2013 to 2018 to examine the dentists’ resignation and relocation before and
after policy implementation in 2017. The observational data of dentists’ location before
and after policy implementation in 2017 contains variation due to HA reduction program.
This variation, which occurred from the independent or exogenous changes in events
across time, can identify the effects of the Hardship Allowance reduction on the dentists’
decision to stay or leave rural and remote areas.
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The effect of dentists’ resignation and relocation after policy implementation in
the areas that changed from rural areas to urban areas was measured. We compared the
resignation and relocation of dentists between the changed areas and unchanged areas to
show the characteristics of dentists in these two areas. Because the data set, we obtained
is the longitudinal data of individual dentists from 2013 to 2018, we can do the panel data
analysis. We estimated the resignation and relocation of rural and remote dentists in the
changed areas and unchanged areas after the policy implementation in December 2016 by
using interrupted time series regression for panel data analyzation.
Sources of data
Data sources used for addressing this study’s aim included the dentists’ data from
2013 to 2018, and the rural and remote areas data adjusted in December 2016. The dentist
data was obtained from the Policy and Strategy Bureau, which is revised from the annual
reported data of Human Resource Management Division, Permanent Secretary
Bureau, MoPH from 2013 to 2018. The data contained individual dentist's data in each
year from 2013 to 2018. The individual dentist data includes dentists' characteristics, for
example, gender, age, year of service, and geographic location of each dentist by year.
The changed status of rural to urban is obtained from the notification of the MoPH issue
# 11,12 by the Policy and Strategy Bureau, MoPH in December 2016.
Study population
The study population in this study is rural and remote dentists who work in
primary hospital under MoPH across the country during 2013 to 2018. We
excluded data of rural and remote dentist who died, retired, or fired for any reason.
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Unit of analysis
The unit of analysis in this study is the individual dentist-year working in rural
and remote primary hospitals under MoPH from 2013 to 2018.
Dependent variable
To achieve the study’s aim, the dependent variable is whether an individual
dentist who was working in rural and remote primary hospitals under the Ministry of
Public Health resigned or relocated (to urban areas) from their location from 2013 to
2018.
Key explanatory variable
The key explanatory variables are the time during the implementation policy in
December 2016 and the changed areas. The recategorized HA areas policy in December
2016 is implemented in some rural areas which become urbanized areas. Some rural areas
became urban areas in December 2016, and as a result the HA payment rate reduced. The
objective of the recategorized HA areas’ implementation in December 2016 is to adjust
the areas to comply with the economics and urban expansion. The HA payment criteria
in December 2016 is the same as the payment criteria in 2013 as shown in Table 1.
The major variables in the Econometric model for the study are composed of:
RuraltoUrban is the changed areas, ruraltourban =1 if the rural areas became in urban
areas in December 2016, otherwise ruraltourban=0
Post in the econometric model identified when is the time that policy implementation,
after December 2016 post = 1, otherwise = 0.
Post * RuraltoUrban is the interaction of the time of the policy implementation and
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the changed area status from rural to urban areas, if after December 2016 and in the
changed areas, post*ruraltourban is = 1, otherwise = 0
Covariate variables
The covariate variables use to accomplish the study are following these variables:
Age is recorded in number in data set. Age of dentists in resignation and relocation data
is the current age at the time they leave from the MoPH. Age will be categorized in 4
groups: 1 = age 23-28 years, 2 = age 29-35

years, 3 = age 36-45 years, 4 = 46-60 years

Gender of rural and remote dentists is record in text in data set. Two value of dentists’
gender is recorded for male and female.
Year of service is recorded in number in data set. Year of services is the duration that
dentists working in any rural and remote primary hospitals under the MoPH. It is
calculated from the different of recruitment date which is a date when dentist start
working in MoPH and resignation date which is a date when dentist quit working
in MoPH.
Region is the geographic area. In Thailand is divided into 4 regions: 1=Northern region,
2=Central region, 3=Northeastern region, and 4=Southern region.
Distance is the distance from the dentist’s practice location (primary hospital) to the
urban city in each province. The distance in this study is measured in kilometer (1
kilometer = 0.62 mile). In the econometric model for Aim 2 the distance is categorized in
4 groups: 1=0-20km., 2=21-40km.,3=41-60km., and 4=61km.ups
Data analysis
Descriptive statistics are calculated to describe the characteristics of the study
population. A bivariate analysis is used to demonstrate whether there is any difference
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between before and after December 2016. Mantel-Haenszel chi square test is conducted
to measure if there are any differences in these characteristics between, before, and after
December 2016. The analysis is conducted at a 95% confidence interval (alpha =.05). A
segmented regression analysis for panel data is then used to estimate the differences in
rural and remote dentist’s resignation and relocation where the area is changed after the
2017 implemented policy.
Econometric Model
Difference in difference regression with fixed effect estimation:
Yit = β0 + β1ruraltourbanit + β2postit + β3postit.ruraltourbanit + Ɛit
From this model we applied into 3 models, where Yit are the resigned dentists, the
relocated to urban dentists, and the resign and the relocated to urban dentists following
these:
1) Yit is whether rural and remote dentist ‘i’ resigned in year ‘t’ , Yit = 1 if dentist ‘i’
resigned in ‘t’, otherwise Yit = 0 ;
2) Yit is whether rural and remote dentist ‘i’ relocate to urban in year ‘t’ , Yit = 1 if dentist
‘i’ relocate to urban in ‘t’, otherwise Yit = 0 ;
3) Yit is whether rural and remote dentist ‘i’ resigned in year ‘t’ , Yit = 1 if dentist ‘i’
resigned in ‘t’, otherwise Yit = 0 t
Ruraltourbanit is the changed areas, ruraltourban =1 if the rural areas became in urban
areas in December 2016, otherwise ruraltourban=0
Postt is the policy implementation, post = 1 if year >= 2017, otherwise post = 0
Post.ruraltourbanit is the time after policy implementation interaction with the
changed area in year ‘t’
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Xit is covariate variables
Results
Dentist Characteristics
The characteristics of rural and remote dentists locating in unchanged areas and
changed areas from 2013 to 2016 show in Table 5.2. The unit of the dentists’ number in
this table is dentist-year. Unchanged area is the location, which is identified rural area
before and after December 2016. On the other hand, changed area is the location which is
identified rural area before December 2016 but after that it became urban area. The age of
dentists is categorized into 4 groups. There are 22-28-year-old, 29-35-year-old, 36-45year-old, and 46-60-year-old. Data shows that rural and remote dentists in this study
mostly are age between 29-35 years both in unchanged and changed areas. The number
of the youngest group age 22-28-year-old are the second and mostly located in
unchanged areas. About 30% of rural dentists are in middle age group 36-45-year-old and
most of them locating in changed areas. The oldest group which age 46-60-year-old are
less than 10% of all rural dentists. Most of the oldest group are in the changed areas as
same as the middle age group.
Data show the majority of dentists in Ministry of Public Health in Thailand are
female. In this study, about 70% are female dentists. Even though, the number of female
dentists showed that they are in unchanged areas. The proportion of male in unchanged
and changed areas is 1.6 while the proportion of female in unchanged and changed areas
is 1.1.
According to the HA rate and criteria in 2013 and 2016 by MoPH, the year of
service are categorized into three groups: 1-3-year, 4-10-year, and 11-year ups.
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Table 5.2 Dentist characteristics by rural to urban policy status during 2013-2018, n
(person-year) (column %)
characteristics

Rural to urban policy
Unchanged areas

Changed areas

N= 6,242

N= 4,971

P-value

Age
22-28

2, 276 (36.46)

908 (18.27) P < 0.001

29-35

2,566 (41.11)

2,194 (44.14)

36-45

1,174 (18.81)

1,491 (29.99)

46-60

226 (3.62)

378 (7.60)

Male

2,247(36.00)

1,359(27.34) P < 0.001

Female

3,995(64.00)

3,612(72.66)

Gender

Year of service
1-3

2,259(36.19)

877(17.64) P < 0.001

4-10

2,760(44.22)

2,372(47.72)

11 ups

1,223(19.59)

1,722(34.64)

North

1,526(24.45)

1,402(28.20) P < 0.001

Central

723(11.58)

2,136(42.97)

Northeast

2,345(37.57)

925(18.61)

South

1,648(26.40)

508(10.22)

Region

Distance from hospital to the urban city in each province.
0-20km

400(6.41)
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937(18.85) P < 0.001

21-40km

946(15.16)

2,488(50.05)

41-60km

1,896(30.37)

1,009(20.30)

61km ups

3,000(48.06)

537(10.80)

Nearly half of them have been working under the MoPH for 4-10 years. Among
these 3 groups, the proportion of the smallest experience group (1-3 years) are the highest
group which locating in the unchanged areas. Thailand geography have been classified in
4 regions: North, Central, Northeast, South regions. The unchanged areas mostly are in
Northeastern region. About 40% of changed areas are in Central regions. This is
consistent with the distance from the practice location areas to the urban city in each
province. Due to unchanged areas mostly are further the urban city in each province than
changed areas, and most of unchanged areas are in the Northeastern region. In this study,
the distance to the city are categorized in 4 groups: 0-20km.,21-40km., 41-60km., and
60km ups. Data shows that nearly 50% of the furthest locations (60km ups) are the
unchanged areas. Another 30% of the further location which has a distance about 41-60
km. from the city also are the unchanged areas. Contrarily, about 50% of location which
has a distance 21-40 km. from the city are in the changed areas. In addition, the nearly
20% of location which less than 20 km from the city are in the changed areas.
The results in Table 5.3 shows the number of rural and remote dentists who stay
or leave from the rural areas between the dentists in unchanged and changed areas from
2013 to 2018. However, the unit of dentists’ number is a dentist because we count the
resignation, relocation of dentists each year. In 2013 to 2014, dentists in unchanged areas
resigned more than dentists in changed areas about 0.4%, while all dentists who relocated
to urbans areas are from the unchanged areas. As well as, the number of resigned dentists
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Table 5.3 Dentist location status by rural to urban policy during 2013-2018, n (column
%)
Year

Location status

Rural to urban policy
Unchanged areas
(rural_rual)

20132014

84(7.4)

Relocated to urban

17(1.5)

0(0)

6(0.5)

5(0.6)

1,032(90.6)

836(92.5)

1,139(100)

904(100)

Stay

Resign

115(10.5)

71(8.2) P < 0.001

73(6.7)

2(0.2)

Relocated to rural areas

34(3.1)

42(4.9)

872(79.7)

747(86.7)

1,094(100)

862(100)

Resign

84(8.1)

Relocated to urban

29(2.8)

1(0.1)

6(0.6)

11(1.4)

912(88.5)

753(93.3)

1,031(100)

807(100)

Relocated to rural areas
Stay

20162017

63(7.0) P=0.016

Relocated to urban

Stay

20152016

Changed areas
(rural_urban)

Resign

Relocated to rural areas

20142015

P-value

Resign

124(11.8)

Relocated to urban

42(5.2) P=0.001

59(7.5) P=0.002

21(2.0)

12(1.5)

8(0.8)

0(0)

902(85.5)

714(91.0)

1,055(100)

785(100)

Relocated to rural areas
Stay
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20172018

Resign

64(6.8)

34(4.7) P < 0.001

Relocated to urban

47(5.0)

16(2.2)

Relocated to rural areas

21(2.2)

18(2.5)

812(86.0)

658(90.6)

944(100)

726(100)

Stay

from the unchanged areas are higher than the resigned dentists from the changed areas
during 2015 to 2018. In addition, the number of dentists in the unchanged areas who
relocated to urban areas are also higher than the number of dentists in the changed areas
significantly during 2015 to 2018.
Mapping of the percentage of changed areas by province
The map graph in Figure 5.1 and 5.2 shows the mapping of percentage of urban
areas before and after the policy implemented in December 2016 by province on Thai
maps. This showed how the areas changed from rural areas to urban areas. The dark blue
is stand for the highest rate and the light blue is stand for the lowest rate of changed
areas. The map demonstrates that most of the changed areas located in the province in
central region. Most provinces in northeastern region and provinces near the border of the
country contain the lower percentage of changed areas. In this study, the changed areas
are the areas which were identified rural after the policy implemented in December 2016,
these areas became urban areas. This map can be explained that most rural areas in the
central regions became urban areas which is understandable. Because most provinces in
central regions are close to Bangkok the capital city which easy to urbanization. Figure
5.3 (green) shows the average of resignation dentists by province. Comparing mapping

135

Figure 5.1 Mapping graph of percent of urban areas by province in 2013

Figure 5.2 Mapping graph of percent of urban areas by province after December 2016
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Figure 5.3 Mapping graph of resigned dentists by province

Figure 5.4 Mapping graph of relocated dentists by province
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graph in Figure 5.2 and 5.3, it is found that the high average resignation is not in the
central region where located most changed areas but the border in northeastern region
where located most unchanged areas. Figure 5.4 shows the percentage of relocation to
urban of dentists. The map graph showed that provinces which contain high percentage of
changed areas have more relocation percentage.
The resignation trend by area changed from 2013 to 2018
The trend graph (Figure 5.5) shows the resignation rate of dentists from 2013 to 2018 in
unchanged and changed areas. The graph shows that both resignation trend between
unchanged and changed areas are similar pattern. However, the resignation rate in
unchanged areas is higher than in changed areas. After policy implementation in 2017
and 2018 the unchanged areas still rural areas, but the changed areas became urban areas.
This shows that dentists in unchanged areas (close to rural areas) are more likely to resign
from their location, while dentists in changed areas (close to urban areas) are less likely
to resign from their location. Figure 5.6 shows the pattern of relocation rate of rural
dentists in unchanged and changed areas from 2013 to 2018. The trend shows that the
relocation rate of dentists in unchanged areas increased since 2013 continuously until
dropping in 2017. After 2017, the relocation trend in unchanged areas is more likely to
grow up. The relocation trend of changed areas quite stable since 2013 but after the
policy implementation in December 2016, the trend is rising persistently.
The estimated percentage point from difference in difference regression on
resignation and relocation rates among rural and remote areas.
We applied the regression analysis for panel data to analyze the effect of the HA
rate reduction, due to the recategorized HA areas policy in December 2016, on
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Figure 5.5 unadjusted trend graph of dentists resignation rate by years from 2013 to 2018
resignation and relocation rate of dentists in rural and remote areas. The results table
shows that the resignation dentist in changed area increase insignificantly compared with
unchanged areas. However, comparing the resignation rate before and after policy
implementation in December 2016, the resignation of dentists increases significantly.
Nevertheless, the regression results show that the resignation of dentists in changed areas
after the policy implementation is no difference from the resignation in changed area
before 2017.
Table 5.4 show the results of the regression analysis for panel data to analyze the
effect of recategorized HA area policy in December 2016, which reduced the HA rate, on
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Figure 5.6 unadjusted trend graph of dentists’ relocation rate by years from 2013 to 2018
relocation of dentists. The results table shows that the relocation of dentist in changed
area decreases significantly, while from 2017 which is the year after the policy
implementation the relocation of dentists insignificantly decreases. Nonetheless, it is
found that the relocation of dentists in changed areas after the policy implementation,
increases significantly.
Table 5.5 show the results of the regression analysis for panel data to analyze the
effect of recategorized HA area policy in December 2016, on resignation and relocation
of dentists in rural and remote areas. The results table shows that the resignation and
relocation of dentist in changed area decreases significantly. On the other hand, after the
policy implementation the resignation and relocation of dentist significantly increases. In
addition, the regression table shows that the resignation and relocation of dentist in
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changed areas after policy implementation increases significantly (at significant level
0.1).
Discussion
This study aims to assess the effect of HA payment reduction, due to the changed
HA areas from rural to urban, on the decision to leave or stay in rural areas. The finding
shows that dentist resignation was not significantly different between the changed and
unchanged areas after the policy implementation in December 2016. However, the rural
and remote dentists who relocated to urban areas were more likely to increase in changed
areas after the policy implementation. This finding demonstrates that HA reduction
influences dentists to leave rural areas although they do not resign. Based on the payment
rate in Table 1, the HA payment reduced from 20 to 50%. Therefore, we could imply that
the HA reduction could minimize the retention of dentists in rural areas. This finding
corresponds to the results of the study of job motivation in North Viet Nam, which
showed that the low salary and allowances discouraged rural health care workers
(Dieleman, 2003).
The study of evaluating the effect of financial incentive reduction, as well as our
study, is rarely found. Most of the evaluated program financial incentives studies show
the results after implementing financial incentives. For example, the scholarship and loan
repayment program in many developed countries (Sempowski, 2004; Barnighausen and
Bloom, 2009) examined the retention of health workers after providing financial support.
However, there are some studies that showed the effect of reducing financial support for
retaining health providers in underserved or rural areas. For example, in 1990 and 1991,
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Table 5.4 Regression analysis on resignation of dentists between changed and unchanged
areas after the policy implementation
Resignation

Relocation

Resignation&relocation

Intercept

.54**(.003)

.077**(.013)

.128**(.013)

Post(after2016)

.054**(.005)

-.001(.005)

.052**(.007)

Ruraltourban

.008(.006)

-.132**(.029)

-.120**(.028)

Post.ruraltourban

-.006(.008)

.025**(.006)

.018(.010)

R-sq within

.020

.017

.022

R-sq between

.031

.021

.003

No. of observation

11,213

10,381

11,213

No. of groups

2,384

1,975

2,384

Sigma_u

.374

.076

.368

Sigma_e

.181

.144

.228

rho

.810

.220

.722

the study of the National Health Service Corps program, and the relation with the access
and service of people in underserved areas in the US, showed that reduced support from
the NHSC affected the reduction of physicians in underserved areas (Stone et al. 1991;
Brown et al. 1990). In 1994, Pathman et al. findings also revealed that poor financial
incentives programs caused the retention in underserved areas of NHSC physicians less
than non-NHSC physicians did. These studies are indirect evidence to support our
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finding. The outcomes of our study, which show the effect of the reduction of direct
payment financial incentives, will be further evidence to benefit the policy makers.
Our finding that the resignation of dentists in changed areas is insignificantly
different with the unchanged areas after the policy implementation, but the relocation of
dentists in changed areas is significantly higher than in the unchanged areas after the
policy implementation, which could be explained by several reasons. First, the increasing
of the number of dentists across countries due to the government policy in 2005 affected
the decision to resign as government employees under the MoPH. The increasing dentists
make the highly competitive in dental service market especially in urban city. Some
public dentists may be reluctant to resign to compete with other private dentists, which
increase every year. Second, the social norm of most Thai people provides a high value
and respect for the government employee. Many dentists accepted the low income by
working with the MoPH because they can be the government employee. Therefore, the
reduction of HA payment may reduce their income, but it cannot influence them resign
from the MoPH. This reason can explain by utility theory when dentists preferred nonfinancial incentives. Third, the increasing of HA payments in 2008 combined with other
financial supplements (non-private fee (1995); professional fee (2005)) secure the
financial status of these government employee’s dentists. Generally, if we do not
compare the income of MoPH’s dentists with the income of private dentists, the average
income of MoPH’s dentists is higher than Thailand’s GDP per capita.
In addition, the increasing of the relocation of dentists in changed areas after the
policy implementation in December 2016 could be clarified by these reasons. First, the
number of recruited dentists increase from the educational strategy and mandatory
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service strategy affect the decision to resign or relocate of dentists in rural and remote
areas. In Thailand, the public dentists who have at least 2 years of services can get
permission to relocate. Dentists in changed areas mostly have more experience than most
dentists in unchanged areas which make changed areas dentist are more likely to be
eligible to relocate. These dentists choose to move before the favorable positions are
occupied. Second, relocation to urban areas for most dentists means relocating near their
home. Many dentists have original backgrounds in urban areas (Lexomboon, 2003).
Therefore, relocating near hometowns reduces the cost and time of commuting. This
commuting reduction may compensate with the HA reduction. Third, relocating near the
urban city increases more opportunity to get extra income from working extra hours in
either public sectors or private sectors (Wibulpolprasert, 2003; 2008). The suburban or
urban areas mostly have higher density populations, which mean these areas require more
oral health service than in the rural areas. Besides, the suburban or urban population
mostly have more potential to afford the cost of dental care treatment compared with
rural people. Fourth, relocating to urban areas in many places provides more opportunity
to continue education. For example, the big city such as Chiang Mai, Khon Kan, Song
Kla, there are the universities in the urban city. Relocating near the urban city makes it
easy to attend the conference or use the library of the university or contact the professor,
etc. Fifth, the urban cities have many amenities that can make life more convenient and
comfortable. These can attract some dentists who prefer lifestyles in a big city to relocate
to near an urban city because of this reason (Henderson, 2008).
The resignation trend graph of dentists in unchanged and changed areas showed
similar trends; however, the resignation of dentists in unchanged areas is higher than in

144

changed areas due to the characteristic of the unchanged areas. Because unchanged areas
are rural areas before and after the policy implementation, and most of them are further
from the urban city. This characteristic make unchanged areas are unattractive compared
with changed areas. This finding demonstrates that the resignation of dentists in rural
areas which is unattractive areas is higher than in urban or suburban areas. Even though
there is HA payment in changed areas decreased, the resignation of dentists in changed
areas did not increase significantly. This finding shows that we have not enough evidence
to prove our hypothesis that financial incentive reduction increase resignation rate of
dentists. This outcome shows that the financial incentive is not the only factor that
motivates health workers’ decision to leave or stay in their practice location, but nonfinancial factors are also influential (Dieleman, 2003; Henderson, 2008).
Based on the study’s conceptual frameworks, it shows that the decision of dentists
to stay or leave rural areas depends on financial and non-financial incentives. In this
study, the financial incentive that we focus on is the HA. The outcomes of the study show
that the financial incentive in our model cannot comprehensively explain the resignation
of dentists in changed and unchanged areas. There are non-financial incentive variables
missing from our model. To make accurate clarification on all factors that influence
dentists’ decisions, more study is required. The finding that only financial incentives are
insufficient to motivate dentists working in rural and remote areas corresponds with the
review article by Henderson. He found that the significance of financial incentive in
terms of salaries, benefits and allowances affect the healthcare workers in most
developing countries (Henderson, 2008). In countries with low salaries, mostly in
developing countries, the additional monetary incentives could attract healthcare workers
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to relocate to rural and remote areas. Only financial incentives are not enough for
motivating health workers to remain in rural and remote areas, but non-financial
incentives, such as good working and living conditions, the opportunity for continuing
education, the professional and personal support programs, are also significant motivation
(WHO, 2004; Stilwell B, 2004; Vujici, 2004; Humphreys,2009).
Conclusion
The results of the study show that the reduction of HA payment affect the
decision of dentists to stay or leave their location practice. As a result, the disparity
distribution of dentists still exists. Besides, a new problem may take place as new dentists
recruit to replace the rural and remote areas for 1 or 2 years, and then they relocate to
urban or suburban areas.
Consequently, the rural and remote areas must recruit new dentists every year or
every two years. It will establish a cycle of recruit and relocate in the rural and remote
areas. Moreover, these can create another issue. For example, the increasing dentist’s
policy combined with the reduction of HA might cause the congestion of dentists in
urban areas, and rural areas would still have a dental supply shortage.
Limitation
Data source of the study is obtained from the annual report of Human resource
management which contained a few variables. There are some variables unavailable from
the data set. For examples, variables which related with the non-financial incentives is
not included in the annual report. Based on the conceptual framework showed the factor
related to the decision of dentists to leave or stay in rural and remote areas involved with
financial and non-financial factors. However, the observational data is contained mostly
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the financial factor variables and some personal characteristics of dentists. Therefore, the
outcome shows the restricted evidence to analyses and discuss to complete to theoretical
concept.
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Abstract
Financial strategy extensively used to address the inequitable distribution of
health workers worldwide either in high-income or low-income countries. Several studies
showed the effectiveness of financial incentive in recruiting and retaining health
providers in rural and remote areas. However, few studies have investigated the
relationship between the health providers’ age and their location choice when the
financial incentive is reduced. This study aims to examine the relationship between
dentists’ age and dentists’ location choice on financial incentive reduction, due to
the recategorization of Hardship Allowance (HA) areas in Thailand. A retrospective
observational study was conducted. Data on the rural and remote dentists’ location annual
report, including the relocation and resignation of dentists from 2013 to 2018, were
obtained from the Human Resource Management Department and the Policy and Strategy
Bureau at the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) in Thailand. Triple differences
regression with random effect estimation was used to analyze the panel data of dentists’
resignation and relocation by age groups, in changed areas after the policy
implementation. Data of 2,384 rural and remote dentists from 2013 to 2018 were
used. The percentage of dentists by age groups 22-28, 29-35, 36-45, and 46-60-yearold is 28%, 42%, 23%, and 5.4%, respectively. About 70% of 22-28-year-olds, and 2935-year-olds are in rural areas, while approximately 60% of the other two groups are in
urban areas. The regression analysis of dentists’ resignation and relocation on dentists’
age in changed areas after the policy implementation shows that the oldest group in
changed areas is the less likely to resign significantly from their location after the policy
implementation compared with the youngest group.
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In conclusion, dentists’ age is related with the dentists’ decision to leave or stay in
rural and remote areas when the HA was reduced. Although, the policy implementation
caused the reduction of financial incentives, most of the oldest group decided to stay in
their practice location. Besides financial incentive, age is another factor that influences
that the dentists’ decision to leave or stay in rural and remote areas.
Introduction
The shortage of health professional especially in rural and remote areas is a global
issue (WHO, 2010). Statistics show that health workers worldwide are mostly located in
urban areas while most of the population are in rural areas (WHO, 2010). Most healthcare
providers prefer living in urban cities than in rural and remote communities (Dussault,
2005; Henderson, 2008). For example, in the US, about 20% of people are in rural areas,
while there is only 9% of physician service there (Hancock et al., 2009). In Australia
approximately 2.6 physicians per 1000 population are in urban cities, while there is only
0.9 physician per 1000 people in rural communities (Viscomi, 2013). Many countries in
Southeast Asian, including Thailand, also are challenged with the same problem. For
example, in Vietnam, 70% of the population live in rural areas, but about 1/3 of rural
health centers have no physician (Vujicic, 2011). In Cambodia, physician density in
urban city is 0.41 per 1000 population, while in some remote areas the physician density
is 0.06 per population (Chhea, 2010).
In addition, statistics shows the shortage of dental supply in rural and remote
areas affected the utilization of oral healthcare service (Lapying & Puttasri, 2013;
2014). Although, a few studies report the shortage of oral health care workers, there is a
study in California that shows that approximately 70% of communities with dental supply
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shortages are rural. Areas with a lower supply of dentists have higher percentages of
minorities, children, and low-income populations (Mertz, 2001). A study found that
dentists in a major city in Australia were 0.59 per 1,000 population, but in rural and
remote areas there were 0.28 and 0.16 per 1,000 population (Teusner, 2005). In Thailand
in 2013, the statistics from the Thai dental council shows that in Bangkok dentists were
0.96 per 1,000 population, while in Northeastern region dentists were 0.07 per 1,000
population.
The disparity distribution of health workers is related with health outcomes
(Chen, 2004; Henderson, 2008). The insufficiency of qualified health providers in rural
and remote areas minimizes the access to health care service for the population in those
areas (Dussault, 2005; Henderson, 2008). Data shows the association of the child
mortality rate and low density of healthcare workers (Henderson, 2008). In other words,
with lower health worker density comes higher child mortality rates. Oral health service
also has a similar problem. For example, in 2011, the dental care service of people in
Bangkok was 0.27 visit/person/year, while it was 0.12 visit/person/year in the
Northeastern region.
The current evidence shows that financial incentives are significant factors in
motivating health workers to locate in rural and remote areas (Sempowski,
2004; Barnighausen and Bloom, 2009; Dolea, 2010). Several studies conducting
surveys on the significant factors motivating health workers who serve rural and remote
people showed that the financial incentives or monetary factors are the most important
for healthcare providers to decide whether to leave or stay their location (Adzei,
2012; Awofeso, 2010). However, many studies report that only financial incentives
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are insufficient to attract health workforce in the rural communities especially in the lowmiddle income countries (Lehman, 2008; Henderson, 2008; Humphrey, 2009).
Several studies suggest that financial incentive is not the only significant factor
motivating health providers to locate in rural and remote areas. Non-financial factors are
also important in attracting health workforce. Studies show the achievement of
integrating financial and non-financial strategies to address the shortage of health
workforce in unfavorable areas (Henderson, 2008; Humphrey, 2009). Based on the WHO
(2010) framework showing the factors related to health workers’ decision to leave or stay
in rural and remote areas, besides financial incentives, non-financial factors included:
personal and family factors, working and living conditions, career aspects, and
professional and personal support.
This study examines the relationship of personal factors (age) and health
worker’s choice of location when the financial incentive is reduced. Based on the
Hardship Allowance (the direct payment financial incentive from the Thai government)
criteria, the payment rate depends on the area and the year of service. This relationship
implies that the dentists’ age is associated with the HA rate payment. The evidence of the
relationship between health worker’s age and their location choice is required, because at
the present, this relationship is still inconclusive.
A different connection between age and practicing location decisions was
found (Lexomboon, 2003). Generally, relationships between the decision for
leaving a practice location and demographic characteristics, such as age, gender,
education level are indecisive (Lehman, 2008). In 1990, Easterbrook
explored how factors influenced family medicine location decisions and found that age
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was no significant factor on physician decisions. However, the study of the impact of job
satisfaction on worker turnover found that the higher the age of the workers, the more
likely they are to leave their present work (Lamber, 2001).
In 2005, Richards showed there was a high percentage of older health workers
(>50 years) practicing in rural areas, while another study reported the average ages of
health workers in urban and rural areas were 36.1 and 36.8, respectively (Richards,
2005; Ebuehi, 2011). In 2013, Antwi identified the impact of wages on the retention of
health workers. The author stated that age was important and focused on young adults
aged 20-35-years old (Antwi, 2013). These studies showed the various results regarding
the relationship between age and health worker’s decision. Evidence is still required to
show the actual association of age on practice location decisions of the healthcare
workforce.
Background
Thailand is a low-middle income country using financial incentive strategies to
address the inequitably distributed healthcare providers in urban and rural areas. The Thai
government implemented direct payment financial incentives, called Hardship Allowance
(HA), to motivate health professionals to stay in primary hospitals under the Ministry of
Public Health (MoPH), especially in rural and remote communities. Since 2001, the HA
are provided to healthcare providers, including physicians, dentists, pharmacists, nurses,
etc., to retain them in primary hospitals principally in rural and remote areas.
The highest rate HA policy was launched in 2008. The Hardship Allowance
policy was implemented by the government provides 100% of new graduated dentists’
salary to rural dentists and 200% to 300% of new graduated dentists’ salary to remote and
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very remote dentists. The evaluated study showed that the HA policy could reduce the
resignation rate of dentists in rural areas significantly.
However, in 2013, the government adjusted the rate and criteria of payment which
reduced the HA rate of dentists who were located near the city and dentists who served
over 4 years. This significant change happened again in December 2016 when the
government adjusted the HA areas categorization. Some rural areas became urban areas,
which reduced the HA payment rate. Table 5.1 shows the criteria and rate of HA payment
in 2008 and 2016, and the reduction percentage of HA payment when rural areas became
urban areas.
From Table 5.1, the HA payment rate reduction from the changed policy
implementation shows that there is different of reduction rate among the dentists’ year of
service and dentists’ location practice. For dentists who serve 1 to 3 years, the changed
areas did not affect their HA payment. For either rural or urban locations, there is no HA
payment rate different for the dentists with 1-3 year of experience. For dentists who serve
4 to 10 years, the difference of rural and suburban areas and the difference of rural and
urban areas are 25% and 40%, respectively. In addition, for dentists who serve over 11
years, the difference of rural and suburban areas and the difference of rural and urban
areas are 20% and 50%, respectively.
Based on the literature review, there are a few research gaps in the study of the
relationship of health providers’ age and health providers’ location choice on the
financial incentive for the retainment of health providers in rural areas, especially in lowmiddle income countries. This research uses Thailand as a place of study and provides an
opportunity to address all these gaps. Moreover, at the present there is no evidence to
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show the effect of financial incentive reduction on rural and remote dentists’ choice to
leave or stay their practice location and how this decision relates with dentists’ age in
Thailand.
This study we aim to determine the relationship between dentists’ resignation and
dentists’ age after the decrease in HA due to the 2016 policy change of practice location
area categorization. We hypothesized that rural and remote dentists who affect the most
from the HA reduction are more likely to leave their practice location compared with the
group that has little or no effect from the decreased payment. Based on our hypothesis,
the older group who affected more from the reduction of HA are more likely to resign and
relocate from the rural areas compared with the younger dentists.
Theoretical model
In this study, we used the utility theory to explain the decision to stay or leave
rural and remote areas of dentists. We assumed that dentists have different preference to
stay or leave rural and remote areas. They have chosen to locate in the areas that provide
them the maximum utilization based on financial and non-financial factors. The simple
utility function of dentists’ location choice can be denoted as function (1).
U (π, x; β)
U = f (π, x; β)

(1)

Where
U is the utility function of dentist choice
π is the financial factors which in this study we estimate the effectiveness of the HA
x is non-financial factors
β is the vector of parameters
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We adopted the WHO framework of factors related to the decision to leave or stay
in rural areas to account for the non-financial factors. From the WHO 2010 framework,
all factors included financial aspect, mandatory service, personal origin and values,
family and communities’ aspects, working and living conditions, and career related
aspect.
Based on the 2010 WHO framework, besides the financial aspects are nonfinancial factors. They include personal origin and values, family and community aspects,
working and living condition, career related aspect, and mandatory service. The
conceptual framework of Thai dentist’s location choice is established to comply with the
2010 WHO framework, and it is shown in Figure 1.3.
Method
Research design
Our study design is a longitudinal retrospective cohort study using an
observational data. The study is based on natural intervention of the policy change.
The Thai government implemented the policy reducing the Hardship Allowance rate by
changing the categorization of dentist’s working location used for allocating HA in
Thailand in December 2016. Since 2000, the Thai government has launched a policy for
attracting healthcare providers to stay longer in rural and remote areas by providing a
direct payment financial incentive called “Hardship Allowance”. The Hardship
Allowance is the direct payment incentive for physicians, dentists, pharmacists and other
health providers working in primary hospitals under the Ministry of Public Health,
especially in rural and remote areas.
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In 2008, the HA in rural areas was about 100% of newly graduated dentists’
salary and it was 200-300% in remote areas. After the economic growth and urbanized
expansion, the government adjusted the HA area categorization in December 2016. Some
rural areas became urban areas causing the reduction of the HA payment rate. The
adjustment of the HA area categorization criteria plans has been issued since December
2012 through the Notification of MoPH. It was identified that all areas in each
province had to reclassification for the urban, rural or remote areas based on several
criteria following these criteria. The first criteria is the difficulty of transportation from
the working location to the urban city within the province and to another big province
nearby. Second is the urbanization within the working area’s district, such as number of
commercial banks, number of medical and dental private clinic, number of convenient
stores, annual revenue of local government in district level, etc. Third is the dentist
shortage situation in that area. And the last one is the areas that are in the risk zone,
which are the three provinces at the southern border of Thailand. After that,
the MoPH mailed the criteria to recategorize the rural and remote areas to every
provincial public health office to consider and adjust the area in their province.
Subsequently, the provincial public health office reported the new categorization to
the MoPH to reconsider before launching the policy in December 2016.
The adjusted working areas are collected and distributed through the Ministry of
Public Health Notification Issue #11 and the list of new areas after the change in
December 2016 are shown in Appendix B. In this study, we investigate the relationship
between dentists’ retention and dentists’ age after influence by the financial incentive HA
reduction due to the adjusted HA area categorization in some rural areas. The policy
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affects all dentist populations in the study. The intervention group in this study is only the
dentist group, so there is no control group. Therefore, we used the retrospective
observational data of dentists’ location from 2013 to 2018 to examine the change of
location choice before and after policy implementation. The observational data of
dentists’ location before and after the policy implementation in December 2016 contains
variation in the Hardship Allowance reduction program. This variation, which occurred
from the independent or exogenous changes in events across time, can identify the effects
of Hardship Allowance reduction on the dentists’ resignation in relation to the dentists’
age.
In this study, we measure the relationship of the age with the resignation and
relocation rate of rural and remote dentists after the adjusted areas policy in December
2016. We compared the resignation and relocation of dentists in each age group (22-28,
29-35, 36-45, 46-60) between the changed areas and unchanged areas to show the
characteristics of dentists in these areas. Due to data set that we obtained is longitudinal
data of individual dentists from 2013 to 2018, we can conduct the panel data analysis. We
estimate the resignation and relocation of dentists in each age group in the changed areas
after the policy implementation by using segmented regression for panel data
analyzation.
Sources of data
The data sources used for addressing the research question in this study is the data
of dentists from 2013 to 2018, and the rural and remote areas data adjusted report in
December 2016. The data of dentists obtained from the Policy and Strategy Bureau,
which is revised from annual reported data from the Human Resource Management
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Division under the Permanent Secretary Bureau in the MoPH from 2013 to 2018. The set
is contained data of individual dentists in each year from 2013 to 2018. The individual
dentist data include their characteristics for example gender, age, year of service, and
geographic location of each dentist by year. The changed areas data that some rural areas
became urban areas is obtained from the notification of the MoPH issue # 11,12 by the
Policy and Strategy Bureau, MoPH in December 2016 (Appendix B).
Study population
The study population is all dentists who worked as a government employee in
rural and remote primary hospitals under MoPH across the country during 2013 to 2018.
In this study we excluded data of rural and remote dentists who is identified the
resignation reason as death or retirement or termination from the job for any reason.
Unit of analysis
The unit of analysis in this study is the individual dentist-year working in
healthcare facilities in rural and remote areas under MoPH from 2013 to 2018.
Dependent variable
To achieve the aim of the study, the dependent variable is whether an individual
dentist working in rural and remote primary hospitals under the Ministry of Public
Health resigns or relocates to urban areas from 2013 to 2018.
Key explanatory variables
The key explanatory variables for this study are the time of the policy
implementation in December 2016, the changed or unchanged areas, and the dentists’
age. In this study, we aim to measure the relationship of dentists’ leaving from rural and
remote areas and dentists’ age in changed areas after the policy implementation. The HA
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areas changed policy in December 2016 is implemented in some rural areas which
became urbanized. Some rural areas became urban areas in December 2016, causing the
HA payment rate to be reduced. The objective of the recategorized HA areas
implementation in December 2016 is to adjust the areas to comply with the economics
and urban expansion. The HA payment criteria in December 2016 is the same as the
payment criteria in 2013, as shown in Table 1.2. The major variables in the Econometric
model for this study are composed of:
RuraltoUrban is the changed areas, ruraltourban =1 if the rural areas became in urban
areas in December 2016, otherwise ruraltourban=0
Post in the econometric model identified when the time implementation of the
changed area status in December 2016, after December 2016 post = 1, otherwise = 0.
Age is recorded in number in data set. Age of dentists in the data set is the current age at
the time they quit from the MoPH or relocate to urban areas. Age will be categorized in 4
groups: 1 = age 23-28 years, 2 = age 29-35

years, 3 = age 36-45 years, 4 = 46-60

years.
Post * RuraltoUrban is the interaction of the time of the policy implementation in
December 2016 and the changed area status from rural to urban areas, if after December
2016 and in the changed area, post*ruraltourban is = 1, otherwise = 0
RuraltoUrban*Age is the interaction of the changed area status from rural to urban areas
and the dentists’ age
Post *RuraltoUrban*Age is the interaction term of the time of the
policy implementation in December 2016, the changed area status and the dentists’ age,
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we can see how age affect the dentist’s resignation and relocation to urban areas when
practice location status changed after the policy implementation in December 2016 .
Covariate variables
The covariate variables use to accomplish the aim of the study are following these
variables:
Gender of rural and remote dentists is record in text in data set. Two value of dentists’
gender is recorded for male and female.
Year of service is recorded in number in data set. Year of services is the duration that
dentists working in any rural and remote primary hospitals under the MoPH. It is
calculated from the different of recruitment date which is a date when dentist start
working in MoPH and resignation date which is a date when dentist quit working
in MoPH.
Region is the geographic area. In Thailand is divided into 4 regions: 1=Northern region,
2=Central region, 3=Northeastern region, and 4=Southern region.
Distance is the distance from the dentist’s practice location (primary hospital) to the
urban city in each province. The distance in this study is measured in kilometer (1
kilometer = 0.62 mile). In the econometric model for this study the distance is
categorized in 4 groups: 1=0-20km., 2=21-40km.,3=41-60km., and 4=61km.ups
Data analysis
Descriptive statistics are calculated to describe the characteristics of the study
population. A bivariate analysis is used to demonstrate whether there is any difference
between before and after December 2016. Mantel-Haenszel chi square test is conducted
to measure if there are any differences in these characteristics between, before, and after
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December 2016. The analysis is conducted at a 95% confidence interval (alpha =.05). A
triple difference regression with random effect estimation for panel data is then used to
estimate the differences in rural and remote dentist’s resignation and relocation where the
area is changed after December 2016 implemented policy.
Econometric Model: triple differences regression with random effect estimation:
Yit = β0+β1ruraltourbanit + β2ageit+ β3postit+ β4post.ruraltourbanit + β5 post.ageit+
β6ruraltourbanit. ageit + β7 post.ruraltourbanit.ageit +βmXit + Ɛ it
where :
Yit are the outcome variables including the resigned dentists, the relocated to urban
dentists, and the resign and the relocated to urban dentists following these:
1) Yit is whether rural and remote dentist ‘i’ resigned in year ‘t’ , Yit = 1 if dentist
‘i’ resigned in ‘t’, otherwise Yit = 0 ;
2) Yit is whether rural and remote dentist ‘i’ relocate to urban in year ‘t’ , Yit = 1 if
dentist ‘i’ relocate to urban in ‘t’, otherwise Yit = 0 ;
3) Yit is whether rural and remote dentist ‘i’ resigned in year ‘t’ , Yit = 1 if dentist
‘i’ resigned in ‘t’, otherwise Yit = 0 t
Ruraltourbanit is the changed areas, ruraltourban =1 if the rural areas became in urban
areas in December 2016, otherwise ruraltourban=0
Ageit is the dentist ‘i’ age in year‘t’, age is categorized in 4 groups: 1 = age 23-28 years, 2
= age 29-35

years, 3 = age 36-45 years, 4 = 46-60 years

Post is the time of policy implementation, post = 1 if year >= 2017, otherwise post = 0
Post.ruraltourbanit is the time after policy implementation interaction with the changed
areas in year ‘t’
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Post.ageit is the time after policy implementation interaction with the age of dentist ‘i’ in
year ‘t’
ruraltourbanit.age is the changing status areas in year ‘t’interaction with the age of dentist
‘i’ in year ‘t’
Post.ruraltourbanit.ageit is the time after policy implementation interaction with the
changing status areas in year ‘t’ interact with the age of dentis ‘i’ in year ‘t’
Xit is covariate variables
Results
Dentist Characteristics
Data of dentists’ characteristic of rural and remote areas by age groups from 2013
to 2018 are shown in Table 6.1. The unit of the dentists’ number in this table is dentistyear. In this study, the age groups of rural and remote dentists are categorized into 4
groups: 22-28, 29-35, 36-45, and 46-60-year-old. The oldest age of dentists is 60 years
old because they are the government employees. In Thailand, all government employees
retire at age 60 years old. Most rural and remote dentists from 2013 to 2018 are age
between 29-35-year-old (42%). About 28% of them age between 22-28-year-old, follow
by the group of age 36-45-year-old is 23%. The oldest group (46-60-year-old) are the
smallest groups at about 5.4%. It is found that there are more female than male dentists in
all age groups except in the oldest group where there are more male dentists. The year of
service is consistent with the dentists’ age. Most of the youngest dentist have served 1-3
years and most of the oldest dentist group have more than 11 years of service.
In 2013, that we initially only recruited rural and remote dentists’ data. These
rural and remote dentists started to relocate to urban and other rural and remote areas in
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2014. In 2017 and 2018, all location in changed areas became urban areas. Data shows
that approximately 70% of rural dentists are the younger and youngest age groups. The
middle age and the oldest age groups are in urban areas at 60% of all age groups.
Data of dentists by region shows that most of the youngest groups are in
the Northeast region while most of the oldest groups are in the North and Central regions,
respectively. The dentists age 22-28 years most located in the Northeast region follow by
the South, Central and North regions, respectively. The younger age groups and the
middle aged group are distributed in any region proportionately. In contrast, the dentist
age 46-60-year-old are mostly located in the North region, followed by the Central,
Northeast, and South regions, respectively.
The distance from hospital to the urban city in each province are categorized into
4 groups: 0-20 km., 21-40km., 41-60km., and over than 61km. Most urban hospitals are
in the urban city or distance less than 20km from the city. The rural hospitals are
further from the urban city than the urban hospitals and the remote hospitals are the
furthest among three areas. Data shows that the youngest age dentists group mostly
located in the furthest areas (over than 61 km. from the urban city). It is found that the
older age the dentist is the closer the dentist locates to the urban city.
The results in Table 6.2 show the dentists’ location status in unchanged areas and
changed areas by age groups. It is found that most of resigned dentists are the youngest
group both in unchanged and changed areas. Although the number of dentists’
resignation is higher in the unchanged areas than in the changed areas, the proportion is
equal at 14.6% and 14.0%, respectively. If consider only the number of the dentists, it
seems that the oldest group is the least likely to resign from their working place.
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However, data showed that the middle age dentists (36-45 years) have the lower
percentage of resignation compared with the oldest group in both unchanged and changed
areas.
Mapping of the percentage of dentists age by group (22-28, 29-35, 36-45, 46-60 years
old) by province
The percentages of dentists’ ages by age group are mapped and shown in Figure
6.1 to 6.6. The mapping graph of the youngest dentists group shows that most of them are
in the Northeastern region of Thailand. The distribution of this group is mostly in the
bordered provinces next to Laos and Cambodia in the Northeast and Southeast regions,
respectively. The younger age dentists seem evenly distributed across country. However,
the graph shows that they are light in the bordered provinces in the Northeast and
Southeast regions. The middle age dentists are mostly distributed in the Central and the
lower part of the Northern regions, as well as the oldest dentists’ group.
Figure 6.1 shows the mapping of the resignation of dentists from 2013 to 2018.
Comparing the mapping graph of the resignation of dentists with the dentists’ ages, the
graph shows that the resignation of dentists mapping graph in Figure 6.5 is the most
identical with the youngest dentists’ group mapping graph in Figure 6.1. In addition, the
mapping graph of the relocation of the dentists in Figure 6.6 is the most alike with the
younger dentists’ group in Figure 6.2.
The resignation trend by age groups in changed and unchanged areas from 2013 to
2018
Figure 6.7 shows the resignation trend of dentists in unchanged areas by age
group, from 2013 to 2018. The line graph shows that the youngest dentists’ group has the
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Table 6.1 Rural and remote Dentist’s characteristic by age groups from 2013 to 2018 n
(dentists-year) (%column)
characteristics

Age22-28yrs Age29-35yrs Age36-45yrs Age46-60yrs P-value
(n=3,184)

(n=4,760)

(n=2,665)

(n=604)

Gender
Male (3,606)

1,049(32.9)

1,546(32.5)

707(26.5)

304(50.3)

Female (7,607)

2,135(67.1)

3,214(67.5)

1,958(73.5)

300(49.7)

2,892(90.8)

239(5.0)

5(0.2)

0(0)

292(9.2)

4,372(91.9)

463(17.4)

5(0.8)

0(0)

149(3.13)

2,197(82.4)

599(99.2)

Urban(2,022)

168(5.3)

1,033(21.7)

630(23.6)

191(31.6)

Rural(7,437)

2,522(79.2)

3,004(63.1)

1,610(60.4)

337(55.8)

494(15.5)

723(15.2)

425(15.9)

76(12.6)

North(2,928)

626(19.7)

1,301(27.3)

770(28.9)

231(36.3)

Central(2,859)

653(20.5)

1,317(27.7)

706(26.5)

183(30.3)

1,241(38.9)

1,222(25.7)

686(25.7)

121(20.0)

664(20.9)

920(19.33)

503(18.9)

69(11.4)

P<0.001

Year of service
1-3 years
4-10 years
11 years ups

P<0.001

Area

Remote(1,718)

P<0.001

Region

Northeast(3,270)
South(2,156)

P<0.001

Distance from hospital to the urban city in each province.
0-20km

193(6.1)

688(14.5)

344(12.9)

112(18.5)

21-40km

708(22.2)

1,430(30.0)

1,045(39.2)

251(41.6)

41-60km

960(30.2)

1,176(24.7)

658(24.7)

111(18.4)

1,323(41.6)

1,466(30.8)

618(23.2)

130(21.5)

61km ups

P<0.001

highest resignation rate, and the oldest dentists group has the lowest resignation rate. The
trend of the resignation in the dentists aged 22 to 28-year-old is increasing, and dropped
in 2018, while the trend of the resignation in the dentists aged 46 to 60-year-old is
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constant until the trend increase in 2017. The resignation rate in-group of age 29 to 35 is
lower than the youngest group but the pattern is similar. The resignation trend in-group of
age 29 to 35 is increasing from 2013 but dropped in 2016 before raising again in 2017
and 2018. The resignation trend in the dentists aged 36 to 45 is alike to the oldest group
but more constant. The resignation trend in the 36-45 age group is quite straight
compared with the other three groups.
The graph shows that the youngest dentists have the highest resignation rate
among four age groups and the oldest dentists have the lowest rate. The trend of
resignation in unchanged and changed areas is quite similar, although in changed area the
resignation rate is lower than in unchanged areas. The oldest dentists in changed areas
also have the same scenario of the resignation trend in unchanged areas, that is quite
stable from 2013 to 2017 then increasing in 2018. The overall resignation trend in
changed areas is a similar pattern in unchanged areas but the rate is lower.
The trend graph in figure 6.9 and 6.10 shows the relocation rate of rural and
remote dentists in unchanged and changed areas respectively. Overall, the relocation rate
in changed areas is lower than in unchanged areas. In the unchanged areas, the relocation
trend drops in 2017 and raises again in 2018. However, in changed areas, the relocation
trend of the dentists aged 29-35 group and 36-45 group is increasing, while the trend in
the youngest group decreases.
The triple differences regression analysis in resignation and relocation of dentists in
changed and unchanged areas by age groups
The regression results of the resigned dentist and dentists’ age in changed areas
after the policy implementation and other related factors in Table 3.1 shows that after the
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Table 6.2 Rural and remote Dentist’s location status by age groups in unchanged and
changed areas from 2013 to 2018
Location status

Age22-28yrs

Age29-35yrs

Age36-45yrs

Age46-60yrs

(n=3,184)

(n=4,760)

(n=2,665)

(n=604)

341(14.6)

144(5.4)

24(2.0)

12(5.2)

Relocate_urban

64(2.7)

96(3.6)

21(1.8)

6(2.6)

Relocate_ rural

88(3.8)

135(5.1)

33(2.8)

6(2.6)

1,847(78.9)

2,287(85.9)

1,117(93.5)

208(89.7)

127(14.0)

135(6.1)

34(2.3)

15(4.0)

Relocate_urban

2(0.2)

21(0.9)

7(0.5)

1(0.3)

Relocate_ rural

26(2.9)

45(2.0)

21(1.4)

3(0.8)

755(83.0)

2,014(90.9)

1,436(95.9)

360(95.0)

Resign

Stay
Resign

Stay

Figure 6.1 Mapping graph of percent of dentists age 22-28-year-old by province from
2013 to 2018

168

Figure 6.2 Mapping graph of percent of dentists age 29-35-year-old by province from
2013 to 2018

Figure 6.3 Mapping graph of percent of dentists age 36-45-year-old by province from
2013 to 2018
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Figure 6.4 Mapping graph of percent of dentists age 46-60-year-old by province from
2013 to 2018

Figure 6.5 Mapping graph of resigned dentists by province from 2013 to 2018
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Figure 6.6 Mapping graph of relocated dentists by province from 2013 to 2018

Figure 6.7 The trend graph show the resignation rate of dentists in unchanged areas from
2013 to 2018
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Figure 6.8 The trend graph show the resignation rate of rural and remote dentists in
changed areas from 2013 to 2018

Figure 6.9 The trend graph show the relocation rate of rural and remote dentists in
unchanged areas from 2013 to 2018
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Figure 6.10 The trend graph show the relocation rate of rural and remote dentists in
changed areas from 2013 to 2018

policy implementation the resignation dentists are more likely to increase significantly
although the resignation of dentists in unchanged and changed areas is no different.
Among four age groups, it is found that the youngest group are the most likely to resign
from the MoPH facilities compared with the other three groups. It is found that the higher
age the dentist is, the less likely to resign from their location in rural and remote areas,
significantly. In addition, the resignation of dentists after December 2016 in the youngest
group is the highest among four groups. The younger group (29-35) and the middle group
(36-45) are less likely to resign significantly compared with the youngest group (22-28),
although the oldest group (46-60) is less likely to resign insignificantly after the policy
implementation, compared with the other three groups.
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The regression analysis shows that in the changed areas after the policy
implementation in December 2016, the oldest dentists’ group (46-60) is the less likely to
resign from their location practice significantly compared with the youngest group (2228). Data shows there is no difference of resignation between male and female dentists.
But resignation of rural and remote dentists by region shows that dentists in the North
and South regions are less likely to resign significantly, compared with the Northeast
dentists.
Nevertheless, the data shows that the distance between the dentists’ working
location and the urban city in each province affected the decision of dentists to resign. It
is found that dentists who were located the furthest away are less likely to resign
significantly. Data shows that the further away the dentists were located, the less likely
they resigned from their working place. The regression of the relocation to urban areas of
dentists, with dentists’ age and other related factors shows in Table 6.4. Although there is
no different of the resignation of dentists in unchanged and changed areas, the dentists’
relocation to urban in changed areas is less than in unchanged areas significantly,
while the relocation of dentists after the policy implementation is less likely to
increase insignificantly.
The relocation data of dentists shows that the oldest group is the less likely to
relocate among four age groups followed by the middle age group (36-45). On the other
hand, the younger dentists(29-35) are also more likely to relocate to urban areas
compared with the youngest dentists insignificantly.
In the unchanged and changed areas, data showed that the relocation of dentists in
each of the four age groups is not different. In addition, it is found that before and after
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the policy implementation in December 2016, there is no significant difference
of dentists’ relocation in all age groups. Furthermore, in changed areas after December
2016, the oldest groups are less likely to relocate the most, followed by the middle groups
and the younger group insignificantly compared with the youngest dentists.
The relocation of male and female dentists is no difference, as well as the
resignation of male and female dentists. However, the relocation to urban areas by
dentists in the North and the Central regions is increasing significantly compared with
dentists in Northeast region. Furthermore, the relocation of dentists who are located close
to the city are more likely to relocate to urban city significantly.
Table 6.4 shows the regression of the resignation and the relocation to urban areas
of dentists with dentists’ age and other related factors. The statistics shows that the
dentists’ resignation and the dentists’ relocation to urban areas combined is likely to
decrease significantly in changed areas. In contrast, the resignation and the relocation of
dentists are more likely to increase after the policy implementation in 2016. As well, the
resignation and relocation of dentists in changed areas after the policy implementation are
more likely to increase significantly. The youngest dentists are more likely to resign and
relocate the most among four age groups, as well as the oldest dentists are less likely to
resign and relocate the most significantly. Data shows that the younger the dentist is, the
more likely to resign and relocate to urban areas.
It is found that there is still no significant difference of resignation and relocation
of dentists between unchanged and changed areas in all age groups, except that the
younger dentists are less likely to resign and relocate compared with the youngest.
But after the policy implementation in December 2016, the resignation and relocation
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rate of the younger dentists(29-35) and the middle groups(36-45) decreased significantly
compared with the youngest dentists’ groups.
The data analysis shows that in the changed areas after the policy implementation
in December 2016, the oldest dentists are less likely to resign and relocate significantly
compared with the youngest dentists, followed by the middle-aged dentists.
Nonetheless, the male and female dentists still have no significant difference of
resignation and relocation to urban areas.
It is found that the resignation and relocation of dentists in the Central region is
not different compared with the dentists in the Northeast region. However, the dentists
in the North and South regions are less likely to resign and relocate significantly.
Moreover, data shows that dentists who are located in the areas close to the city (020km., and 21-40km.) are more likely to resign and relocate significantly compared with
the dentists who are located the furthest from the urban city.
Discussion
The study aims to determine the relationship between dentists’ age and their
decision to leave or stay in rural and remote areas after the HA payment reduction, due to
the December 2016 policy of recategorized the HA location areas. The finding shows that
dentists’ age is related with dentists’ location choice. The regression analysis shows that
the oldest group (46-60) is less likely to resign compared with the youngest dentists
significantly. Therefore, the youngest group is the more likely to leave the practice
location in the changed areas after the policy implementation. Although, the finding is
opposite from the study’s hypothesis, it is not surprised.
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Table 6.3 Regression analysis on resignation of dentists and changed areas and age after
policy implementation
Resignation

Relocation

Resignation
&relocation

Intercept

.257**(.014)

.017**(.005)

.235**(.140)

Post(after2016)

.161**(.014)

-.011(.009)

.160**(.046)

Ruraltourban

.012(.014)

-.056**(.006)

-.082**(.017)

Post.ruraltourban

.064(.039)

.058(.030)

.129**(.006)

29-35year-old

-.027**(.009)

.001(.005)

-.037**(.011)

36-45year-old

-.073**(.014)

-.025**(.006)

-.112**(.016)

46-60year-old

-.119**(.031)

-.024(.013)

-.169**(.035)

29-35year-old

-.025(.014)

-.013(.008)

-.041**(.017)

36-45year-old

-.002(.021)

.015(.009)

-.002(.024)

46-60year-old

.034(.039)

.013(.018)

.047(.046)

29-35year-old

-.107**(.017)

.010(.011)

-.129**(.019)

36-45year-old

-.127**(.019)

.022(.012)

-.123**(.022)

46-60year-old

-.051(.030)

.021(.021)

-.044(.037)

29-35year-old

-.041(.042)

-.026(.032)

-.053(.049)

36-45year-old

-.080(.043)

-.057(.032)

-.132**(.051)

46-60year-old

-.128**(.053)

-.073(.038)

-.205**(.063)

-.012(.012)

-.0004(.003)

-.012(.011)

Age
(ref. 22-28 year-old)

Rualtourban.age
(ref. 22-28 year-old)

Post.age
(ref. 22-28year-old)

Rualtourban.post.age
(ref.22-28 year-old)

Gender(ref.male)
female
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Region (ref. NE)
North

-.080**(.014)

.009**(.004)

-.039**(.014)

Central

-.027(.014)

.009**(.004)

.006(.014)

South

-.062**(.015)

-.005(.004)

-.058**(.016)

Distance from hospital to urban(ref. 60 km up)
0-20km

-.045**(.014)

.108**(.005)

.183**(.016)

21-40km

-.041**(.013)

.038**(.004)

.047**(.014)

41-60km

-.031**(.012)

.016(.004)

.003(.013)

R-sq within

.011

.111

.035

R-sq between

.144

.084

.108

No. of observation

11,213

10,381

11,213

No. of groups

2,384

1,975

2,384

Sigma_u

.242

0

.229

Sigma_e

.181

.135

.223

Rho

.641

0

.513

Prior evidences provide the indecisive conclusion whether health workers’ age
related with the health workers’ location choice (Lehmann, 2008; Ruston, 2012).
However, our study’s outcomes show that the youngest dentists are more likely to leave
their location when the financial incentive reduction. The outcomes of the study differ
from the study’ hypothesis that the older aged dentist who affects the reduction of HA the
most, should be more likely to leave the practice location. Although, the outcomes of the
study contrast with our assumption, the outcomes correspond with several articles (Wang,
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2013; Antwi, 2013). For example, the study to explore the poor recruitment of physicians
to rural areas in Beijing found that generally physicians who practice in rural areas were
older than the average age of all physicians (Wang, 2013).
Nonetheless, our outcomes are different from several findings which showed that
the younger health workers were more likely to remain in rural and remote areas
(Lexomboon, 2003; Richards, 2005; Ebuehi, 2011). For example, Lexomboon (2003)
found that the young experience dentists were more likely to remain in the rural and
remote areas. The author explained that the young dentists who serve for 1 to 3 years
have the compulsory service contract with the government. The contract could keep them
in their practice location at least 3 years. The more year they served, the more likely to
leave their location. However, our study shows that the young dentists are more likely to
leave their location.
The reason of the different results of our study and Lexomboon’s maybe due to
the low value of the payout rate of dentists who leave before completing the mandatory
service. Since 1989, the government implemented the compulsory service policy for
retaining new dentists working in community hospitals especially in rural and remote
areas. The payout rate of punishment any dentists who could not complete the mandatory
service within three year, have not been changed since the policy implementing. At the
present, the rate has been reduced by the value of money reduced. Therefore, there are
more young dentists decide to resign and payout at the current data set.
In this study, we classified the dentists’ age into 4 groups. The youngest was aged
from 22 to 28 years old. Most dentists in this group had working experience of 1-3-year.
The outcomes of our study show that this youngest group is the most likely to leave from
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their practice location. We will explain the reason for the resigning of the youngest
groups following these. First, the youngest groups mostly recruit to serve in the very rural
areas in the Northeast region, as shown in the mapping graph. Some of them who are of
urban origin cannot adjust to work in those rural locations and decide to leave
(Wilson, 2009). However, every new dentist must serve at least two years before getting
permission to relocate. Therefore, many of them decide to resign instead of waiting for
the relocation permission. Second, the payout of punishment dentists who could not serve
at least three years is the same rate which is not high compared with the income from the
private sector (Wilbulpolprasert, 2003). Many young dentists who come from the
affordable family could payout and resign from the MoPH. Third, the youngest group
who have no spouse or kid are more flexible to resign or relocate compared with the older
group. In addition, these young dentists have less relationship with the working place and
community which made them decide to leave easier than the senior group who are
accustomed with working and living in rural and remote communities.
On the other hand, the oldest dentists are the less likely to leave from their
practice location. There are several reasons could be explained this situation. First, there
are several monetary supplements for dentists working in MoPH, for instance, the nonprivate fee, the professional fee, etc. These supplements may be enough for motivate
these groups to remain in their practice location despite the HA reduction
(Wilbulpolprasert, 2003; Henderson, 2008). Second, the oldest dentists who settle in that
areas, which make them get used to with their location areas. They have family, friend,
and good relationship with the communities (Wilson, 2009; Buykx, 2010). The reduction
of the HA payment could not motivate them to leave their areas. In addition, this dentists
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group have no financial burden for family or children and free of financial issues.
They choose to remain in the communities that make them happy rather than making
more money.
The findings that the oldest group is less likely to resign from their practice
location despite the reduction of the financial incentives. This outcome demonstrates that
financial factor is not only factor that motivate dentists’ location choice. The nonfinancial factor such as age which is the personal factor also affects the decision of
dentists choosing to leave or stay in rural and remote areas. This finding supports the
concept of the integration of the financial and non-financial factors to motivate health
workers working in rural and remote areas (Henderson, 2008; Humphrey, 2009). Besides
the personal factors, there are many non-financial factors which significant influence the
health worker location choice. Non-financial factors are also including family aspect,
working and living conditions, career aspects, professional and personal support (WHO,
2010). Our findings which show the relationship of dentists’ age and dentists’ location
choice demonstrate the significant of the non-financial incentives. There are many nonfinancial incentives which required more study to investigate.
Conclusion
In conclusion, dentists’ age is related with the dentists’ decision to stay or leave
rural and remote areas when the HA reduction. Although, the policy implementation
caused the financial incentive reduction, most of the oldest group decide to stay in their
practice location. Therefore, financial incentive may be not the only factors influence
dentist decide to stay or leave rural and remote areas.
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Limitation
The data source of this study is obtained from the annual report of Human
resource management which contained a few variables. There are some variables
unavailable from the data set. For examples, variables which related with the nonfinancial incentives is not included in the annual report. Based on the conceptual
framework showed the factor related to the decision of dentists to leave or stay in rural
and remote areas involved with financial and non-financial factors. However, the
observational data is contained mostly the financial factor variables and some personal
characteristics of dentists. Therefore, the outcome shows the restricted evidence to
analyses and discuss to complete to theoretical concept.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
This dissertation consists of 3 specific aims. Study Aim#1 is to examine the
effectiveness of the direct payment financial incentive called HA, on retaining dentists in
rural and remote areas. The difference in difference regression on resignation rates of
dentists in response to the HA in 2008. It can be concluded that the HA direct payment is
a significant factor to retain health workers in rural and remote areas. The outcome of
the study shows that direct payment financial incentives affect the resignation rate of
dentists in rural and remote areas. This study does not measure the retention rate of
dentists directly. However, the decreasing of resignation rate after the 2008 financial
incentive program implementation demonstrates that financial factors could retain dentist
in rural and remote areas.
Study Aim#2 is to examine the effect of HA reduction on dentists’ location
choice. In December 2016, the government recategorized the HA areas; as a result, some
rural areas became urban areas and the HA decreased by the area changing. From the
different in different regression with fixed effect estimation on dentists’ resignation and
relocation in response to the changed areas after the policy implementation in December
2016, it can be concluded that the HA reduction is influencing dentists to relocate from
their practice location. Although the resignation of dentists is not significantly different in
changed areas after the policy implementation, the combination of the resignation and
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relocation of dentists can infer that dentists are more likely to leave the practice location
when the HA is reduced.
Study Aim#3 is to examine the relationship of dentists’ age and dentists’ location
choice when the HA is reduced. This is because the HA payment criteria depends on the
areas (urban, rural, and remote areas) and year of service (1-3, 4-10, and over 11
years). It is assumed that besides practice location, age should be another essential
influence for dentists’ decisions to stay or leave their rural communities. From the triple
difference regression with random effect estimation on dentists’ resignation and
relocation in response to dentists’ age and changed areas after the policy implementation
in December 2016, it can be concluded that dentists’ age is related to the location choice.
It found that the oldest dentists (46-60) is the less likely to leave their location practice
where the HA is reduced, compared with the youngest group.
Although the observational retrospective data which we obtained has a limitation
to provide the retention rate data, the resignation rate which is used in the study can
illustrate the effectiveness of HA direct payment financial incentives. Nevertheless, the
data is insufficient to reveal the extent of dentists remaining in rural and remote areas.
The study can show the effect of HA payment on dentists’ location choice when either
the HA increases or decreases.
The responses of dentists’ decisions to stay or leave rural areas based on the HA
direct payment both in positive and negative ways show that the financial factor is the
essential factors on health worker’s location choice. However, the study shows that
financial incentive is not only factor which influences health workers’ decision. At least,
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personal factors such as health workers’ age are also key factors on health workers’
location choice.
It can conclude that the outcome of the study is consistent with the utility theory.
Based on the utility theory, it is assumed that health workers choose practice locations
which maximize their utility. The utility function includes financial and non-financial
factors. Therefore, to develop the efficient strategies to address the disparity distribution
of health workers, the policy maker should integrate both financial and non-financial
incentives. Moreover, to conduct an efficient study to evaluate the effectiveness of the
program, the researcher should create the effective method to collect and record adequate
and quality information for optimal analysis.
Lessons learned from the study
The government have to consider how age of dentists relates with the decision to
leave or stay in rural and remote areas. The outcome shows that the HA payment
reduction did not affect the oldest dentist group to resign or relocate their location
compared with the youngest group. This demonstrates that if the government have the
budget constraint and the high resignation rate problem still exist. The effective strategy
to retain dentists working in rural and remote areas including increase financial incentive
to the youngest group while reduce the payment rate to the oldest group.
In addition, the government should implement other non-financial incentives
strategy which evidence show the relationship to health workers’ location choices. For
example, improving the working and living condition or provide more opportunity to
continuing education to attract the young dentists' group to stay longer in their practice
location. Because the evidence shows that these factors affected the health worker to
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leave or stay in rural and remote areas especially for dentists in Thailand (Lexomboon,
2003). In addition, the results from the difference in difference regression with fixed
effect analysis in Aim#2 shows that the distance between the practice location and the
urban city related with the resignation and relocation of the dentists. The outcome for
Aim#2 also demonstrated that the changed areas which have more amenities such as
commercial banks, private clinics, convenient stores, etc., are more attractive compared
with the unchanged areas. The finding shows that the dentists in the changed areas area
less likely to resign or relocate to their location practice.
The most important thing is the government should evaluate all the strategies that
were implemented to improve the disparities distribution of dentists and other health
professionals, including the educational strategies, the compulsory services, the financial
and non-financial incentives programs. Besides, to improve the efficiency of the
programs, persistently evaluating the program could prevent new issues. This is because
the increasing of the dentists from the educational and compulsory service policy might
cause the oversupply of dentists. However, the dentists still continuously resign or
relocate from the unpleasant places in rural and remote areas. Therefore, the
government have to create another policy to address the oversupply of dentists in urban
and some attractive rural areas, and the undersupply in some unpleasant rural and remote
areas.
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APPENDIX A
THE TABLE OF THE COMMUNITY HOSPITALS UNDER THE MOPH BY HA AREAS BY PROVINCES WHICH ATTACHED
IN THE NOTIFICATION OF MOPH ON SEPTEMBER 5, 2013
HR

Province

1

Chiangrai

Urban

Suburban1

Suburban2
Teang
Pan
Maechan
Maesai
Weingpapao

191

Nan

Payao

Pua

Hospitals
Rural
Khuntan
Chiansan
Padad
Payamengrai
Maelao
Maesaui
Weingchiangrung
Somdetpayansangworn
Doiluang
Chiangklang
Tawangpa
Maecharim
Wiengsa
Pupieng
Chun
Dokkamtai
Pong
Maechai

Remote1
Chiangkong

Remote2
Maefahluoung
Wiengkan

Tungchang
Nanoi
Nameaun
Banluang
Songkaew
Santisuk
Chiangmuan

Bokleau
Chalermpakiet

HR Province
1

Urban

Suburban1

Suburban2
Denchai

Chomthong
Fang

Hangdong

Sanpatong

Phrae

Chiangmai

192

Hospitals
Rural
Rongkwang
Long
Wangchin
Song
Sungmen
Nongmuangkai
Chiangdao
Chaipakan
Doisaket
Doilor
Prao
Maetang
Maewang
Maeon
Sameang
Sankampang
Sansei
Sarapi
Hod

Maehongson

Lampang

Koka
Teon

Ngao
Chaehom
Mueangpan
Maeta
Maemo
Wangneau

Remote1

Remote2

Doitao
Maeeai

Wianghang
Aomgoi
Watchan
Maecham

Pai
Maesariang

Kunyaum
Pangmapa
Maelanoi
Sobmeui

Maeprik

HR

Province
Urban

1

Suburban1

Suburban2

Lampang
Lampoon

2

Tak
Pitsanulok

193

Petchabun

Wichianburi Nongpai
Lomsak
Lomkao

Sukothai

Uttaradit

Nampad

Hospitals
Rural
Sobprab
Sermngam Hangchat
Banti
Banhong
Pasang
Maetar
Wiangnonglong
Bantak
Samgnao
Neonmaprang
Bangkratum
Bangrakam
Prompiram
Wangtong
Watboad
Chondan
Buengsampan
Wangpong
Sitep
Kongkailad
Kirimad
Tungsalium
Bandanlanhoi
Sinakorn
Sisatchanalai
Sawankalok
Tron
Tongsankan

Remote1

Remote2

Li

Tunghuachang

Pobpra
Maelamad
Nakorntai
Chattakan

Tasongyang
Unpang

Kaokor

Namnao

Fakta

Bankok

HR

Province
Urban

2

Uttaradit

3

Chainat

Suburban1

Suburban2

kanuworakburi

Pichit

Bangmunnak
Tapanhin

Nakornsawan

Chumsang
Takli
Tatako
Ladyao

194

kampangpet

Hospitals
Rural
Tapla
Pichai
Lablae
Manorom
Wasting
Sankaburi
Sanpaya
Hanka
Klongklung
Klonglan
Saitongwatana
Tungpotalay
Saingam
Buengsamaki
Prankatai
Lankabue
Tabklor
Potalay
Popatabchang
Wachirabarami
Wangsaipun
Samngam
Kaoliao
Krokpra
Takfa
Banpotpisai
Payuhakiri
Pisali
Nongbua

Remote1

Pangsilatong

maewong

Remote2

HR

Province
Urban

3

Uthaitani

4

Nontaburi

Patumtani
195

Ayuthaya

Suburban1

Suburban2

Bangkrau
Bangbua_t
Bangyai
Pakgred
Tanyaburi

Hospitals
Rural
Tabtan
Banrai
Lansak
Sawangarom
Nongkayan
Nongchang
Houikot
Sainoi

Klongluang
Pachatipat
Ladlumkeaw
Lamlukka
Samkok
Nongseau
Tareau
Bangsai
Bangsi
Bangban
Bangpahan
Bangpain
Banpreak
Pakhai
Pachi
Maharat
Ladbualuang
Wangnoi

Remote1

Remote2

HR

Province
Urban

4

Ayuthaya
Saraburi

196

Lopburi

Singburi

Angtong

Suburban1

Hospitals
Rural
Somdetprasankarat
Uthai
Kangkoi
Donpud
Banmor
Muaklek
Wangmoungsatatam
Wihandang
Saohai
Nongkae
Nongsang
Nongdone
Koksamrong
Kokchareon
Chaibadan
Tawung
Taluang
Patananikom
Lamsonti
Saboad
Nongmoung
Kaibangrachan
Tachang
Bangrachan
promburi
Wisetchaichan Chaiyo
Pamok
Potong
Samko
Sawangha

Suburban2

Remote1

Remote2

HR

Province

Hospitals
Urban

Suburban1

Suburban2

Nakornnayok

5

Tamoung
Boploy

Ratburi

Chombueng

Supanburi

Danchang
Utong

Pachaupkirikan

Bangsapan

Petburi

Chaum

197

Kanchanaburi

Rural
Banna
Pakpli
Ongkarak
Chaokunpaibunpanom_t
Danmakamtia
Takadan
Saiyok
Laokwan
Huaikachao
Chetsamien
Bangpae
Paktor
Watpleng
Suanpeung
Donjedee
Dermbangnangbuad
Bangplama
Sipachan
Samchuk
Nongyasai
Kuiburi
Bansapannoi
Pranburi
Samroiyod
Kankachan
Kaoyoi
Tayang

Remote1

Remote2

Tongpapum
Sangkaburi
Suksirisisawat
Satanpabarami
somdetpapiyamarat

HR Province
Urban
6

Petburi

Samutsongkram
Chacheonsao

198

Prachinburi

Kabinburi

Sakeaw

Aranyapatet

Samutprakan

Banchak
Banbo
Banpli

Chantaburi

Suburban1

Hospitals
Rural
Remote1
Banlad
Banlam
Nongyaplong
Napalai
Ampawa
Bangnampreau Bangkla
Tatakieb
Bangpakong
Banpo
Panomsarakam Planyao
Sanamchaiket
Ratchasan
Nadi
Bansang
Pachantakam
Simahapo
Simahosot
Kaochakan
Tapaya
Klonghad
Wangnamyen
Watananakorn
Pasamutchedisawatyanon
Suburban2

Kanghangmaew
Klung
Kaokitchakut
Kaosukim
Tamai
Nayaiarm
Pongnamron
Makham

Remote2

HR

Province
Urban

Suburban1

Suburban2

Chantaburi

6

Chonburi

Banglamun
g
Banbueng
Panasnikom
Aoudom

Trad
199

Rayong

7

Klang
Mabtapud

Kalasin

Khonkan

Banchan

Yangtalad
Somdet
Kuchinarai

Chumpae

Nampong

Hospitals
Rural
Songpinong
Soidao
Lamsing
Kosichan
Botong
Pantong
Watyannasanwararam
Satahieb
Nongyai
Kaosaming
Klongyai
Lamngob
Kaochamao
Nikompattana
Bankai
Plaugdang
Wangchan
Kamalasai
Kammuang
Namon
Rongkam
Sahasakan
Nongkungsi
Huaipueng
Huaimeg
Kaosuankwang

Remote1

Remote2

Kochang

Kokud

Takanto
Kaowong

HR

Province
Urban

7

Khonkan

200

Mahasarakam

Roiet

Suburban1

Hospitals
Suburban2
Rural
Chonnabot
Samsung
Banfang
Peaunoi
Prayean
Pupaman
Puwieng Manchakiri
Wangnoi
Wangyai
Sichompu
Nongreau
Nongsonghong
Ubonrat
Borabue
Kantarawichai
Payakpupisai Kaedam
Kosumpisai
Chiangyean
Nacheuk
Nadun
Wapipatum
Ponetong
Kasetwisai
Suwannapu
Chaturapakpiman
m
Chanhan
Selapum
Tawatburi
Patumrat
Panompai
Pochai

Remote1

Banpai
Pon
Kanoun

Yangsisurat

Meyawadee

Remote
2

HR

Province
Urban

8

Suburban1

Hospitals
Suburban2
Rural

Roiet

Ponesai
Muengsuong
Sisomdet
Nongpok
Artsamat
Sopisai
Pakkad
Pornchareon
Siwilai

Buengkan

Loei
201

Nongkai

Tabor

Nongbualampu

Udontani

Kumpawapi

Banpeu
Pen
Nonghan

Chiangkan
Tali
Naduang
Pukadueng
Pureau
Wangsapung
Arawan
Ponepisai
Sichiangmai
Sakai
Naklang
Nawang
Nonesang
Sibunreang
Kudchab
Chaiwan
Tungfon

Remote1

Remote
2

Seka
Buengkonglo
n
Bungkla
Dansai
Pakchom
Puloung
Pakao

Sangkom

Suwankuha

Nayoon
Namsoam

Naheaw

HR

Province
Urban

8

Suburban1

Hospitals
Suburban2
Rural
Bandung

Nonesaard
Pibunrak
Wangsammor
Sitat
Sangkom
Nongwausar
Nongsang
Huaikeang

Nakornpanom

Sisongkam
Tatpanom

Tauten
Nakae
Nawa
Banpang
Plapak Ponesawan
Renunakorn
Wangyang
Kudbak
Kusuman
Kamtakla
Koksisupan
Chareonsin
Taongoi
Banmuang
Paarchanban
Paarchanphun
Pungkone
Ponnakeaw
Waritpum

202

Udontani

Sakonnakorn

sawangdindang

Wanornniwas

Remote1

Natom

Nikomnamun

Remote
2

HR

Province
Urban

8

Sakonnakorn

9

Chaiyapum

203

Nakornratchasi
ma

Pakchongnana
Teparat

Suburban1

Pimai

Hospitals
Suburban2
Rural
Songdao
Akartamnoui
Kangkor
Kasetsombun
Bamnetnarong Kornsawan
Pukieu
Kornsan
Nongbuadang Chasturas
Tepsatit
Neonsanga
Bankewa
Bantan
Nongbuaraheal
Subyai
Kornburi
Kangsanamnan
Chakarat
Kamtalaysor
Kamsakaesang
Chumpoung
Kong
Chokchai
Dankuntod
Nonedang
Buayai
Nonetai
Patai
Nonesung
Paktongchai
Banleaum
Sikew
Patongkam
Sungneon
Lamtameinchai
Wangnamkiew
Seangsang
Nongbunnak
Huaitalang
Bualai
Teparak

Remote1

Pakdichumpo
n

Somdetya_my

Remote
2

HR

Province
Urban

9

Suburban1

Hospitals
Suburban2

Nakornratchasi
ma
Nangrong

Pakonechai
Puttaisong
Lahansai

Surin

Prasat

Tatum
Ratanaburi
Sikarapum
Sangca

204

Buriram

Rural

Remote1

Sida
Chalermpakie
t
Kasang
Cumuang
Candong
Chalermpakie
t
Chamni
Napoe
Nonesuwan
Bankruad
Banmaichaipo
t
Pacam
Pubplachai
Nongki
Nonghong
Huairat
Kabcheang
Chompa
Chumponburi
Buached
Lamduan
Sanom
Samrongtab

Panomdongrak

Remote
2

HR

Province
Urban

9

Surin

10

Mukdahan

Yasotorn

205

Sisaket

Ubonratchatani

Kantarara
k

Mahawachira
Warinchamra
b
Detudom

Hospitals
Rural
Nonenarai
Kewasirin
Sinarong
Kamchaee
Dontan
Nikomkamsoi
Wanyai
Leangnokta
Kudchum
Korwang
Kamkeankeaw
Saimoon
Thaichareon
Patew
Mahachaichano
Kukun
Kantrarom
Kunhan
Buengbun
Rasisalai
Bencharak
Utumpornpisai
Prangku
Pribueng
Yangchumnoi
Wanghin
Sirattana
Huaitabtan
Takanpeadpon
Kudkaopun
Pibunmangsaha Kemmarat
n
Kuangnai
Kongcheam
Donmoddang

Suburban1 Suburban2

Remote1

Remote2

Dongluang
Nongsung

Namkliang
Nonekoon
Pusing
Muangchan

Namyean
Buntarik
Poesai

Nachaluai

HR

Province
Urban

10

Suburban1

Suburban2

Ubonratchatani

Amnartchareon
206

11

Chumporn

Nakornsitammarat

Lungsuan

Tungsong
Sichon

Tasala
Pakpanung
Ronpibul
Chawang

Hospitals
Rural
Tansum
Tungsiudom
Moungsamsib
Simuangmai
Samrong
Sirintorn
Natan
Nayia
Namkun
Nayia
Laosuaukok
Patumratwongsa
Pana
Lueamnart
Senangkanikom
Huatapan
Tungtaco
Patew
Paknamchumporn
Paknamlungsuan
Tasae
Mabammarit
Lamae
Sawee
Kanom
Chulaporn
Chauad
Chienyai

Remote1

Chanuman

Patoh

Tampannara
Bangkun
Pipoon

Remote2

HR Province
Urban

Surattani

207

Krabi

11

Pangnga

Suburban1

Suburban2

Kanchanadit
Tarongchang
Bannasan
Wiengsa

Hospitals
Rural
Tungyai
Nabon
Promkiri
Lansaka
Huasai
Kiriratniyom
Kiensa
Chaiya
Donsak
Tachang
Tachana
Bantakun
Bannaderm
Panom
Prasang
Punpin
Kaopanom
Klongtom
Plaipaya
Lamtub
Neauklong
Aoleuk
Kaponchaipat
Takuatung
Tubpud
Taimuangchaipat
Bangsai

Remote1

Remote2

Kopangan
Chaiburi
Wipawadi

Kolanta

Kuraburichaipat Koyaochaipat

HR Province
11

Phuket

Urban
Patong
Talang

Suburban1

Suburban2

Ranong
12

208

Pattalung

Kuankanun

Trang

Huaiyod

Naratiwat

Hospitals
Rural

Kaburi
Kaper
Kaochaison
Tamoad
Bangkeaw
Pakpayoon
Pabon
Papayom
Sibunpot
Sinakarin
Kantrang
Nayong
Palien
Yantakao
Ratsada
Wangwiset
Sikao
Hadsamran

Remote1

Remote2

Laun
Suksamran
Kongrha

Ranhae
Lueseau
Yinhor
Chanae
Cheairong
Takbai
Bachea
Wang

HR Province
Urban
12

Suburban1

Suburban2

Hospitals
Rural

Remote1

Naratiwat

Pattani

209

Yala

Songkla

Ranode

Klonghoikong
Kuannien
Namom
Bangglum
Padangbesa

Tepa
Chana
Kasaesin
Somdet_rachini

Remote2
Sisakorn
Sukkirin
Sungaipadi
Kapor
Kokpoe
Tungyangdang
Panare
Mayor
Maelan
Maikan
Yarang
Yaring
Saiburi
Nongchik
Krongpinang
Kabang
Tantoe
Bannangsata
Yaha
Raman
Sabayoi

HR Province
Urban
12

Suburban1

Suburban2

Songkla

Satun

Langu

Hospitals
Rural
Rattapum
Satingpa
Sadao
Singhanakorn
Kuankalong
Kuandone
Tapae
Manang

Remote1

Tungwa

Remote2

210

APPENDIX B
THE TABLE OF THE COMMUNITY HOSPITALS UNDER THE MOPH BY HA AREAS BY PROVINCES WHICH ATTACHED
IN THE THE NOTIFICATION OF MOPH ON DECEMBER 29, 2016
HR

Province

1

Chiangrai

Urban

Suburban1
Pan
Maechan
Maesai

Suburban2
Weingpapao
Teang
Payamengrai
Chiansan
Maelao
Somdetpayan

211

Nan

Pua
Tawangpa
Pupieng
Wiengsa

Payao

Chun
Dokkamtai
Pukamyao
Pong
Maechai
Pusang

Hospitals
Rural
Khuntan
Padad
Maesaui
Weingchiangrung
Doiluang

Chiangklang

Remote1
Chiangkong

Remote2
Maefahluoung
Wiengkan

Tungchang
Nanoi
Nameaun
Banluang
Songkaew
Santisuk
Maecharim
Chiangmuan

Bokleau
Chalermpakiet

HR
1

Province

Hospitals
Urban

Suburban1
Denchai
Sungmen

Chomthong
Fang
Hangdong

Sanpatong
Doisaket
Sansei
Sarapi

Phrae

Chiangmai

Suburban2
Rongkwang
Song
Nongmuangkai
Chiangdao
Prao
Maetang
Maewang
Maeon
Sankampang

Rural
Long
Wangchin

Remote1

Remote2

Chaipakan
Doilor
Sameang
Hod

Doitao
Maeeai

Wianghang
Aomgoi
Watchan
Maecham

Pai
Maesariang

Kunyaum
Pangmapa
Maelanoi
Sobmeui

Maehongso
n
212

Lampang

Lampoon

Tak
Pitsanulok

Koka

Teon
Maemo
Maeta
Hangchat

Banti
Banhong
Pasang
Maetar
Wiangnonglong
Bantak
Wangchao
Bangkratum
Bangrakam

Ngao
Chaehom
Mueangpan
Wangneau
Sobprab
Sermngam

Samgnao
Neonmaprang

Maeprik

Li

Tunghuachang

Pobpra
Maelamad
Nakorntai
Chattakan

Tasongyang
Unpang

HR

Province
Urban

1

Pitsanulok

2

Petchabun

Sukothai

213

Uttaradit

3

Chainat

Kampangpet

Suburban1

Wichian_
Lomsak

Hospitals
Suburban2
Rural
Prompiram
Wangtong Watboad
Nongpai
Chondan
Lomkao
Wangpong
Buengsampan
Sitep
Kongkailad
Kirimad
Tungsalium
Bandanlanhoi
Sinakorn
Sisatchanalai
Sawankalok
Nampad
Tongsankan
Tron
Tapla
Pichai
Lablae
Manorom
Hanka
Wasting
Neonkam
Sankaburi
Nongmamong
Sanpaya
Kanuworakburi
Klongklung
Tungpotalay
Klonglan
Prankatai
Saitongwatana
Saingam
Buengsamaki
Lankabue

Remote1

Remote2

Kaokor

Namnao

Fakta

Bankok

Pangsilatong

HR

Province
Urban

3

Pichit

Nakornsawan

Suburban1
Suburban2
Bangmunnak Popatabchang
Tapanhin
Samngam
Saklek

Ladyao

214

Uthaitani

4

Nontaburi

Patumtani

Ayuthaya

Chumsang
Takli
Tatako
Kaoliao
Krokpra
Payuhakiri
Tabtan
Nongkayan
Nongchang

Bangkrau
Bangbua_t
Bangyai
Pakgred

Sainoi
Bangbua_t2

Tanyaburi

Klongluang
Pachatipat
Ladlumkeaw
Lamlukka
Samkok
Nongseau
Bangsai
Bangsi

Hospitals
Rural
Tabklor
Potalay
Wachirabarami
Wangsaipun
Buengnarang
Takfa
Banpotpisai
Pisali
Nongbua

Banrai
Lansak
Sawangarom
Houikot

Remote1

Maewong
Chumtabon

Remote2

HR

Province
Urban

4

Suburban1

Ayuthaya

Kangkoi

Lopburi

Koksamrong

215

Saraburi

Singburi

Hospitals
Suburban2
Rural
Bangban
Bangpahan
Bangpain
Banpreak
Tareau Pakhai
Pachi
Maharat
Ladbualuang
Wangnoi
Somdetprasankarat
Uthai
Donpud
Banmor
Muaklek
Wangmoungsatatam
Wihandang
Saohai
Nongkae
Nongsang
Nongdone
Chaibadan
Kokchareon
Tawung
Taluang
Patananikom
Lamsonti
Saboad
Nongmoung
Kaibangrachan
Tachang
Bangrachan

Remote1

Remote2

HR

Province
Urban

4

Singburi
Angtong

Suburban1
Wisetchaicha
n

Nakornnayok

5

Kanchanaburi

Somdet_

Boploy
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Ratburi

Chombueng

Supanburi

Utong

Pachaupkirika
n

Hospitals
Suburban2
Rural
Promburi
Chaiyo
Pamok
Potong
Samko Sawangha
Banna
Pakpli
Ongkarak
Tamoung
Takadan
Danmakamtia
Laokwan
Saiyok
Huaikachao
Chaokunpaibun_
Chetsamien
Banka
Bangpae
Paktor
Watpleng
Suanpeung
Danchang
Nongyasai
Donjedee
Dermbangnangbuad
Bangplama
Sipachan
Samchuk
Bangsapan
Kuiburi
Bansapannoi
Pranburi
Samroiyod

Remote1

Remote2

Tongpapum
Suksirisisawat
Satanpabarami
Somdetpapiya_

Sangkaburi

HR Province
Urban
5

Petburi

6

Samutsonkram
Chacheonsao

Prachinburi
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Hospitals
Suburban2
Kaoyoi
Tayang
Banlad
Banlam
Napalai
Ampawa
Bangnampreau Sanamchaiket Bangkla
Bangpakong
Banpo
Panomsarakam Planyao
Ratchasan
Bansang
Pachantakam
Simahapo
Simahosot
Suburban1
Chaum

Sakeaw

Samutprakan
Chantaburi

Rural
Kankachan
Nongyaplong

Tatakieb

Nadi

Kaochakan
Klonghad
Wangnamyen
Watananakorn
Koksung
Wangsombun
Banchak
Banbor

Pasamutchedisawatyanon
Bangsaotong
Klung
Kaokitchakut
Kaosukim
Tamai
Makham
Songpinong

Remote1

Kanghangmaew
Nayaiarm
Pongnamron
Soidao

Tapaya

Remote2

HR

Province
Urban

6

Chantabu
ri
Chonburi

Suburban1

Banglamung Pantong
Banbueng
Panasnikom

Trad
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7

Rayong

Banchan

Kalasin

Yangtalad

Khonkan

Chumpae

Banpai

Suburban2
Lamsing
Satahieb

Kaosaming
Lamngob
Nikompattana
Bankai
Plaugdang
Wangchan
Somdet
Kuchinarai
Kamalasai
Rongkam
Sahasakan
Kongchai
Donchan
Nampong
Pon
Kanoun Prayean
Kaosuankwang
Banfang
Nonesila
Nongreau

Hospitals
Rural

Kosichan
Botong
Watyannasanwararam
Nongyai
Kochan
Klongyai
Borrai
Kaochamao

Kammuang
Namon
Nongkungsi
Huaipueng
Huaimeg
Naku
Samchai
Chonnabot
Samsung
Peaunoi
Pupaman
Puwieng
Manchakiri
Wangnoi

Remote1

Remote2

Kochang

Kokud

Takanto
Kaowong

HR

Province
Urban

7
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Roiet

8

Suburban2

Borabue

Payakpupisai
Kantarawichai
Kaedam
Kosumpisai
Chiangyean
Wapipatum
Ponetong
Suwannapum
Selapum
Kasetwisai
Chaturapakpiman
Chanhan
Tawatburi
Muengsuong
Sisomdet
Panompai
Artsamat
Chiangkwan

Khonkan

Mahasarakam

Buengkan

Hospitals
Rural
Wangyai
Sichompu
Nongsonghong
Ubonrat
Kokpoechai
Wiengkao
Nongnakam

Suburban1

Remote1

Nacheuk
Nadun
Cheanchom
Kudrung

Yangsisurat

Patumrat
Pochai
Ponesai
Nongpok
Nonghi
Tungkaoluang

Meyawadee

Sopisai
Pakkad
Pornchareon

Seka
Buengkonlon
Bungkla

Remote2

HR

Province
Urban

8

Suburban1

Buengkan
Loei

Nongkai

Tabor
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Nongbualampu

Udontani

Nakornpanom

Kumpawapi

Nonghan

Tatpanom

Hospitals
Rural
Siwilai
Wangsapung
Chiangkan
Tali
Naduang
Pukadueng
Pureau
Arawan
Ponepisai
Sichiangmai
Sakai
Faorai
Poetak
Ratanawapi
Naklang
Nawang
Nonesang
Sibunreang
Banpeu
Chaiwan
Pen
Tungfon
Bandung
Nonesaard
Kudchab
Pibunrak
Nongwausar
Wangsammor
Sitat
Sangkom
Nongsang
Huaikeang
Kukeaw
Pachaksilapako
m
Sisongkam
Nakae
Suburban2

Remote1

Remote2

Dansai
Pakchom
Puloung
Pakao

Naheaw

Sangkom

Suwankuha

Nayoon
Namsoam

Natom

HR

Province
Urban

8

Suburban1

Nakornpanom

Sakonnakon

Sakonnakorn
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9

Chaiyapum

Nakornratchasima

Pimai Chokchai
Paktongchai

Hospitals
Rural
Nawa
Banpang
Plapak
Ponesawan
Renunakorn
Wanornniwas
Kudbak
Koksisupan
Kusuman
Taongoi
Kamtakla
Chareonsin
Banmuang
Paarchanban
Paarchanphun
Pungkone
Ponnakeaw
Waritpum
Songdao
Akartamnoui
Kangkor
Kasetsombun
Bamnetnarong
Kornsawan
Pukieu
Kornsan
Nongbuadang
Chasturas
Bankewa
Tepsatit
Neonsanga
Bantan
Nongbuaraheal
Subyai
Kornburi
Kangsanamnang
Chakarat
Kamsakaesang
Kong
Suburban2
Tauten
Wangyang

Remote1

Nikomnamun

Pakdichumpon

Somdetya_my

Remote2

HR

Province
Urban

9

Suburban1

Suburban2
Chumpoung
Dankuntod
Buayai
Patai
Sikew
Sungneon
Kamtalaysor
Chalermpakiet
Nonetai
Nonesung

Buriram

Pakonechai
Lampaimas

Puttaisong
Lahansai
Sateuk
Kasang
Huairat

Surin

Sangca

Tatum
Ratanaburi
Sikarapum
Kewasirin
Chompa

Nakornratchasima
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Hospitals
Rural
Nonedang
Banleaum
Patongkam
Lamtameinchai
Wangnamkiew
Seangsang
Nongbunnak
Huaitalang
Bualai
Teparak
Sida
Cumuang
Candong
Chalermpakiet
Chamni
Napoe
Nonesuwan
Bankruad
Banmaichaipot
Pacam
Pubplachai
Nongki
Nonghong
Bandan
Kabcheang
Chumponburi
Buached
Sanom
Samrongtab

Remote1

Nonedindang

Panomdongrak

Remote2

HR

Province
Urban

9

Surin

10

Mukdahan

Suburban1

Yasotorn

Kantararak
Rasisalai
Utumpornpisai

Ubonratchatani

Pibunmansahan
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Sisaket

Hospitals
Rural
Nonenarai
Sinarong
Nikomkamsoi
Kamchaee
Dontan
Wanyai
Leangnokta
Kudchum
Saimoon
Korwang
Patew
Kamkeankeaw
Mahachaichana
Thaichareon
Kukun
Kantrarom
Kunhan
Buengbun
Yangchumnoi
Bencharak
Payu
Prangku
Poesisuwan
Pribueng
Wanghin
Sirattana
Huaitabtan
Silalad
Takanpeadpon
Kudkaopun
Kuangnai
Kemmarat
Laosuaukok
Kongcheam
Donmoddang
Tansum
Tungsiudom
Moungsamsib
Simuangmai
Samrong
Sirintorn
Natan
Suburban2
Lamduan

Remote1

Remote2

Dongluang
Nongsung

Namkliang
Nonekoon
Pusing
Muangchan

Namyean
Buntarik
Poesai

Nachaluai

HR

Province
Urban

10

Suburban1

Ubonratchatani

Amnartchareon

11

Chumporn

Hospitals
Rural
Nayia
Namkun
Nayia
Lueamnart
Patumratwongsa
Pana
Senangkanikom
Huatapan
Lungsuan
Tungtaco
Patew
Paknamlungsuan
Paknamchumpor Tasae
n Sawee
Mabammarit
Lamae

Suburban2
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Nakornsitammar
at

Tasala
Pakpanung
Ronpibul

Chawang
Chienyai
Promkiri
Lansaka
paprom

Surattani

Kanchanadit
Tarongchang
Bannasan
Wiengsa

Tachang
Punpin

Kanom
Chulaporn
Chauad
Tungyai
Nabon
Huasai
Portanklai__
Chalerm_
Nobpitam
Kiriratniyom
Kiensa
Chaiya
Donsak
Tachana
Bantakun
Bannaderm

Remote1

Chanuman

Patoh

Tampannara
Bangkun
Pipoon

Kopangan
Chaiburi
Wipawadi

Remote2

HR Province
Urban
11

Suburban1

Suburban2

Surattani
Krabi

Kaopanom
Neauklong
Aoleuk

Pangnga

Takuatung
Tubpud

Phuket

225

Pattalung

Kuankanun

Kaochaison
Bangkeaw
Pabon
Papayom
Sinakarin

Trang

Huaiyod

Kantrang
Nayong
Yantakao
Sikao

Naratiwat

Remote1

Remote2

Kolanta
Kopipi

Kaponchaipat
Taimuangchaipat
Bangsai

Kuraburichaipat Koyaochaipat

Kaburi
Kaper
Tamoad
Pakpayoon
Sibunpot

Laun
Suksamran
Kongrha

Patong
Talang

Ranong
12

Hospitals
Rural
Panom
Prasang
Klongtom
Plaipaya
Lamtub

Palien
Ratsada
Wangwiset
Hadsamran
Ranhae
Lueseau
Yinhor

HR Province
Urban
12

Suburban1

Suburban2

Hospitals
Rural

Remote1

Naratiwat

Pattani
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Yala

Songkla

Ranode
Singhanakorn

Klonghoikong
Kuannien
Namom
Bangglum

Tepa
Chana
Kasaesin
Somdet_rachini

Remote2
Chanae
Cheairong
Takbai
Bachea
Wang
Sisakorn
Sukkirin
Sungaipadi
Kapor
Kokpoe
Tungyangdang
Panare
Mayor
Maelan
Maikan
Yarang Yaring
Saiburi
Nongchik
Krongpinang
Kabang
Tantoe
Bannangsata
Yaha
Raman
Sabayoi

HR Province
Urban
12

Suburban1

Suburban2

Songkla

Satun

Langu
Kuandone
Tapae

Hospitals
Rural
Padangbesa
Rattapum
Satingpa
Sadao
Kuankalong
Manang

Remote1

Tungwa

Note: Black letter are the unchanged areas, Blue letter are the changed areas, Brown letter are the new areas.

Remote2
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APPENDIX C
THE TOP 25 PROVINCES WHERE EARN THE HIGHEST REVENUE IN 2013
Provinces
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Nontaburi
Songkla
Patumtani
Rayong
Surattani
Phuket
Chonburi
Chiangmai
Nakornratchasima
Samutprakan
Khonkan
Prachaupkirikan
Nakornsitammarat
Nakornpathom
Udontani
Nakornsawan
Samutsakorn
Ubonratchatani
Trang
Lampang
Chiangrai
Pitsanulok
Petburi
Saraburi
Ayuthaya

Sum of Revenue
(Million Baht)
562.78
466.02
455.05
372.45
325.44
313.97
262.66
251.33
213.38
207.53
181.59
154.57
139.72
137.11
132.03
125.87
124.91
118.47
104.30
100.26
92.11
86.96
84.54
82.44
81.47
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District

Hatyai

Pattaya

Huahin

Chaum

